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Foreword
For the past five years, I have been intrigued by the question: what consti-
tutes legal knowledge? In finding my way in the domains of positive law and 
jurisprudence – a rather difficult task given my non-legal background – my 
journey was considerably shortened by the many helpful comments and useful 
advice offered by various people. Although I now dare to claim that I have some 
sense of what the law is and of what a practitioner of law does, I do not wish 
to pretend that I know what constitutes legal knowledge. In the thesis I have 
introduced many possible distinctions for legal knowledge, and consequently I 
should know about knowing the law. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise 
the fact that my answer to the question ‘what constitutes legal knowledge?’ is: I 
really, really do not know. Thus, a person who tries to find a single definition of 
legal knowledge in this thesis, will do so in vain.
 Writing a thesis is, by itself, a solitary activity – it is so, at least, in such disci-
plines as philosophy and law. However, I wrote mine in an environment that of-
fered the necessary relief and the opportunity to put things into perspective: the 
department of law and computer science, part of the Faculty of Law in Leiden. 
After five years, I cannot imagine that I would have been able to finish a Ph.D. 
thesis in a place not offering the unique mixture of melancholy, interdisciplinary 
research and Friday-afternoon drinks. Within the practical and formal limits 
imposed on expressing one’s gratitude in the foreword of a thesis, I would like 
to thank the following people: Jaap Hage, who made an effort in convincing me 
to study legal philosophy instead of only epistemology, Franke van der Klaauw, 
who provided urgent mental care in many cases, and introduced me to experts 
who proved to be important to my research project, and, of course, my parents, 
whose continuing support was essential during the research project.
Laurens Mommers
Leiden, April 23, 2002
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 Introduction
The current thesis is the result of a research project into legal knowledge rep-
resentation. The research project started out as an investigation into the pos-
sibility of translating conceptual specifications of the legal domain into formal 
ones, using the language of situation semantics developed by Barwise and Perry 
(1983). It stands in the tradition of the development of general conceptual and 
formal specifications of the legal domain in the Leiden department of law and 
computer science (currently the Center for eLaw at Leiden). Starting with the 
challenging work by Van den Herik (1991), who, among other things, pointed 
out what factors complicate knowledge representation in the legal domain, the 
tradition was set with the work by Van Kralingen (1995) and Visser (1995), who 
built a conceptual model of the law and a formal model of the law respectively. 
Oskamp (1998) took a different, practically oriented viewpoint, modelling the 
elements relevant to determining a sentence in several domains within penal 
law. 
. The research lines
The research described in this book can be regarded as a follow-up to Van 
Kralingen’s, Visser’s and Oskamp’s work, although it does not describe the re-
lation between conceptual and formal models of law, as originally intended. 
Instead, it focuses on the relation between conceptual models of the law and 
a branch of research previously practised at the Leiden department by Hage 
(1987). He developed a view on the legal domain that can be characterised ret-
rospectively as an ontology of law, based on legal-theoretical and general philo-
sophical insights. Hage’s thesis is mainly about philosophy, but it clearly provides 
handles for modelling activities in the legal domain. 
 Thus, the current work arises from two different strands of research: first, the 
research into ontologies of law by the ai-and-law community, and second, the 
research into the structure of the legal domain by the legal-philosophical com-
munity. At the intersection of these two strands, it focuses on the concept of 
knowledge in the ai-and-law community. This concept is used in such phrases 
as ‘legal knowledge representation’, and its meaning is often taken for granted. 
In my view, in this context, the concept of knowledge deserves more attention 
for two reasons. First, the phrase ‘legal knowledge representation’ often refers to 
the representation of elements of the legal domain, and relations between these 
elements, rather than to knowledge about these entities and relations. Second, 
scrutinising the concept of knowledge can yield valuable insights, that may help 
to build useful legal knowledge-based systems.
. Three perspectives
For the reasons mentioned above, I elaborate on the role that the concept of 
knowledge plays in the legal domain. I do so from three perspectives: from 
general epistemology, from legal theory, and from ai and law. From the first 
perspective, I address the questions how knowledge is acquired, what it is about, 
and how it is justified. From the second perspective, I discuss the specific char-
acteristics of legal knowledge. From the third perspective, I discuss the role the 
concept of knowledge plays in legal knowledge representation. By their nature, 
these subjects are strongly connected with the question what knowledge is 
about. With regard to the legal domain, this is the subject matter of the philo-
sophical discipline called legal ontology. 
 Legal ontology scrutinises the existence of legal entities, such as rules, norms, 
and legal institutions, and the dependencies between these entities. Together, 
legal epistemology and legal ontology can provide an integrated view on the le-
gal domain, thus facilitating the representation of knowledge. However, among 
those who practise legal epistemology and legal ontology, there is little consen-
sus on what justifiable claims can be made within these disciplines. Moreover, 
prior to making such claims, one has to develop a general view on the law, and 
such attempts have been manifold (natural law theory, legal positivism etc.). A 
general view on the law inevitably comprises a view on the way in which the 
law can be known, and on the entities it consists of. Differences in the general 
views cause the lack of consensus on epistemological and ontological claims.
. A model of law
In the thesis, I build a model of law that leaves open the possibility of expressing 
different views on legal epistemology and legal ontology, thus avoiding to take 
a stance in the legal-philosophical debate prior to building the model. In this 
sense, the model developed may be called a ‘meta-ontology’ of law – it allows 
for different views on what knowledge in the legal domain actually amounts 
to. To attain this, different ontological status layers and different epistemic roles 
are distinguished. The ontological status layers allow for different views on the 
existence of the law, and the epistemic roles allow for expressing different views 
on what knowledge amounts to in the legal domain.
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 Knowledge, I claim, may be regarded as the mark of a quality stamp. It is a 
mark of approval; it says that a belief or a skill conforms to a set of criteria, and 
that it deserves to be called ‘knowledge’ for that reason. The applicable set of 
criteria depends on the type of entity that we wish to qualify as knowledge, 
and the context in which we encounter that entity. For instance, if we wish to 
qualify a belief about the whereabouts of a suspect as knowledge, we may de-
mand that this belief is true. However, if we wish to qualify a belief about the 
value of a piece of circumstantial evidence as knowledge, we demand that this 
belief is justified rather than true. Knowledge is a value predicate, a way to ex-
press the worthiness of an entity. Representing knowledge thus requires to make 
explicit the criteria by which the represented entities deserve their qualification 
as knowledge. 
 These criteria may apply to the acquisition, object and justification of knowl-
edge. Thus, they do not only concern the content (object) of knowledge, but 
also the sources of knowledge (acquisition), and the reasons there are to believe 
its content (justification). Together, the criteria provide a framework for assess-
ing whether to assign the quality mark. What is more, they provide valuable 
additional information on represented knowledge. For that reason, the concept 
of knowledge is useful, even if its meaning does not conform to the traditional 
view of having one set of criteria that determines all possible instances of the 
concept. 
. Problem definition and research questions
Having more insight into the nature of the concept of legal knowledge improves 
the quality of knowledge representation in the legal domain and provides more 
depth to the use of such phrases as ‘legal knowledge representation’. Ideally, this 
phrase induces the distinction between the legal domain itself, knowledge about 
the domain, and the model in which the domain and the knowledge about the 
domain are represented (see figure 1.1).
(2) knowledge about the 
legal domain
(1) the model represents: 
- knowledge about the 
   domain
- the domain itself
→
↑↓
→ (3) the legal domain
Figure 1.1. Distinction between model, knowledge and domain
i nt roduc t i on
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In most existing models of law, there is no clear distinction between knowledge 
about the legal domain on the one hand, and the legal domain itself on the 
other hand, or there is focus on only one of the two elements. In this thesis, I 
attempt to explain the role knowledge plays with respect to the legal domain. 
The problem definition for this thesis is as follows: 
What role can a concept of legal knowledge, formulated from the perspec-
tive of epistemology, play in the representation of legal knowledge? 
Knowledge about the legal domain may play two roles: as the object of a model 
of the legal domain (represented by the arrow between boxes 1 and 2 in figure 
1.1), and as a potential part of the legal domain (because of the mutual depend-
ence between knowledge about the legal domain and the legal domain itself, 
represented by the arrow between boxes 2 and 3 in figure 1.1).
 The goal of the research is to develop an ontology of law that takes into 
account the concept of knowledge formulated as an answer to the problem 
definition. An ontology specifies what elements and relations we can find in the 
legal domain. It may form the basis for the representation of legal knowledge in 
computer systems. The desired effect of building an ontology is to reduce the 
representation effort that occurs each time when new knowledge is added to a 
system. Thus, an ontology is a framework in which a specific model (box 1 in 
figure 1.1) can be constructed. As a consequence of incorporating the concept 
of knowledge, the resulting ontology caters for the need to express relevant 
characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain. 
 The research questions that follow from the problem definition focus on four 
themes: general epistemology, legal epistemology, legal ontology, and knowledge 
representation. Four corresponding research questions are investigated: 
(1) What are the characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain, given 
the viewpoint of general epistemology?
(2) What are the characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain, given 
the viewpoint of legal epistemology?
(3) What characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain are useful as 
constituents for a model of the legal domain?
(4) How can this ontology of law be used to represent knowledge about the 
domain of Dutch penal law?
The first question serves to reveal the characteristics that constitute knowledge 
about the legal domain. These characteristics are classified according to the dis-
tinction between acquisition, object, and justification of knowledge. The second 
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
18
i nt roduc t i on
19
question serves to identify the limits of legal knowledge specification from the 
perspective of legal philosophy: what epistemic claims can be derived from dif-
ferent views on the law? The third question initiates a search for the elements 
that can be distinguished in the legal domain on the basis of relevant distinctions 
and characteristics applying to knowledge about the legal domain. A knowledge 
characteristic may shift to a constituent of the model because knowledge about 
the legal domain can reveal structural features of the domain itself. The fourth 
question is answered by the specification of a knowledge-based ontology of 
law. In this ontology, different existence claims and knowledge claims can be 
expressed, thus enabling to incorporate legal epistemology and legal ontology in 
the field of legal knowledge representation. 
. The structure of the thesis
The structure of the thesis follows the research questions outlined above. In 
chapter 2, to answer the first research question, I discuss the question what 
knowledge is from an epistemic point of view. I deal with some basic distinc-
tions in the theory of knowledge. First, I shed light on three dimensions of 
knowledge: its acquisition, its object and its justification. Second, I discuss the 
distinction between doxastic and non-doxastic theories of knowledge, and 
between internalist and externalist theories of knowledge. Third, several types 
of beliefs and knowledge about the legal domain are discussed, based on their 
origination sources. Fourth, the phenomenon of an epistemic niche is used to 
explain the situation in which legal professionals acquire knowledge. By discuss-
ing these topics, I provide an answer to the first research question about the 
characteristics of legal knowledge from a general epistemic viewpoint.
 In chapter 3, in accordance with the second research question, I attend the 
same subject. However, the viewpoint will be a legal-theoretical one. I start the 
chapter with a discussion of the intertwinement of the knowing subject (the 
person who has knowledge) and the known object (the thing he knows some-
thing about) in hermeneutical theories of law. Other views on knowing the law, 
derived from stances in legal philosophy, are discussed as well, among which 
natural law, legal positivism, and institutional theories of law. In addition, formal 
and material sources of law, and knowledge sources for the law are discussed. 
By discussing these topics, I provide an answer to the second research question 
about the characteristics of legal knowledge from a legal-epistemic viewpoint.
 In chapter 4, I deal with the issue of legal ontology. As an addition to the dis-
cussion of epistemic claims from the point of view of different legal-theoretical 
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stances in chapter 3, I give an overview of ontological claims from these stances. 
Furthermore, I discuss in depth two objects of legal knowledge: systematisa-
tions and interpretations, as well as the elements that are part of the reasoning 
process that leads to establishing these objects. A detailed discussion of differ-
ent modes of existence follows. Finally, two basic relations in the legal domain 
(namely counting as and causation) are dealt with. This chapter helps to provide 
an answer to the third research question, because a discussion of ontological 
approaches to the law enables me to explain how epistemology interferes with 
ontology in the current domain. 
 In chapter 5, the representation of legal knowledge is discussed. This chapter 
consists of three parts. The first part deals with the concept of representation. 
The second part is about meaning and reference, discussing the way in which 
classic views on meaning can be applied to legal concepts. The third part dis-
cusses three ontologies of law by listing prior work in the conceptualisation of 
the legal domain. Meaning can be an object of representation, as the meaning 
of an entity (for instance the meaning of a word) clarifies what role that entity 
plays. Making explicit meanings and representing them may thus enable a richer 
representation in information systems.
 In chapter 6, a knowledge-based model of the law is presented, based on 
chapters 2 through 5. An answer to the fourth research question is given by 
describing a model that consists of entities, ontological status layers, epistemic 
roles, relations, acts and facts. The categories distinguished are clarified and, 
where necessary, further divided into subtypes. The model accommodates dif-
ferent concepts of knowledge, and different views on the ontology of law. 
 In chapter 7, I discuss central notions within Dutch penal law in order to have 
sufficient background information for the application of the knowledge-based 
model in chapter 8. For this purpose, some basic principles of criminal proceed-
ings and penal law are discussed, as well as central notions of penal law, such as 
culpability and causality.
 In chapter 8, I combine the findings of the chapters 6 and 7. In this chapter, 
I represent characteristics of Dutch penal law in terms of the knowledge-based 
model of the law. A representation language is chosen for this purpose, and it 
is explained how the elements of the knowledge-based model of law are rep-
resented in this language. Furthermore, inference rules regarding knowledge 
qualification and reasoning are proposed and discussed.
 One final remark: wherever I use the pronoun ‘he’ (‘his’), I use the pronoun as 
an abbreviation of ‘he or she’ (‘his or her’).
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 Legal knowledge from a general epistemic viewpoint
For centuries, knowledge has been subject of a lively debate among philoso-
phers. What is knowledge?, How can we acquire knowledge?, and How can 
our knowledge grow? are three questions that are discussed in the philosophical 
discipline called epistemology. We can approach these questions in a normative 
manner. In this approach, we ask: what counts as knowledge?, what does it take 
to turn a mere belief into knowledge? The answer to these questions is given by 
an individual or a small group, arguing for certain choices on the criteria they 
deem necessary to qualify something as knowledge. The focus in this chapter 
is on the first research question, searching for the characteristics of knowledge 
about the legal domain from the viewpoint of general epistemology. 
 In section 2.1, I offer an analysis of the different dimensions in the question 
what knowledge is. I distinguish three dimensions: acquisition, object and justi-
fication. Then, in section 2.2, the meaning of these dimensions is analysed with 
respect to legal knowledge. Subsequently, in section 2.3, I discuss two relevant 
distinctions in the theory of knowledge: doxastic and non-doxastic theories, 
and internalist and externalist theories. In section 2.4, different knowledge cri-
teria are explained that can be attached to the dimensions that are discussed in 
sections 2.1 and 2.2. We may impose these criteria on mere belief in order to 
explain the difference between belief and knowledge. In section 2.5, I outline a 
typology of belief and knowledge. Knowledge qualification depends on the type 
of belief under scrutiny. In order to identify a particular belief or knowledge 
type, we have to know in what ways we can classify beliefs and knowledge. The 
classifications are listed in this section. Finally, in section 2.6, epistemic niches 
are discussed. These are (partially) controlled environments in which knowledge 
is acquired and processed. In this chapter, the above characteristics are used to 
explain in what manners we can scrutinise the concept of knowledge about 
the legal domain from a general epistemic viewpoint. In the next chapter, after 
I have discussed the characteristics of knowledge from a legal epistemic view-
point, the resulting two sets of characteristics are employed to develop a frame-
work for the characterisation of knowledge about the legal domain. 
. Dimensions of knowledge
The transition from belief to knowledge plays a major role in explaining the 
three dimensions of knowledge. By using criteria based on these dimensions, it 
is assessed whether a belief qualifies as knowledge. Only when it complies with 
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all applicable criteria, a belief may be called knowledge. Therefore, the three 
dimensions of knowledge are discussed relative to beliefs. The first dimension is 
acquisition: how is the belief acquired? A person can acquire a belief by differ-
ent routes, some of which deserve more trust than others (subsection 2.1.1). The 
second dimension is its object: what is the belief ’s object? A person’s belief has 
– supposedly – some kind of object; the belief is about something (subsection 
2.1.2). The third dimension is justification: how is the belief justified? A person 
can be justified in believing something. He can, for instance, have good reasons 
for his belief. Both acquisition and object belong to the so-called context of dis-
covery. The justification of a belief constitutes the context of justification (subsec-
tion 2.1.3). The three dimensions are discussed below.
.. Acquisition
A belief can be acquired from different sources. On a sunny Sunday morning, 
John acquires the belief that the sun is shining by looking out of the window. 
He learns from the Saturday newspaper that it will start raining before 2 pm. 
His daughter tells him that she watched the morning weather forecast on the 
weather channel, and that she learned it will not start to rain until the evening. 
Perception (looking out of the window) and testimony (reading the newspaper 
and listening to your daughter) are called belief sources (Audi 1998). A belief 
source is the process or phenomenon that a belief is based upon. A knowledge 
source is similar to that, except that in this case a piece of knowledge arises from 
the process or phenomenon. Audi (1998) distinguishes five sources of belief and 
knowledge: perception, memory, consciousness, reason, and testimony. I briefly 
discuss them below.
 This overview gives an idea of how we acquire beliefs. Extensive literature is 
available on most of these belief sources. An introduction is given in chapters 1 
through 5 in Audi (1998). First, through perception, beliefs are acquired about 
what we see, smell, taste, hear, and feel. In most (but not all) cases, our senses 
provide an accurate picture of the world we live in, and on the basis of that 
accurate information we form correct beliefs. Second, we may preserve this 
information for later use in our memory. When we recall beliefs stored earlier, 
or base new beliefs on whatever we stored earlier, we use memory as a source 
of belief. Third, sometimes, a person is conscious of what he is doing and of 
what he is thinking. This characteristic enables a person to reflect on what he is 
doing and thinking. These reflections are themselves a source of belief, called 
consciousness. Fourth, reason is a source of belief. Our intelligent skills enable us 
to produce beliefs that are not directly based on other sources, but whose truth 
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is somehow obvious to us, or can be proved, for example mathematical theses. 
Fifth, we can acquire beliefs on the basis of something other people tell us. We 
need not experience or prove everything ourselves, we may also base our beliefs 
on what other people, or products of other people, tell us. 
.. Object
Beliefs are generally about something. They reflect some view on how things 
relate to each other in reality. For instance, beliefs are about the weather, a book, 
or a judgement. In that case, the weather, book, or judgement forms the object of 
the belief. Beliefs differ in how they relate to objects. They vary in their degree 
of abstractness (an abstract belief about an arbitrary book from a library versus a 
concrete belief about the copy of this book you are holding). A belief is abstract 
when it generalises over individual objects; instead of referring to individual oc-
currences (tokens), it refers to object categories (types). A belief is concrete if it 
is connected with objects, i.e., if it refers to individual objects (tokens).
 The distinction between type and token deserves particular attention in the 
discussion of the object of belief. A type is a category of things or symbols. A 
token is a concrete specimen of a type. For instance, the previous sentence con-
tains one token of the type ‘concrete’, and you are probably holding a copy of 
this book, which is a token of the publication ‘Applied legal epistemology’. The 
object of belief is investigated in the philosophical discipline called ‘ontology’. 
Ontology makes claims regarding the existence of individual things (tokens) 
and categories of things (types), and the kind of existence they have.
 Ontological claims thus regard the nature of the object of belief. For instance, 
I can claim that the type ‘judge’ exists, or I can claim that a specific judge exists. 
Ontological claims may also vary according to the kind of existence they claim. It 
is an easy thing to claim that some object exists, but it is rather difficult, if not 
impossible, to say what existence amounts to. The kind of hard-boiled, physical, 
tangible existence of a rock is something quite different from the non-tangible, 
societal existence of the institution ‘court’.
 The distinction made between objects of belief is connected to the ontologi-
cal view adopted. If my ontological view is such that types exist, my beliefs can 
be about types. If universals do not exist, my beliefs can still be about them, but 
in that case these beliefs do not refer to universals. So I may use the word ‘book’ 
to refer to a type, without referring to an existing universal. Instead, we could 
assume that there are only the names of types (words like ‘book’), a position 
called nominalism. For a brief introduction to ontology and its claims, please 
refer to section 4.1.
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.. Justification
Justification amounts to those circumstances in which the content of some 
entity or behaviour is sufficiently defended. Such a defence can be given in an 
explicit way: in terms of reasons for the content of an entity, or a proof of the 
content of the entity. A defence can also be given in a rather implicit way, for 
instance by establishing a high chance that the belief is true. Justification thus 
consists of all those factors that make us believe something. Justification is found 
in several forms. There are different types of justification. The typology I give in 
this subsection is partly based on Audi (1998, p. 2-3), who distinguishes between 
justification as a state of a belief, as a state of a person, and as a process. 
 I distinguish three main types of justification: justification as a state, justifica-
tion as a process, and justification as a status. The first main type, justification as a 
state, is further divided into four subtypes. These are belief justification, personal 
justification, propositional justification (a proposition is an assertive sentence), 
and situational justification. The main types and subtypes of justification are 
summarised in table 2.1 and explained thereafter. 
state belief justification:
state of justification for a belief
personal justification:
state of justification for a person
propositional justification:
state of justification for a proposition
situational justification:
state of justification for a belief not held
process procedural justification:
process in which the justification is formed
status justification status:
justifying role of a certain entity with respect to another entity
Table 2.1. Justification types
Before listing the subtypes of justification as a state, I have to explain the dif-
ference between a belief and a proposition. A belief is a proposition within the 
reach of a propositional attitude. For instance, if the proposition is ‘2 + 2 = 4’, a 
corresponding belief might be: “I believe that ‘2 + 2 = 4’”, or “I hold that ‘2 + 2 
= 4’”, where the propositional attitudes are ‘I believe’ and ‘I hold’. A proposition 
is a sentence (in a natural or formal language). 
 Within the first main type of justification, there are four subtypes. (1) Belief 
justification is attained if certain criteria are met with respect to a specific belief. 
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The belief is, in other words, in the state of being justified. (2) Personal justifica-
tion occurs if a person is actually justified in having a belief, and he knows that 
he is in this state of justification. (3) Propositional justification occurs if there 
are sufficient reasons for justifying the proposition. If certain criteria are met 
with respect to a proposition, this proposition is in the state of being justified. 
(4) Situational justification occurs if a person has sufficient reasons to justify a 
certain belief, but nevertheless does not hold that belief. For instance, John has 
consulted the marriage register and read Mary’s name. However, he has not 
realised that this means that Mary is married. Thus, John would be justified in 
believing that Mary is married, but in fact, he does not believe that Mary is mar-
ried.
 The second main type of justification is justification as a process. A state of 
justification can, but need not be, the result of a successful process of justifica-
tion. Such a process may consist of exchanging reasons, or applying certain 
rules, or any series of acts that aims at accomplishing a state of justification. For 
instance, the different steps in a penal trial aim at (among other things) reaching 
a clear picture of the actual facts. The rules that govern this process let the dif-
ferent parties present and explain their stances, and by presenting the evidence 
and responding to each other, ideally relevant and true statements are made as a 
conclusion. 
 The third main type of justification is justification as the status of an entity. It 
refers to the justifying role an entity can play. For instance, a fact can be qualified 
as a reason, and then its justifying role is based on a status layer of the fact. In 
the example given above, the fact that Mary’s name is in the marriage register 
can be qualified as a reason for believing that Mary is married. Because it has 
the status of a reason, it performs a justifying role with respect to the belief that 
Mary is married.
 To attain a state of justification for a belief, we often need reasons. Reasons 
generally help us to support some belief. Some reasons, however, do the reverse: 
they attack a reason. Such reasons are called defeaters. Reasons and defeaters 
play an important role in the justification process, and in reaching a state of 
justification. Reasons do so by their justifying function towards conclusions (for 
instance a proposition or belief). Defeaters do so by attacking reasons and thus 
by decreasing the justification of a conclusion. The following discussion of rea-
sons and defeaters is based on Pollock (cf. Pollock 1974 and 1999). Reasons and 
defeaters play an important role in the discussion of legal knowledge in chapter 
3 and, consequently, in the ontology described in chapter 6.
 In Pollock’s (1999) discussion of reasons, a reason is a ground for a belief, 
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which can be either conclusive or non-conclusive. A conclusive reason entails 
its conclusion (the belief). For instance, the reason ‘three men ate poisoned fish’ 
logically entails the belief ‘two men ate poisoned fish’. A non-conclusive reason 
does not entail its conclusion. For example, the reason ‘Mark hates fish’ does not 
logically entail the conclusion ‘Mark did not eat the poisoned fish’. Still, it seems 
to support that conclusion. 
 A conclusive reason supports its conclusion because a conclusive reason en-
tails that conclusion logically. Non-conclusive reasons are inductive reasons and 
other (non-logical) grounds for belief (Pollock 1974, p. 36-39). Pollock (ibid.) 
claims that most reasons that matter (and are important for justification, and 
thus for epistemology) are non-conclusive reasons. These reasons, called prima 
facie reasons, can be defeated. This means that new information may force us to 
reject such reasons. The concept of ‘defeater’ is defined as follows (ibid., p. 38):
“If p is a reason for s to believe q, r is a defeater for this reason if and only if 
r is logically consistent with p and (p&r) is not a reason for s to believe q.”
The reason p only yields a justified belief q if there is no defeater r, that, in 
conjunction with p, would cancel the reason to believe q. There are two types 
of defeaters: rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters. A rebutting defeater is 
defined as follows (ibid., p. 38):
“If p is a prima facie reason for s to believe q, r is a rebutting defeater for 
this reason if and only if r is a defeater (for p as a reason for s to believe q) 
and r is a reason for s to believe ~q.”
In this case, r is just another reason. It has basically the same status as p, but its 
conclusion is opposite to the conclusion of p. For instance, if I believe that it is 
raining outside because I saw the weather forecast predicting rain for the next 
two hours, a rebutting defeater for that belief is that I do not see rain falling 
when I look out of the window.
 An undercutting defeater attacks the connection between the reason and the 
belief held as a consequence of the presence of that reason. An undercutting 
defeater is defined as follows (ibid., p. 39):
“If p is a prima facie reason for s to believe q, r is an undercutting defeater 
for this reason if and only if r is a defeater (for p as a reason for s to believe 
q) and r is a reason for s to deny that p would not be true unless q were 
true.”
An undercutting defeater need not attack the belief itself or the reason for it, 
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but rather the assumption that the reason is a reason for the belief. For instance, I 
assume that there is a reason for me to believe that I will be happy next week. 
The reason is that I have read a prediction of this in my horoscope. An opponent 
may attack the reason (I will be happy because the horoscope says so) instead of 
the conclusion (I will be happy). For a further discussion of reasons and defeat-
ers, see subsections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. For an account of how reasons and defeaters 
may be used to determine the degree of justification for a conclusion, cf. Pollock 
(2001).
 Having explained the different types of justification, and the way in which a 
state of justification can be attained by employing reasons and defeaters, I should 
stress that reasons also play a role in the other main types of justification. With 
respect to justification as a process (procedural justification), reasons constitute 
the main entity type governed by procedure (qua content and place in the pro-
cedure). Regarding justification as a status, reasons themselves carry a justifying 
status. To untie justification in general and justification purely based on reasons, 
I separate the two in the discussion of legal knowledge criteria (section 2.4). 
We find justification in general in the joint forces of three knowledge criteria: 
proper justification, reliability, and coherence. Justification based on reasons is 
found in the proper justification criterion. 
. Legal knowledge
The differences between regular knowledge (knowledge about the observable 
world) and legal knowledge can be traced back to the three dimensions of 
knowledge distinguished in the previous section. The acquisition (subsection 
2.2.1), object (subsection 2.2.2), and justification (subsection 2.2.3) of legal be-
lief are different from those of regular belief. Regular knowledge, the domain 
of traditional epistemology, is often acquired through perception, is often about 
tangible objects, and has justification demands matching with its acquisition, 
whereas legal knowledge is often acquired through testimony and interpreta-
tion, is about intangible objects, for instance institutions and norms, and imposes 
justification demands that conform to the acquisition of knowledge about those 
intangible objects. Below, I provide an overview of these differences. 
.. Acquisition
Although legal knowledge may arise from the same sources as regular knowl-
edge, the focus is somewhat different. In subsection 2.5.2, I elaborate on sources 
relevant for acquiring legal belief. For the moment, I focus on specific sources of 
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legal belief and knowledge, i.e., sources that are classified because of their con-
tent rather than by the acquisition method employed. These are the so-called 
knowledge sources for the law. In order to explain what knowledge sources for 
the law are, I start to elaborate on two different types of sources of law: formal 
and material sources of law. Subsequently, I explain what knowledge sources for 
the law are, and finally, I clarify to what extent sources of law (formal and mate-
rial sources of law) can be qualified as knowledge sources for the law. 
 There are two types of sources of law: formal sources of law and material sourc-
es of law. Formal sources of law are, according to Algra and Van Duyvendijk 
(1989, p. 19), the sources of positive law itself. These are statute law, treaties, and 
legal precedents (ibid.). Customary law is often also considered a formal source 
of law. Material sources of law are the origination sources of law, i.e., those fac-
tors that contributed to the drafting and interpretation of positive law. Material 
sources of law themselves cannot be reduced to legal rules or legal norms. They 
form, however, the grounds for those rules and norms. For instance, as soon as a 
judge has made a decision in a case, and he has based his decision partly on the 
consequences his decision will have for the social structure (socioeconomic de-
velopments constitute a material source of law), he establishes a verdict (a legal 
precedent is a formal source of law). 
 Algra and Van Duyvendijk (1989, p. 20) distinguish the following material 
sources of law: political powers, civil servants, pressure groups, religious beliefs, 
moral beliefs, socioeconomic developments, geographical circumstances, and 
technological developments. The importance of this enumeration is that mate-
rial sources of law are indeed the external factors relevant to the origination and 
interpretation of the law. Material sources of law, such as moral beliefs and tech-
nological developments, have an impact on both the content of law and on the 
way in which the content of law is understood. 
 Knowledge sources for the law are the sources through which we acquire 
knowledge about the law. Acquiring (explicit) knowledge about the law re-
quires us to know two properties of the law: its content and its validity. Knowl-
edge about the two properties is acquired in different manners for different 
legal-philosophical stances. In a legal-positivist stance, formal sources of law 
largely coincide with valid law. Thus, if one acquires knowledge of the formal 
sources of law, one will acquire knowledge of both the content and the validity 
of law. In a natural-law stance, however, this is not necessarily the case; the va-
lidity of law is also determined by principles that are not part of the system of 
positive law, and thus are not part of the formal sources of law. In such a stance, 
knowledge about the content of positive law is derived from the formal sources 
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of law, but knowledge about the validity of positive law is partly derived from 
principles outside positive law. 
 In legal-positivist and natural-law stances, knowledge about the content and 
validity of the law may also be derived from material sources of law. Material 
sources of law are helpful in interpreting the content of formal sources of law. 
Thus, sources of law (both formal sources of law and material sources of law) 
can function as knowledge sources for the law. However, their precise role may 
differ, depending on the legal-philosophical view of the law taken.
.. Object
The main difference between the object of legal knowledge and the object of 
regular knowledge, is that the object of legal knowledge largely consists of in-
tangible institutions and entities, which brings about the danger of a confusion 
of the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself. I discern two categories 
within the object of knowledge about the legal domain. The first object cat-
egory is legally-relevant, the second object category is legal. 
 The objects within the first category are situations in the world that are rel-
evant for the legal domain, i.e., entities, facts, acts, and practices that have not 
(yet) got assigned a legal status. The objects within the second category are situ-
ations in the world that are part of the legal domain, i.e., entities, facts, acts, and 
practices that have been assigned a legal status. For instance, the object category 
of knowledge about the fact that John hit a pedestrian with his car is not legal. 
However, the object category becomes legal whenever the fact has the assigned 
legal status of criminal negligence. The fact that an object of knowledge is legal 
need not mean that the knowledge itself is legal. Neither does the fact that an 
object of knowledge is legally-relevant imply that the piece of knowledge it-
self is legally-relevant. That depends on the content of the piece of knowledge 
itself. For instance, knowledge about hitting a pedestrian with a car as criminal 
negligence may count as a piece of legal knowledge if it concerns the legal con-
sequences of that fact.
 The confusion of knowledge with the object of knowledge starts where the 
object of knowledge is more or less intangible, and the result of reasoning, in-
terpretation, or an artifact resulting from social conventions. Whereas it is easy 
to distinguish the situation that John hits a pedestrian from the belief ‘John hits 
a pedestrian’, it is somewhat harder to distinguish an interpretation from a be-
lief about that interpretation. The reason for this is that interpretations are not 
objects in the same way as we can regard, for instance, toys as objects: we cannot 
hold, feel, and look at interpretations from different angles (i.e., not literally), 
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whereas in the case of toys, we can. We construct interpretations ourselves, and 
by doing this we ‘make’ knowledge. At the same time we add something to the 
world: a new interpretation, a new object of our knowledge. A further elabora-
tion on the object of knowledge about the legal domain is given in chapter 4, 
that deals with the subject matter of ontology.
.. Justification
In the current subsection, I discuss legal examples of the three justification 
types distinguished in subsection 2.1.3: justification as a state, as a process, and 
as a status. After that, I discuss sources from which we can derive the content 
and structure of justification. Subsequently, I explain the analogy between the 
justification of legal decisions and the justification of legal belief. Finally, on the 
basis of my findings on these matters, I explain how justification of legal belief 
can be typified.
 All three justification types distinguished in subsection 2.1.3 are found in the 
legal domain. Some of the instances of the types are actually institutionalised in 
the law. An example of justification as a state is the legitimate character of evi-
dence (which is attained by acquiring evidence in a lawful manner). An example 
of justification as a process is the application of parts of civil procedural law, 
which guide two parties in exchanging arguments. An example of justification 
as a status is the legitimising force a piece of evidence exerts towards a conclu-
sion (e.g., evidence for finding a suspect guilty). From these examples, we can 
derive the main characteristic of justification with respect to legal belief. Basi-
cally, justification of legal belief is based on sources of law. In many cases, this 
means that it is rule-governed, i.e., procedural rules determine in what cases 
justification as a state, process or status occurs. The legitimate character of evi-
dence arises from the lawful application of legal rules regarding the gathering 
of evidence. The legitimate character of a civil trial partly arises from following 
the applicable rules of procedure. The legitimising force a piece of evidence 
exerts towards a conclusion may also arise from legal rules regarding the role of 
evidence. Of course, this is only valid insofar as the legal system concerned is 
rule-based, such as the Dutch one is to a certain extent.
 Justificatory material in the legal domain is raised from several sources, dis-
tinguished by their content. I list the typology of Aarnio (1987, p. 123-131) as 
an example of the classification of justification material. He lists six sources of 
justification: (1) the law text itself, (2) the process that led to the accomplish-
ment of the law text (‘traveaux préparatoires’), (3) systemic interpretation in 
accordance with the legal system (coherence criteria), (4) court decisions (case 
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law), (5) doctrinal opinion (legal literature), and (6) practical reasons (goal-di-
rected reasoning). Their justificatory nature is given by a legal tradition that also 
determines the prevalence of one source over another. Distinct legal systems 
may emphasise different sources of justification. In continental legal systems, 
emphasis is on legal rules. In Anglo-Saxon systems, past decisions (case law) are 
stressed. 
 Justification in the sense of the legitimisation of a legal decision is analogous 
to justification as a knowledge criterion. The legitimisation of a legal decision 
may add to its classification as knowledge. If a legal decision is sufficiently le-
gitimised, the reasons given in that legitimisation may serve as a way to justify 
the belief about the decision. The legitimisation of the decision serves justice, the 
justification of the belief about the decision serves truth. The presence of legiti-
mising reasons constitutes the rationality of a decision, helping it to be accept-
able for the parties involved, thus helping it to be just. The presence of the same 
reason may to a certain degree help us to establish the truth of a belief about the 
decision: having good reasons available for a certain decision makes it plausible 
that the decision was indeed made, and thus, that the belief about it is true. Of 
course, this is only valid if we deem the person who makes the decisions capable 
of providing good reasons.
 I distinguish two general features of justification in the legal domain. The first 
feature relates to the content of justification, the second comprises the structure 
of justification. The content of justification concerns the substantial reasons 
given for a legal proposition or a belief. This part of justification is based on the 
actual meaning of justifying entities, such as reasons and defeaters. The fact that 
some reason is a justifying reason for a proposition or a belief depends on its 
content, not on its structural features alone. Whether such a reason has a justify-
ing content is to be assessed through the context in which it is used, the relevant 
facts, the content of both the reason and the proposition or belief it supports.
 The structure of justification concerns the way in which reasons are handled 
and judged in order to assess whether the state of justification is attained. The 
structure of justification may be procedural or non-procedural. If structural jus-
tification is procedural, the occurrence (or the non-occurrence) of a resulting 
state of justification depends on the outcome of a process of exchanging argu-
ments. The process is subject to a set of rules, which should help in developing 
a satisfactory defence of some stance. Procedural law comprises many rules that 
regulate the way in which statements and decisions are legitimised, and thus, it 
functions as a means to regulate procedural features of justification. If the struc-
ture of justification is non-procedural, it is static. A static justification structure 
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is, for instance, an inference scheme (deduction or induction). Such a structure 
does not require an exchange of arguments, just the filling in of the variables in 
the inference scheme. 
justification 
features
content of justification:
the content of justifying entities (for instance, the content of reasons 
and defeaters)
structure of justification:
- the form of a justifying structure (non-procedural)
- the form a justifying procedure (procedural)
justification 
content 
sources
material sources of law:
political powers, civil servants, pressure groups etc. (cf. subsection 
2.2.1)
formal sources of law:
legal rules, case law, treaties, and customary law (cf. subsection 2.2.1)
justification 
structure 
sources
material sources of law:
inference schemes (for instance deduction or induction, legal 
reasoning methods)
formal sources of law:
legal rules, case law, treaties and custom regarding procedure (cf. 
subsection 2.2.1)
Table 2.2. Content and structure of justification in the legal domain
state content features:
the content of the reasons leading to the state of justification
structural features:
the entity with respect to which the state holds (for instance, a 
conclusion), and the conditions under which the state holds
process content features:
content of procedural rules and the content of concrete procedures (for 
instance, the content of reasons exchanged in a trial)
structural features:
the way in which procedural rules govern the process
status content features:
content of the entities involved (for instance, reasons and conclusions)
structural features:
the entities with respect to which the status holds (for instance, a 
reason has a justification status with respect to a conclusion)
Table 2.3. Content features and structural features of three types of justification
In table 2.2, I give an overview of the sources of the content and structure of 
justification. In table 2.3, I provide an explanation of the content features and 
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
32
le gal  k nowle dg e  f rom  a  g e ne ral  e p i st e m i c  v i ew p o i nt
33
structural features of the three types of justification: justification as a state, as a 
process, and as a status.
. Two distinctions in the domain of epistemology
Epistemology is one of the philosophical disciplines that seem to require many 
distinctions in order to prove their own right to exist. Still, some of the distinc-
tions are useful in that they are the easiest way to show how a domain is struc-
tured. Next, we have to admit that, of course, those distinctions are really only 
vague at best, and at their worst they form a no man’s land where they remain 
untouched, unproved, and undefeated by rational discourse. As for other disci-
plines, distinctions are useful in epistemology to indicate the most important 
characteristics of divergent epistemic theories. Because many debates in phi-
losophy focus on details, such distinctions are convenient for establishing a bird’s 
eye view on epistemology. According to Pollock (1999), knowledge theories 
are currently classified along two main distinctions: doxastic versus non-doxastic 
theories (subsection 2.3.1), and internalist versus externalist theories (subsection 
2.3.2). Not only can these distinctions be employed to classify epistemic theories 
in this section, they will also serve to classify epistemic criteria in section 2.4. 
.. Doxastic and non-doxastic theories
Doxastic theories tell us that beliefs are ultimately justified by other beliefs. In 
doxastic theories, beliefs are related to each other to form a chain (a series of 
subsequent beliefs) or net (a structure of mutually related beliefs) of justification. 
A justification chain for a certain belief can be grounded by a final (basic) be-
lief. In a justification net, a certain belief is linked to other beliefs in a web-like 
form.
 Non-doxastic theories tell us that some external element plays a part, so that 
the justification of a belief can ultimately be given by something outside the 
realm of beliefs. In a non-doxastic theory one of the ways in which a justifica-
tion can be given is in terms of the reliability of the mechanism (e.g., human 
cognition) that acquires the belief. Non-doxastic theories fall into three main 
groups represented by direct realism, probabilism and reliabilism. These will be 
discussed in the next subsection, because, on their turn, non-doxastic theories 
are subject to the distinction between internalism and externalism.
 There are two main types of doxastic theories: coherentism and foundational-
ism (Pollock 1999, p. 22ff.). Coherentism says that a belief is justified by its place 
in a net of beliefs. The relations between beliefs determine whether one of them 
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is justified. All beliefs have the same justificatory status; there are no beliefs that 
deserve priority, qua justification power, over other beliefs. In foundationalism, 
however, the existence of such basic beliefs is presupposed. In such theories, 
they are claimed to be suitable for starting a justification chain. Foundationalism 
assumes that the chain of justification stops at one or more basic beliefs. These 
basic beliefs are beliefs founded on our perception of the external world. They 
should justify themselves, for if they do not, the chain of beliefs that is based 
upon them will not be justified. The status of basic beliefs differs from the status 
of other beliefs. Basic beliefs have priority over other beliefs, in that they can 
end a justification chain. To give some water-related metaphors again: coher-
entism is best represented by a fishing net: all nodes in the net are more or less 
equal, and the net derives its strength from those nodes. Foundationalism can be 
compared to a ship that has dropped its anchor, grounding it firmly in the sea 
floor.
.. Internalist and externalist theories
A different distinction of knowledge theories is made between internalist and 
externalist theories (Pollock 1999, p. 24-27). Internalist theories state that a justi-
fication is always given in terms of the internal states of a person. These internal 
states are present in our cognitive system, and they can be beliefs or signals from 
our senses. Not all signals we acquire through our cognitive system are con-
scious. Moreover, even if they are conscious, they need not yield explicit beliefs. 
Audi (1997, p. 12) adds to this that internalist theories claim accessibility of these 
internal states for introspection: the belief-justifying internal state is accessible 
for the person who has the belief.
 Foundationalism and coherentism are internalist theories (they are thus in-
ternalist and doxastic). An example of an internalist non-doxastic theory is direct 
realism. Direct realism is the view that some judgements about the world are not 
beliefs about that world, but that they are perceptual states, directly caused by 
the outside world (Pollock 1999, p. 87-88). Thus, there is no mediation of per-
ceptual judgements by so-called perceptual basic beliefs (which are presupposed 
by foundationalist theories).
 Externalism encompasses all views where elements other than mere beliefs 
and internal states are relevant to the justification process. So, if justification 
depends on the general reliability of one’s cognitive system, an externalist view 
is employed: the tendency of one’s cognitive system to yield correct beliefs is 
determined from an external perspective. Externalist theories do not adhere to 
the doxastic assumption because, ultimately, justification is not given in terms 
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of beliefs. Externalist theories evaluate cognitive procedures from an external 
perspective, so that forecasts can be made about the circumstances under which 
these procedures will yield reliable beliefs. Examples of externalist theories are 
probabilism and reliabilism. Probabilism explains epistemic justification in terms 
of the probability of the occurrence of individual beliefs, whereas reliabilism 
explains epistemic justification in terms of the general reliability of a cognitive 
mechanism that yields beliefs (ibid., p. 100-119). 
. Legal knowledge criteria
The distinctions I have discussed in the previous section served to classify dif-
ferent theories of knowledge. Legal knowledge criteria, the subject matter of 
the current section, serve to assess whether a belief can be classified as legal 
knowledge. Two distinctions discussed in the previous section (doxastic/non-
doxastic and internalist/externalist) help us establishing those criteria, because 
in answering the question how a certain theory of knowledge can be classified 
in terms of these two distinctions, we find an anchor for giving a more detailed 
account of justification in that theory. The term ‘justification’ is used here as a 
denominator for everything that adds to the degree in which a belief is sup-
ported. This is a broad concept of justification, and it will prove useful that this 
concept is subdivided into several knowledge criteria. 
 Under what conditions may we call something legal knowledge? This ques-
tion has been revived by Gettier (1963), who explained that the definition of 
knowledge as true justified belief needed revision. Knowledge criteria define 
conditions under which we can qualify an entity as knowledge. I discuss four 
criteria that may establish a qualification relation between a belief and a piece of 
knowledge. These criteria are truth (subsection 2.4.1), proper justification (sub-
section 2.4.2), reliability (subsection 2.4.3), and coherence (subsection 2.4.4). 
They regard the correspondence of a belief with a part of reality, the presence of 
satisfactory reasons for a belief, the reliability of the acquisition of a belief, and 
the conformity of a certain belief with other, related beliefs, respectively. Except 
for truth, the knowledge criteria add to the fulfilment of the broad concept 
of justification, i.e., if the criteria proper justification, reliability and coherence 
are fulfilled, this provides support for the conclusion that the broad concept of 
justification is fulfilled as well. The use of knowledge criteria for the evaluation 
of legal beliefs was discussed in Mommers (1999) and Mommers and Van den 
Herik (2000). In the former publication, it is also shown how such an evaluation 
framework can be used for the assessment of legal information systems.
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 Note that fulfilling knowledge criteria for a belief in order to qualify it as 
knowledge, is something different from qualifying a belief as a valid legal con-
clusion. In the former case, the correctness of the belief relative to its object is at 
stake. In the latter case, the assessment of criteria such as justice and coherence 
with the legal system is at stake. The two may coincide. The knowledge qualifi-
cation of a belief about the content of a legal decision can be constituted by the 
validity of the legal belief. The belief that the Supreme Court qualified electric-
ity as a good can be backed by showing that such a decision is just and coherent, 
although it can only be proved to be correct by showing the correspondence 
between the belief and the judgement.
.. Truth
‘Truth’ and ‘true’, as expressions of our daily language, refer to different phe-
nomena. For instance, if we say that we want to know the truth about the Bijl-
mer disaster, we mean that we want an accurate and complete description of the 
plane crash, of its causes, and of the events that followed it. If we assert that Van 
Thijn acted as a true leader after the disaster, we mean that he did what we think 
a leader should do under certain circumstances. In case we state that what Van 
Thijn said was true, we mean that he made a statement that corresponded to an 
actual event – provided that we regard truth as a semantic, non-epistemic crite-
rion. Semantic means that truth is a relation between sentences and reality. Non-
epistemic means that truth does not depend on knowledge; if we are absolutely 
convinced that some proposition is true, that does not mean it is true. Instead, 
truth depends on the actual agreement between a proposition and reality.
 If, however, we regard truth as an epistemic criterion, truth becomes a func-
tion of the presence of some form of justification for a belief. The truth of a 
belief then depends, for instance, on the presence of good reasons for that belief. 
As a consequence of identifying truth with some epistemic criterion, it easily 
becomes empty. So, for instance, when we identify truth with providing suffi-
cient reasons, we may as well drop the notion of truth. But if we make the truth 
of a belief dependent on the fulfilment of several different epistemic criteria, for 
instance proper justification and coherence, truth can be a useful predicate.
 Truth, understood as a non-epistemic criterion, is independent of our 
knowledge. It belongs to the realm of semantics. The non-epistemic versions of 
semantics describe the meaning of language in terms of the relation between 
language and reality. This means that the truth of a belief does not depend on 
the belief ’s relation with other beliefs. Instead, it only depends on the belief ’s 
relation with reality. The main non-epistemic truth criterion is correspondence 
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truth. This criterion says that for a sentence to be true, it should be in accord-
ance with a situation in reality. Thus, the truth of some sentence does not de-
pend on our opinion about its truth. The truth of a sentence can be postulated, 
but it can only be backed by giving reasons or proof for it, and never be proved 
unconditionally. To specify the notion of correspondence truth, I give a slightly 
abbreviated definition from Devitt (1991, p. 29) (the original definition is made 
dependent on types of sentences):
“Sentences [...] are true or false in virtue of: (1) their structure; (2) the refer-
ential relations between their parts and reality; (3) the objective and mind-
independent nature of that reality.”
The first part of this definition refers to the syntactic structure of the sentence 
under consideration. The second part concerns the referential relation between 
sentence parts and reality. The third part concerns the nature of reality: reality 
exists independent of what we believe about it. Together these elements mean 
that a sentence like ‘the cat is sitting on the mat’ is true whenever this sentence 
has the meaning that the cat is sitting on a mat, and there is indeed a cat sitting 
on a mat. The definition given does not include the existence of things and 
categories of things that are dependent on the mental. To put this constraint on 
correspondence truth is to exclude the possibility of determining the truth of 
sentences containing mind-dependent facts, for instance, ‘Bill thinks the judge 
made the wrong decision’. This is an unnecessary deficit. Why?
 The truth of a statement can also be established if it is about a human-con-
structed part of reality. So, after a soccer game, won by the Dutch team by 1-0, 
the statement ‘one goal was scored in this game by the Dutch team’ is true. To 
know this, we still have to employ epistemic means; after all, we see the goal be-
ing scored, or we hear the radio commentary, and thereby we draw conclusions 
about what happened and how the events are qualified. If the referee disallows a 
goal, it does not exist. Even with sentences about constructed reality, we have to 
know that reality before we can make (supposedly true) statements about it. 
 I adhere to an idealised semantic notion of truth, not to an idealised epistemic 
notion. This means that the question what is true is to a large degree independ-
ent from the question what can be justified. There are statements that we regard 
as true, but that are actually false. There are statements that we regard as false, 
but are actually true. The fact that there is no proof for a statement need not 
withhold us from leaving open the possibility of assigning a truth value to it. 
Moreover, if there is proof for a statement, we should reckon with the possibility 
that the statement is false after all.
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 An idealised, semantic notion of truth, as presented here, has a major disadvan-
tage. If we succeed in separating epistemic considerations from semantic ones, 
i.e., if we separate the relation between knowledge and reality from the relation 
between language and reality, our epistemology should preferably be such that 
it enables us to form correct beliefs about reality. Otherwise we would never be 
able to apply the concept of truth in real situations, i.e., we would never be able 
to say (with an acceptable degree of certainty) whether some statement is true 
or false. Therefore, we have to find some way of linking our epistemic evidence 
(in the form of reasons and a reliability measure) to a state-of-affairs as it is in 
the objective world. A realist epistemology enables us to do so. In a realist epis-
temology we may hold the assumption that we form true beliefs whenever they 
are sufficiently justified.
 In the legal domain, both epistemic and non-epistemic notions of truth play a 
part. For an extensive discussion of different conceptions of truth in this domain, 
I refer to Patterson (1996). Truth as correspondence is not very often considered 
a suitable criterion for application in the legal domain. For instance, Aarnio 
(1981) thinks that the question what is a just interpretation of a certain norm is 
a problem for correspondence. There are many interpretations possible for any 
norm, and correspondence truth seems to allow only one: the one that corre-
sponds to the norm. Correspondence truth needs, in other words, the doctrine 
of the one correct solution (ibid., p. 37). This doctrine states that for each norm, 
and each case to which it is applied, there is a correct interpretation. I elaborate 
on this in subsection 3.1.2. Aarnio’s proposal is to replace truth with acceptance. 
Acceptance is defined relative to some (legal) community: the whole group, or 
only some part of it, adheres to a norm or a value. 
 Niiniluoto (1981) criticises Aarnio’s rejection of correspondence truth. He 
says that Aarnio’s mistake is to regard acceptance and values as parts of the rela-
tion between norm propositions and legal order. Niiniluoto states that, instead, 
acceptance and values are part of social reality (ibid., p. 74). Norm proposi-
tions presuppose the existence of acceptance and values. Norm propositions are 
propositions about norms: given a certain norm (the state’s authority should 
be accepted), we can state something about that norm (‘the state’s authority 
should be accepted’ is a valid norm in The Netherlands). Norms are subject to 
acceptance. It thus becomes possible to determine the truth of norm proposi-
tions (i.e., statements about norms). To put it differently: acceptance and values 
are relative to an auditory, but the moment they are established, they are prone 
to correspondence truth. 
 The result of taking Niiniluoto’s stance is that, whereas we cannot say that 
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some value (the state’s authority should be accepted) is true or not, we can do so 
for a norm proposition (‘the state’s authority should be accepted’ is a valid norm 
in The Netherlands). This does, however, not solve the problem put forward by 
Aarnio. If, as Aarnio states, there are multiple interpretations possible for a norm, 
then we can state multiple norm propositions for a single norm. If these norm 
propositions are inconsistent with each other, they cannot all be true at the same 
time, in so far as we adhere to a correspondence notion of truth.
 Yet, even in parts of the legal domain, truth is non-epistemic. For the parts 
of this domain where we need an epistemic truth notion, such as acceptability, 
maybe we should not try to apply truth at all. After all, it would be best to model 
our conception of truth after the actual use of this word, preferably its use in the 
legal domain, while removing possible inconsistencies and clarifying the notion. 
Thus, for instance, the construal of truth as acceptability is only suitable if it fits 
in with the conception of truth in the legal domain.
 The larger part of the legal domain is constructed by human beings. How-
ever, entities in this part of reality often exist objectively, which means that 
truth remains non-epistemic: the truth of certain statements about such entities 
does not depend on our knowledge of those entities. The following example 
illustrates this. Assume that one day humanity ceases to exist. Assume that there 
is still a book, called ‘Truths about humanity’. It consists of a list of statements. 
One of these statements is: ‘In 1999, Dutch penal law said that killing a person 
on purpose counts as manslaughter’. The sentence is true. It will still be true if 
there is no human being to state that it is true and to justify it. It will still be true 
if some aliens land on earth, find the book, learn the language, find evidence (in 
other books), and regard the statement as true. Moreover, it will still be true if 
these aliens land on earth, find the wrong evidence, and think it is false. Thus, 
there remains a place for a correspondence notion of truth in the legal domain, 
even though parts of it are constructed by human beings.
 Therefore, I adapt the simplified version of Devitt’s (1991) notion of cor-
respondence truth to accommodate human-constructed facts (for instance the 
existence of a legal rule ‘killing a person on purpose counts as manslaughter’) in 
the following way:
A sentence is true or false in virtue of: (a) its structure; (b) the referential re-
lations between its parts and reality; (c) the objective nature of that reality.
In this definition, only part (c) is altered. In the original definition Devitt 
(ibid.) refers to the “objective and mind-independent nature of that reality”. 
The mind-independence demand is left out because it restricts the application 
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area of the correspondence truth criterion too much. To be able to apply the 
non-epistemic correspondence truth criterion we just need to guarantee that 
the parts of reality we are talking about are not true (or false) because we say 
they are true (or false), but because they have been established already when we 
state something about them. For instance, the establishment of such facts can be 
attained by institutional rules or by conventions.
 To return to the discussion between Aarnio and Niiniluoto: does the doctrine 
of the one correct solution coincide with the correspondence truth criterion, 
or: need there be one exclusive interpretation of some norm to be able to em-
ploy correspondence truth? Let us first determine what correspondence truth 
exactly applies to. Correspondence truth only applies to sentences (in either a 
formal or a natural language). Take some sentences s and t that are interpreta-
tions of a legal regulation l. The question is whether s is a true interpretation of l, 
whether t is a true interpretation of l, and whether both can be true interpreta-
tions of l. The application of the notion of correspondence truth depends on the 
establishment of interpretations of l. 
 From such a viewpoint, determining truth in the legal domain involves the 
comparison of statements with facts, just like truth in other contexts. Legal truth 
follows upon the establishment of facts, and these facts are established by certain 
qualified legal professionals. Thus, truth itself is not ‘human-made’, but the real-
ity it refers to is. One of the consequences of this is that the truth of two differ-
ent interpretations of a norm is determined by their consistency with the actual 
norm, that is part of reality. If two interpretations can be consistent with reality, 
they can both be true, if truth is an applicable criterion. 
 This is precisely the problem. To apply the notion of truth to interpretative 
beliefs means that we have to establish new objects (interpretations). If we pro-
vide sufficient reasons for the content of these interpretations, we may establish 
the truth of propositions about those interpretations. For instance, if a quali-
fied person, like a judge, rules in a case, and he justifies his verdict, he performs 
what Niiniluoto (1981) calls ‘truth-constituting argumentation’ (as opposed to 
‘truth-seeking argumentation’). In table 2.4, I give an overview of the situation 
in which there are two interpretations of a norm: a normative belief is formed 
about the norm. Subsequently, two interpretive beliefs are formed, either about 
the normative belief, or about the norm directly. The propositions that are based 
on these interpretative beliefs have a semantic relation with the norm, as well 
as with the interpretations that are established as objects on the basis of the in-
terpretive beliefs. The former relation is interesting; if we claim the existence of 
such a relation, then interpretive beliefs can be true or false.
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   object →
↓ level
norm interpretation 1 interpretation 2
ontological 
level
norm interpretation 1 interpretation 2
epistemic 
level
normative belief
reasons for belief
interpretive belief 1
reasons for belief 1
interpretive belief 2
reasons for belief 2
semantic 
level
norm proposition interpretive 
proposition 1
interpretive 
proposition 2
truth correspondence 
between norm 
proposition and norm
correspondence 
between interpretive 
proposition 1 
and norm, and 
between interpretive 
proposition 1 and 
interpretation 1
correspondence 
between interpretive 
proposition 2 
and norm, and 
between interpretive 
proposition 2 and 
interpretation 2
Table 2.4. Norm propositions and truth
Establishing an interpretative belief should be distinguished from establishing 
the truth of an interpretative belief. Moreover, the latter should be distinguished 
from the truth of a belief about that interpretative belief. Establishing an inter-
pretative belief is a human activity, sometimes supported by an argumentation 
process. Even though the possibility of establishing the truth of an interpretative 
belief may be denied, we can still make true statements about those beliefs.
.. Proper justification
Beliefs are justified in different ways, depending on their content and on their 
type. A belief can be justified by other beliefs, such as beliefs based on sensory 
evidence, beliefs based on the statement of another person, or by facts. The 
fact that the streets are dry could form a reason for me to believe that is has not 
rained. In as far as the justification of a belief (or some other entity, such as an act 
or a proposition) is given in terms of explicit reasons, I call it proper justification. 
Proper justification refers both to the act of giving reasons and to the state of 
being justified. If I give some reason for my belief, I am in the process of justi-
fying properly, and if I have sufficient reasons for my belief, the state of being 
justified properly is attained. A belief can be justified properly for one person 
while it is not for another. For instance, if I lack reasons for a belief, but a friend 
of mine has good reasons for a belief with the same content, he will be justified 
properly in his belief, whereas I will not be justified properly in my belief.
 Proper justification is central to knowledge about the legal domain, as such 
knowledge is often about entities that derive their existence from reasoning. 
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Reasoning comprises the arrangement or reasons in such a form that a con-
sistent argument structure results, and ideally, the proper justification criterion 
is fulfilled. In the description of proper justification in the legal domain, the 
focus is somewhat different from proper justification for regular knowledge. In 
traditional epistemology, proper justification is discussed mainly with respect to 
perceptual beliefs (cf. section 2.5). Proper justification in the legal domain also 
applies to other types of beliefs, such as interpretative beliefs (idem). For instance, 
if we need to interpret some law text, different sources of justification enter. 
Reasons in such a context may be based on material and formal sources of law 
(cf. subsections 2.2.1 and 3.3.1).
 Defining proper justification in a realistic way, that is, employing a criterion 
that can actually be used in real life, can be attained. The following example def-
inition of proper justification takes into account both reasons and defeaters (cf. 
subsection 2.1.3): there should be either a conclusive or a non-conclusive reason 
for a subject to believe a certain proposition p. Additionally, there should not be 
a defeater for this proposition, nor for the reason for the subject to believe that 
proposition.
 In this definition, some arbitrary choices are made with respect to the depth 
of justification. For instance, in some cases, one non-conclusive reason is hardly 
sufficient justificatory material to justify a certain belief. And if there are rea-
sons that are inconsistent with each other, how do we choose the right one? 
However, justifying a conclusion by giving a reason for it, and justifying these 
reasons by giving other reasons, and so on ad infinitum, does not fit in with our 
needs either. Therefore, a relatively arbitrary choice with respect to the depth of 
justification is necessary to apply the criterion in a sensible manner.
.. Reliability
The criterion of reliability mainly applies to perceptual beliefs (cf. section 2.5). 
The issue that induced the introduction of the reliability criterion is illustrated 
by the following example, drawn from Goldman (1976, p. 772-773), and para-
phrased in Audi (1993, p. 188). A person named Henry enters a district where, 
along the roads, barns made out of papier-mâché appear. However, Henry can-
not see the difference between real barns and fake ones. At the border of the 
district, he sees a barn, which is a real one. Now, Henry’s belief that he sees a 
barn is true and it is justified, but is it knowledge? Goldman says we are inclined 
to say it is not. The criterion that should be complied with is the reliability of 
a belief, which is defined by Goldman as follows. Given a certain belief, there 
should be no (potential) event that could cause the same belief, while that belief, 
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which is justified and true, is not a piece of knowledge. Thus, in case of Henry, 
there should be no papier-mâché barn on the route. If there is one, Henry could 
form a belief about a real barn on the same route (‘there is a barn right here’). 
He could be justified in believing it, and the belief would be true. But the belief 
would not be knowledge, because of the possible occurrence of an event that 
would prevent the belief from being transformed into knowledge. This criterion 
of reliability primarily concerns perceptual beliefs.
 Audi lists a number of subcriteria that determine whether a perceptual belief 
complies with the reliability criterion (Audi 1993, p. 17):
“1 the acuteness of the senses relevant to forming, sustaining, and confirm-
ing the belief;
2 the normality of their operation at the time;
3 the appropriateness of the perceptual circumstances to the content of the 
belief;
4 the normality of the perceiver’s responses to the sense(s);
5 the absence of a justified belief - or of justification for believing - that 
one or more of (1)-(4) fails to hold.”
In brief, these criteria amount to the following. Criterion (1) says that we 
should have the power to discriminate a certain fact. So if I claim that I see a 
barn, I should be in close distance to it. In that case I can discriminate it clearly 
from its surroundings, and do not mistake it with some other object (a barn fac-
simile). Criterion (2) says that our senses should operate properly. Hallucinations 
and optical illusions can disturb what we perceive. Criterion (3) says that our 
perception should be appropriate to the kind of belief it is supposed to sustain. 
This means that when we perceive a colour, the lighting should enable us to 
distinguish red from green. Criterion (4) says that a disturbance between the act 
of perceiving and the forming of a belief should not occur. While we see a red 
thing, we may not belief it is red, just because we are confused in some way. Cri-
terion (5) says that there should be no reason for us to believe that any of these 
problems occurs at the time (ibid., p. 201-202).
 If we want to define the reliability criterion relative to testimonial beliefs, we 
will have to find out whether the circumstances under which those beliefs are 
acquired reliably are different from those for perceptual beliefs. The reliable ac-
quisition of perceptual beliefs depends mainly on the reliability of the cognitive 
apparatus that produces those beliefs. Apart from this, the circumstances under 
which the belief is formed, such as the lighting, determines whether the reliabil-
ity of the cognitive system is sufficient; a reliable cognitive system should also be 
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able to discriminate whether the lighting is adequate, and if not, refuse to form a 
belief. In case a person forms testimonial beliefs (cf. section 2.5), the reliability of 
this person’s cognitive system is relevant. But the reliability of the belief source is 
also important. While our environment cannot be deemed reliable or unreliable 
(that would be a category mistake), the sources of testimonial beliefs can. Thus, if 
I read a newspaper that generally has pretty accurate scoops on the extramarital 
life of the president, this adds to the reliable acquisition of my beliefs about the 
extramarital life of the president via that newspaper. 
 Reliability of legal beliefs should allow for the assessment of beliefs concern-
ing legal affairs. But reliability has traditionally been applied to perceptual be-
liefs. These beliefs constitute only a small part of the beliefs relevant for the legal 
domain. Reliability is a measure for the integrity of the cognitive system. It is an 
externalist criterion, i.e., it provides us with the chance that our cognitive sys-
tem yields correct beliefs, and this measure is determined independently of our 
internal states. Audi’s (1993, p. 17) five criteria for determining the reliability of a 
belief all hold for perceptual and testimonial beliefs in the legal domain as well. 
For the other types of belief, the reliability criterion has to be rephrased. In case 
of a memorial belief (cf. section 2.5) that is originally based upon perception, 
both the reliability of the perceptual apparatus and the reliability of the memory 
of a person are relevant. In case of a reasoned belief (cf. section 2.5), there should 
be an acceptable reasoning method, and in case of interpretative beliefs (idem), 
the way the belief is acquired should be acceptable as well. Therefore, I define 
reliability in the legal domain as follows:
A legal belief is acquired in a reliable manner whenever the route by which 
it is acquired is acceptable by the standards in a given legal and social con-
text.
Reliability is thus based upon the acceptability of the route by which a belief 
is acquired. In case of perceptual beliefs, reliability is measured in terms of the 
production of truth. In case of reasoned beliefs, the truth criterion may have 
to be dropped. Instead, the adherence to a procedure becomes important for 
the fulfilment of the reliability criterion. If there is no fixed procedure for the 
acquisition of a belief, such as with interpretative beliefs, the acceptability of its 
acquisition can be determined entirely by relating to the content of the inter-
pretative belief. To establish the acceptability of the acquisition route of inter-
pretative beliefs, we refer to the reasons given for these beliefs. Reliability is then 
reduced to the fulfilment of the proper justification criterion for a sufficient 
amount of interpretative beliefs produced by a certain person.
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 The difference between the reliability criterion and the proper justification 
criterion is that the former is located in the ‘context of discovery’, and the latter 
in the ‘context of justification’. The former is about the production of beliefs, 
and the adherence to the procedures that perform this task, the latter is about 
providing good reasons for the result of the procedure. Distinguishing the two is 
difficult, because the adherence to a procedure also adds to the proper justifica-
tion of a belief.
.. Coherence
In the current subsection, I start discussing general definitions of coherence. 
The main similarity between the two definitions I give (their internalist nature) 
is the outset of a brief discussion of the degree to which coherence constitutes 
truth. After that, I discuss legal philosophers’ views on coherence, explaining the 
main components of their definitions.
 There are different definitions of coherence, varying from the logical defi-
nition by Kirkham (1992) to the extensive definition that was derived from 
BonJour’s (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Kirkham’s definition of 
coherence says that a coherent belief set should be consistent, and that there 
should be inductive or deductive implication relations among the beliefs (cf. 
Kirkham 1992, p. 104):
“Each member of some set of statements or beliefs is consistent with any 
subset of the other statements or beliefs.
Each statement or belief is inductively or deductively implied by the set of 
premises formed by all other statements or beliefs, or by each other state-
ment or belief.”
Bender (1989) gives a summary of the subcriteria of the coherence criterion 
he found in BonJour’s (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. The follow-
ing set of conditions must be fulfilled in order for a set of beliefs to be coherent 
(Bender 1989, p. 5):
“(i) It is logically consistent,
(ii) It has a high degree of probabilistic consistency,
(iii) It has a significant number of relatively strong inferential connections 
among component beliefs,
(iv) It is relatively unified, i.e., does not divide into relatively unconnected 
subsystems,
(v) It contains few unexplained anomalies,
(vi) It provides a relatively stable conception of the world and remains co-
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herent (i.e. it satisfies (i)-(v) in the long run) and
(vii) It satisfies the Observation Requirement, i.e., it must contain laws at-
tributing a high degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of cognitively 
spontaneous beliefs, including introspective beliefs.”
When comparing Kirkham’s (1992) and BonJour’s (1985) coherence criterion, 
the striking difference is that Kirkham’s criterion refers only to logical charac-
teristics of the belief set, whereas BonJour’s criterion also refers to the content 
of those beliefs, the degree to which the beliefs in the set are unified, the stabil-
ity of the belief set, and the link between beliefs and the world (the Observation 
Requirement). However, in both definitions, coherence is still an internalist cri-
terion, i.e., it concerns the internal relations of some system. It does not concern 
the relations between the system and reality, unless there are beliefs in the system 
that concern reality (and then the Observation Requirement comes into play).
 The internalist nature of the coherence criterion has a consequence for the 
relation between coherence and truth. The degree of coherence is often regard-
ed as a direct measure for the degree of truth of the beliefs to which it applies. 
I reject this interpretation, because beliefs can be coherent without being about 
reality. But even if coherence is not used as a truth criterion itself, it can be used 
as a knowledge criterion in either of two ways. First, its purpose can be to give 
epistemic support for the truth of the beliefs involved (instead of being a direct 
measure for the truth of the beliefs, it gives support for the assumption that 
the beliefs involved are true by correspondence). This is attained by employing 
the assumption that beliefs cohere because they adequately represent a coherent 
reality. Second, its purpose can be to support the beliefs by the mere fact that 
they cohere. In this case, coherence directly supports the transition of belief to 
knowledge; it is an ideal in itself.
 Coherence in law is defined in very different ways, but with very much the 
same intentions. MacCormick (1978, p. 152) says about coherence that “the 
multitudinous rules of a developed legal system should ‘make sense’ when taken 
together”. The criterion usually consists of a demand of consistency plus a de-
mand of the presence of reasonable content relations among beliefs. Thus, two 
beliefs cohere with each other when they do not logically exclude each other 
and we are able to say that they fit in with each other. 
 Peczenik (1989, p. 178-179) distinguishes between thirteen subcriteria consti-
tuting the notion of coherence. I summarise these subcriteria by three measures, 
viz. support, preference, and universality. The first measure, support, relates to 
the degree to which some statement is backed by reasons, and the degree to 
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which it is interconnected with other (universal) statements, and the degree to 
which a set of statements contains supported statements etc. The second meas-
ure, preference, indicates the degree to which principles relate to each other in 
a preferential order. The third measure, universality, denotes the degree to which 
concepts can be applied generally, resemble each other, are cross-connected 
etc. According to Peczenik, the list applies to statements, universal statements, 
concepts, theories, reasons, chains of reasons, and principles. But for the sake of 
simplicity, I assume that they apply to beliefs as well. 
 The criteria are used to sustain coherence as an ideal of mutual dependency 
of beliefs. The main assumption that should justify the choice of coherence as 
a knowledge criterion is as follows: a highly coherent theory of some part of 
reality reflects that part of reality, and as a corollary of that assumption, state-
ments of a coherent theory are true statements (cf. Peczenik 1989, p. 184-186). 
There are two ways of attacking such a claim. First, a coherent theory does not 
necessarily provide an adequate description of the world that it should be about; 
the world may be completely different from the coherent picture we give of it. 
Second, starting from the world, how do we acquire a coherent theory about it? 
Surely not by just constructing a theory that is as coherent as possible. Instead, 
we should conform to empirical data about the world, and those data may be 
less coherent than we would wish.
 But there is also an argument in support of employing coherence as a knowl-
edge criterion. The legal domain is a part of reality constructed by human 
beings. If we try to theorise about that part of reality, it could be argued that 
coherence is a reasonable criterion to employ. Human beings usually try to ap-
ply as much consistency on the things they design as possible. The quality of 
some work (be it a law or a book) is often judged by coherence-type criteria. 
Therefore, coherence becomes a reasonable demand. 
 Peczenik (ibid., p. 188) lists three limitations of the coherence criterion. First, 
coherence consists of multiple criteria, balancing those criteria does not always 
lead to a clear answer whether the coherence of a given system exceeds the 
coherence of a different system. Second, the coherence criterion cannot prevent 
that unjust beliefs remain present in a system of beliefs; coherence does not 
regard moral content. Still, Peczenik claims that a higher degree of coherence 
contributes to justice (ibid.). Third, all normative systems suffer from incom-
pleteness; new norms and concepts are introduced or old norms and concepts 
are adjusted so as to fit in with new cases. Thus, even if there is a measure of 
coherence, its value varies over time.
 A different set of three subcriteria of coherence is given by Alexy (1998, p. 41). 
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He regards the following elements as constitutive parts of coherence: consist-
ency, comprehensiveness, and connection. The subcriterion of consistency says 
that a coherent set of propositions should not include a contradiction. The sub-
criterion of comprehensiveness says that a coherent set of propositions should 
contain “as many and as different propositions as possible” (ibid., p. 42). Alexy 
claims that, ideally, a coherent theory covers as many parts of the world as possi-
ble. This means that it should contain propositions about all these different parts. 
The subcriterion of connection means that there should be as many relations 
as possible among propositions, where one proposition is a reason for another. 
If we compare these claims to the three subcriteria of Peczenik’s, then we find 
that consistency and comprehensiveness lack in Peczenik’s overview, whereas it 
seems that connection is similar to the support criterion. 
 Yet another approach to coherence is Brouwer’s (1990). He lists four elements 
that constitute coherence (ibid., p. 25-29). First, the part-whole relation between 
sources of law and legal norms features a degree of coherence, which is in-
creased when that relation is less ambiguous. When two sources of law together 
constitute a certain norm, but they also give rise to a norm different from the 
first, this may decrease coherence. Second, the presence of logical relations (for 
instance, deducibility) or the absence of logical relations (for instance, inconsist-
ency) may increase coherence. Third, if there are elements in a set that presup-
pose the presence of other ones, and those other elements exist, then coherence 
is increased. Brouwer (ibid., p. 27) gives the following example (translated from 
Dutch): “If a person does a without permission from b, then he will be pun-
ished with c”. This norm presupposes that b has the competence to issue a per-
mission. If he does not, this will decrease overall coherence. Fourth, the mutual 
relations between legal norms and legal principles are a factor in determining 
coherence. Brouwer states that the presence of legal principles alone does not 
provide coherence. Legal principles can provide arguments pro or con some 
norm. They may increase coherence, if different legal principles can help us 
defend the same norm, but they also may decrease coherence, in case different 
legal principles provide reasons pro and con a norm at the same time. All four 
criteria can be characterised as support criteria, i.e., they concern the relations 
among statements which sometimes belong to different categories. The other 
categories that I used to classify Peczenik’s coherence criteria do not apply to 
Brouwer’s criteria. 
 Summarising, coherence concerns the presence and nature of relations in a set 
of beliefs: its main ingredient is the support measure mentioned above. Except 
for the demand of consistency of the beliefs considered, content relation among 
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those beliefs play a central role in the concept of coherence. This takes me to the 
concluding remarks about the relation between the four knowledge criteria dis-
cussed in this section and the distinctions explained in the previous subsections. 
I have discussed four knowledge criteria: truth, proper justification, reliability, 
and coherence. I regard truth as a non-epistemic criterion, whose fulfilment can 
only be determined conditionally, through epistemic means. The connection 
between the other three criteria is that they are all epistemic criteria. If any of 
these criteria is fulfilled, this contributes to the fulfilment of the broad concept 
of justification, which covers all available epistemic means to support a belief.
 In addition, there is a more specific relation between the criterion of proper 
justification and the coherence criterion. Proper justification is evaluated with 
respect to an individual belief: it concerns the reasons there are to support the 
content of individual beliefs. Coherence is evaluated with respect to larger sets 
of beliefs, and it concerns the nature of the relations among those beliefs. Thus, 
coherence evaluates relations among beliefs on a larger scale than proper justifi-
cation, but essentially, they cover the same subject matter.
 Starting from the three dimensions of (legal) knowledge in sections 2.1 and 
2.2, we can indicate to which dimension each knowledge criterion belongs. 
First, truth belongs to the object dimension, because it evaluates the relation be-
tween the belief and its object. Second, proper justification obviously belongs to 
the justification dimension, as it concerns giving reasons in support of a belief. 
Third, reliability is found on the acquisition dimension, because it concerns an 
aspect of belief forming. Fourth, coherence is found on the justification dimen-
sion, because it concerns the support relations among beliefs, an increase of 
which may be regarded as an increase of justification of those beliefs.
 The distinctions in section 2.3 provide further guidelines to specify the cri-
teria. Along the doxastic/non-doxastic distinction, we find proper justification 
and coherence on the doxastic side, and truth and reliability on the non-dox-
astic side, because the former two criteria regard beliefs and relations between 
beliefs, while the latter two criteria do not regard beliefs directly, but rather the 
relation between beliefs and reality, and the way in which beliefs are acquired. 
Along the internalist/externalist distinction, proper justification and coherence 
are found on the internalist side, because they concern the relations between 
internal states (beliefs are a subset of internal states). Truth and reliability are 
found on the externalist side, because they review relations that cross the border 
between internal states and the external world. 
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. Types of belief and knowledge in the legal domain
In the present section, I discuss distinctions that can be used to characterise 
beliefs and knowledge in the legal domain. Four distinctions are made to be 
able to do this: (1) between legally-relevant and legal, (2) between abstract and 
concrete, (3) between regular and moral, (4) between belief sources and (5) be-
tween practical and factual. The distinctions (1) through (4) apply to both belief 
and knowledge, while distinction (5) only applies to knowledge. I explain these 
distinctions below (subsection 2.5.1). Subsequently, I elaborate on the distinc-
tion between belief sources, which are called ‘origination sources of legal belief ’ 
from there on (subsection 2.5.2).
.. Distinctions regarding legal belief and knowledge
As to the first distinction mentioned above, legally-relevant belief and knowl-
edge, being regular belief and knowledge relevant to the legal domain, can 
be analysed within the paradigm of traditional epistemology. Legal belief and 
knowledge may be analysed within the same framework, but we should con-
sider the special (normative) status of such knowledge. As explained in subsec-
tion 2.2.2, we should distinguish between belief and knowledge and the object 
of belief and knowledge. As an example, I stated that the object category of 
knowledge about the fact that John hit a pedestrian with his car is not legal. The 
object category becomes legal whenever the fact has the assigned legal status 
of criminal negligence. Whether belief or knowledge itself is legal, depends on 
its content. For instance, knowledge about hitting a pedestrian with a car as 
criminal negligence may count as a piece of legal knowledge if it concerns the 
legal consequences of that fact. All beliefs and knowledge that play a role in the 
legal domain, but whose content is not legal, are legally-relevant. All beliefs and 
knowledge whose content primarily concerns the legal status of some state-of-
affairs are legal. For instance, a belief about an event in which a man is hit by a 
car is legally-relevant, and a belief about that event being culpable homicide is 
legal. 
 As to the second distinction, Hage (1999) distinguishes between abstract and 
concrete legal knowledge. This distinction can also be made for beliefs. Abstract 
belief and knowledge are about rules, principles, values and actions. Concrete 
belief and knowledge are about cases. These two types of belief and knowledge 
represent two sides of a range, between which the character of an actual belief 
or piece of knowledge may vary.
 The third distinction is between regular knowledge and moral knowledge. 
Both types of knowledge are found in the legal domain. For instance, moral 
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knowledge is especially relevant to natural-law views, in which such knowledge 
is directly related to legal knowledge. Also, moral knowledge can be regarded 
as a material source of law, even in a legal-positivist view. More generally, there 
are analogies between the treatment of moral rules as indicated by Audi (1997) 
(see below) and the epistemology of legal rules. These analogies can be found in 
the justification criteria for legal rules (for instance the lack of susceptibility for 
truth of rules, and the alternative criteria that are available).
 Although the distinctions between doxastic and non-doxastic, and between 
internalist and externalist theories of knowledge seem to be geared to regular 
(perceptual) knowledge, they also apply to moral knowledge. In this subsection, 
I explain how. Audi (1997, p. 13-17) explains the relevance of the internalism-
externalism distinction to moral knowledge. The internalism-externalism dis-
tinction applies to both moral beliefs and actions. With respect to moral beliefs, 
justification can be acquired by reflection or introspection (internalism), or by 
an appeal to a general pattern (externalism) (ibid.). 
 To scrutinise the meaning of the distinctions for moral knowledge, I use one 
of Audi’s (ibid.) examples of a moral belief. Assume that we have a belief that the 
promising rule is correct, i.e., the rule that people should generally keep their 
promises is a morally valid rule. In a Kantian internalist view, such a belief can be 
justified by an appeal to the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative 
may be grasped by introspection, and its content may justify the belief in the 
promising rule. It boils down to the obligation that someone’s own action (I 
promise Marie to pick up her child at the school bus stop) is translated to a rule 
(I should keep my promises). The rule should be applicable to all people in order 
to be valid (people should keep their promises). In a utilitarian externalist view, 
it is assessed to what extent a certain behaviour adds to happiness in general. If 
the promising rule adds to happiness, and people behave in accordance with that 
rule, this constitutes a reliable process, adding to the externalist justification of 
belief in the promising rule.
 A similar approach can be taken towards the doxastic/non-doxastic distinc-
tion. Justification in a doxastic theory is always given in terms of beliefs. Justi-
fication in a non-doxastic theory is given – at least partly – in terms of other 
entities or criteria. Beliefs may contribute to the justification of some rule, for 
instance the promising rule. This is the case in the Kantian view. But other enti-
ties, such as acts, or internal states, may also add to the justification of a belief. 
For instance, the absence of an internal state could help justify the belief in the 
promising rule. The internal state may be the awareness of a counter-example 
of the promising rule (for instance, if keeping a promise would lead to serious 
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damage). Note that such awareness need not be explicit, in the form of a belief. 
If I have promised my neighbour that I will watch her car, and while I am wait-
ing for her the garage is set on fire, so that I have to flee, my awareness of an 
exception to my promise need not be explicit. If such a defeater for my belief in 
the promising rule is not present, this may add to the justification of that belief.
 The fourth distinction, between five belief sources, was discussed in sub-
sections 2.1.1, and will be elaborated on with respect to the legal domain in 
subsection 2.5.2. From now on, I call these belief sources ‘origination sources 
of belief ’, because they refer to the way in which the content of a belief is ac-
quired. For now, it suffices to say that, although the origination sources of belief 
discussed for regular belief are relevant to legal belief as well, origination sources 
of legal belief may have a different character. For instance, the acquisition of le-
gal belief may be regulated. If a judge has to disregard some part of evidence that 
he has already heard about, this is clearly a deviation from regular belief acqui-
sition through testimony in a non-legal context, in which, normally, acquired 
belief does not have to be disregarded.
 The fifth distinction, between practical and factual, is based on Ryle’s (1949) 
distinction between practical and factual knowledge (or knowing how and 
knowing that). In a legal context, practical knowledge for instance concerns 
how to assess cases. Factual knowledge is explicit knowledge: what one regards 
as valid law can be expressed in language. Practical knowledge is often implicit; 
few lawyers can explain in detail how they assess cases. This kind of practical 
legal knowledge can still be made explicit to a certain extent, in the form of a 
reconstruction of the procedure followed. Even though this procedure may not 
be an exact reflection of what actually happens (it may even be completely dif-
ferent from that procedure), such a reconstructed procedure may prove useful in 
learning the skills.
.. Origination sources of legal belief
Knowledge sources for the law are to be distinguished from origination sources 
of belief: the former are about knowledge, and the latter about belief. Moreover, 
knowledge sources for the law are relevant sources for establishing legal norms. 
Origination sources of belief refer to the process of belief acquisition that is 
employed. So, for instance, knowledge of the Constitution can be acquired from 
the text of the Constitution (a knowledge source for the law, to be more precise, 
a formal source of law). The way this knowledge is acquired may vary. We can 
read the Constitution (perception), we may remember its content (memory), 
someone might tell us about its content (testimony), we may disagree with 
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some of its content (consciousness), or we may infer something about its con-
tent from other information (reason) (cf. Audi 1998). 
 To these origination sources of belief, I add interpretation. Interpretation is 
distinguished from reason by its apparent implicit nature. While reason is sup-
posed to be explicit and thus verifiable, interpretation is implicit and only verifi-
able by its result and its justification. The result of an interpretative activity, the 
interpretation, can hardly be predicted. The reason why these belief types are 
distinguished, is that their origination may also have an impact on the way they 
should be turned into knowledge.
 Traditional epistemology, in its examination of knowledge acquisition, is 
heavily biased towards perception as a source of belief, whereas legal belief, and 
to a lesser degree legally-relevant belief, are often based on testimony, reason and 
interpretation. The purpose of the present subsection is to find out in greater 
detail what origination sources of belief are involved in acquiring legal belief. 
In the discussion below, I have left out consciousness as an origination source of 
belief, because insofar as it plays a role in acquiring legal knowledge, it does not 
primarily concern its content.
 Perceptual beliefs are beliefs that persons acquire directly through their senses. 
It would be naive to say that this category of beliefs does not require any form 
of interpretation, as perception is not a passive process. Let us, instead, say that to 
acquire a perceptual belief does not require any conscious act of reasoning, and 
that the state-of-affairs perceived is indeed the object of the belief. An exam-
ple of a perceptual belief is the belief ‘John is crossing the street’, held by Peter, 
who sees John crossing the street. Another example is the belief ‘the envelope is 
white’, held by Susan, who holds a white envelope in her hands.
 Memorial beliefs are formed on the basis of the memory of a person. For 
instance, a person who has once seen someone passing by on a yellow-painted 
bicycle, may remember this later. Accordingly, he forms a memorial belief that 
he once saw a person passing by on a yellow-painted bicycle. Acquiring beliefs 
from memory causes distortions due to the functioning of human memory. 
 Testimonial beliefs are derived from indirect evidence, i.e., evidence that 
signifies that some state-of-affairs holds, but that does not directly refer to that 
state-of-affairs. To elaborate on the two examples given above: if I acquire a be-
lief ‘John crosses the street’ when Peter tells me so, and I believe him, I acquire a 
testimonial belief. If I see a written statement saying that Susan thinks the enve-
lope she holds is white, and I believe this statement, then I acquire a testimonial 
belief as well. These testimonial beliefs require an implicit or explicit inference 
step (e.g., she tells me p, so p).
 Reasoned beliefs arise from clearly defined reasoning schemes. Such beliefs, 
which are ‘calculated’ by clearly defined mathematical procedures (algorithms), 
for instance arise from deduction, induction, and argumentation procedures. 
The demand is that there should be a fixed, verifiable procedure with verifiable 
input. Together these will lead to a verifiable output.
 Interpretative beliefs are the result of a process of imposing meaning on, for 
instance, acts, facts, or other beliefs. They provide a certain explanation or clari-
fication of such objects, in different terms, like a translation. Generally, they are 
not derived by a simple inference from other beliefs or evidence. Instead, they 
depend on certain choices and valuations. The process leading to an interpreta-
tion is not completely verifiable, and sometimes it is not verifiable at all. In-
terpretative beliefs occur for instance when a judge sentences in a hard case (a 
case in which there appears to be no clear way to apply a valid rule of law to a 
specific case). 
 In the legal domain, the primary source of belief consists of texts, and read-
ing a text can be both considered as acquiring knowledge via perception, and 
via testimony. In case just the content of the text is important, perception and 
interpretation are the origination source of belief. In case the object the text 
refers to is concerned, testimony is the origination source of belief. The two are 
closely related in the legal domain, where a law text expresses the content of le-
gal norms. The law text is acquired by perception, its content by interpretation. 
Legal norms can be obtained by interpretation accordingly, from the content 
of the law text. Reason covers the different types of reasoning employed in the 
legal domain, for instance a-contrario and analogical reasoning. These reasoning 
types are generally accepted in the legal domain, even though, strictly speaking, 
they may yield logically invalid conclusions.
 These three origination sources of belief (perception, reason, and testimony) 
are regulated to a certain extent by the law itself. When a judge has to disregard 
some part of evidence that he has already seen or heard about, this is clearly a 
deviation from regular knowledge acquisition through perception or testimony, 
where all reliable evidence should contribute to our knowledge. An example 
with respect to reason as an origination source of belief is the use of analogical 
reasoning. Such reasoning is not permitted in Dutch Penal Law, while it is per-
mitted in Dutch Civil Law. 
 By far the most interesting types of legal belief – taken by this classification 
– are reasoned beliefs and interpretative beliefs. The former is the category of 
those beliefs whose origination is clear, i.e., we know how they are derived 
from other beliefs. The latter is the category of those beliefs of which we do not 
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know exactly what factors played a role in their determination, or how these 
factors were valuated.
. Epistemic niches
Some instances of knowledge acquisition in the legal domain can be character-
ised as knowledge acquisition in an epistemic niche, a (partially) controlled envi-
ronment in which knowledge is acquired and processed. Van den Hoven (1995) 
gives examples of epistemic niches: control rooms of nuclear plants, surgery 
rooms, and war rooms. Such niches limit and structure the sources of knowl-
edge available. A person in the control room of a nuclear plant has as his most 
important source of knowledge the instruments on the control panel. Although 
he can pick up a phone and check with employees elsewhere in the plant, the 
actions he performs might be based exclusively on information he reads from 
screens and meters. Such directions may arise from the content of applicable 
protocols. There may be very good reasons to use control rooms and applicable 
protocols, so that certain procedures can be followed accurately, but they limit 
the knowledge acquisition capabilities of the persons involved.
 The same can be claimed of certain legal professionals, such as judges, who 
have to depend on knowledge supplied to them in a controlled environment. 
In this case, rather than walls and meters, rules and procedures limit epistemic 
opportunities for the persons involved. Instead of taking all available proof into 
account, a judge or jury must often decide on the basis of admitted evidence. 
Moreover, instead of being able to supply evidence in any stage of a trial, such 
actions are limited to certain stages. 
 The existence of epistemic niches has three major consequences. First, re-
sponsibility for belief acquisition tends to vaporise, as the epistemic starting 
point for the persons involved is predetermined. Second, procedural restrictions 
may change the reliability and justification of acquired beliefs: reliability may 
decrease or increase, and justification may be standardised (which may be quali-
fied as either a positive or a negative consequence). Third, the content of the be-
liefs acquired will be dependent on the available access channels to knowledge 
sources.
 In the legal domain, sometimes procedural restrictions are applied to knowl-
edge acquisition. Therefore, epistemic dependence is created. As with the con-
trol room of a nuclear plant, that dependence is created intentionally. In the case 
of the plant, the goal is to create safety, while in the case of the legal domain, the 
goal might be to do justice in a rather efficient manner or to attain the goal of 
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due process. Below, I discuss two subjects. First, I explain what doxastic volun-
tarism is, and how this position relates to the different types of beliefs that can 
be distinguished based on the origination sources of beliefs (subsection 2.6.1). 
Second, I discuss the concept of epistemic dependence, explaining whether 
epistemic dependence threatens the knowledge qualification of beliefs (subsec-
tion 2.6.2). 
.. Freedom of belief acquisition: doxastic voluntarism
The idea that the acquisition of beliefs is a process guided by rational considera-
tions is called doxastic voluntarism (Van den Hoven 1995, p. 87ff.). The idea is 
that a person’s beliefs are based on decisions to believe, rather than on spontane-
ous, automatically acquired information. If I see a dog cross the street, then I first 
see it, and then decide to believe that I see a dog cross the street. However, this 
is false in most cases of perceptual belief acquisition. We acquire beliefs without 
intermediary checks whether they are true or justified, or not. For most beliefs, 
it would be ridiculous to verify them additionally, as they are of minor impor-
tance, or they should be reacted upon immediately.
 What is more important, is the fact that most non-perceptual beliefs, such as 
interpretative beliefs, are also acquired in a way that does not comply with dox-
astic voluntarism. Interpretative beliefs are often formed as a result of an uncon-
scious process, unlikely to be governed by any voluntary act. Reasoned beliefs 
and testimonial beliefs are more likely to be based on voluntary acts. In case of 
reasoned beliefs, this is the act of reasoning. In case of testimonial beliefs, this is 
the act of believing what someone says or writes. The results of explicit reason-
ing steps are easy to reject or to accept. The same goes for testimony. However, 
most people would be inclined not to cast doubt on information they receive 
from certain sources, such as people and newspapers they trust.
 Van den Hoven (ibid.) lists the arguments that defeat doxastic voluntarism, 
and he concludes that the adoption of beliefs is only under voluntary control 
insofar as the control concerns the environment in which the beliefs are ac-
quired. This means that deciding to believe something is a matter of long-term 
planning of belief-acquisition conditions rather than an immediate act of will. 
I would like to challenge this observation, in that it is restricted to certain types 
of beliefs: (almost) all perceptual beliefs, and most non-perceptual beliefs, are 
acquired involuntarily. However, there are cases in which testimonial beliefs and 
interpretative beliefs are based on voluntary will. This leaves open the possibil-
ity of partial doxastic voluntarism, a desirable situation with respect to the legal 
domain, in which we want to maintain the autonomy of the judge.
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.. Epistemic dependence
Epistemic niches tend to further epistemic dependence. This means that a per-
son who operates in an epistemic niche has to rely on certain predetermined 
sources of knowledge. Epistemic dependence occurs if someone relies on other 
people’s knowledge rather than on knowledge he acquired himself. In such cas-
es, testimony is the knowledge source. Testimony is a suitable knowledge source 
if one has good reasons to believe the other person (Hardwig 1985, p. 336). To 
explain this principle, take the following example. If an expert witness testifies 
that a suspect’s genetic fingerprint matches with the genetic fingerprint of a 
hair found on the victim’s body, he should have good reasons to do so. These 
reasons might be his skills in doing this type of research, his knowledge of the 
equipment used, the reliable procedures employed etc. The judge may have good 
reasons for believing the expert witness, for instance the fact that he is known 
to be a reliable witness (his testimonies were never defeated), the explanation 
of his findings, and similar findings of another expert witness. So the judge has 
good reasons for believing that the expert witness has good reasons for believing 
that the genetic fingerprints match. Both reason sets may be entirely different, 
so that epistemic dependence arises. The judge epistemically depends on the 
expert witness. What, then, is the status of the beliefs he acquires through these 
channels? Following Van den Hoven (ibid., p. 105), the question is: “But is it 
knowledge?”
 Good reasons for believing someone else’s beliefs may improve their truth-
conduciveness. The epistemic dependence may, however, block a belief ’s 
qualification as knowledge. The question is whether it is sensible to distinguish 
between real knowledge (acquired directly by an individual) and testimonial 
knowledge (acquired through other sources), in a society where many beliefs 
are acquired indirectly through other sources of knowledge. If knowledge quali-
fication is restricted to directly acquired perceptual knowledge, this is a denial 
of the common use of the predicate. The whole point of using the predicate 
‘knowledge’ to qualify beliefs is to express the special nature of the belief under 
scrutiny. 
 My conclusion is that knowledge qualification cannot reasonably be denied 
to all beliefs arising in epistemically dependent situations. Such would be to 
deny the relevance of any kind of quality check mark for beliefs acquired in 
such situations. 
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. The viewpoint of general epistemology
In this chapter, I discussed the characteristics of knowledge about the legal do-
main, given the viewpoint of general epistemology. I did so in order to provide 
an answer to the first research question. Characteristics of knowledge can be 
given by exploring three dimensions of knowledge: its acquisition, its object, 
and its justification. The same is valid for legal knowledge. The three dimensions 
help to explain the difference between regular knowledge and legal knowl-
edge. Epistemological distinctions, knowledge criteria and beliefs can also be 
explained and typified in terms of these three dimensions. In the next chapter, 
they help to explore the different views that exist on knowledge from a legal 
epistemic viewpoint.
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 Legal knowledge from a legal epistemic viewpoint
This chapter is concerned with legal epistemology. Legal epistemology is the 
branch of general epistemology that is involved with developing an account 
of the nature of legal knowledge. I discuss this issue to find out the answer to 
the second research question, which amounts to finding the characteristics of 
knowledge about the legal domain from the viewpoint of legal epistemology. 
In order to give such an account of legal knowledge, I subsequently discuss the 
following subjects. First, in section 3.1, I provide an explanation of the herme-
neutic tradition in legal philosophy. Then, in section 3.2, I outline the epistemic 
claims that can be inferred from some other important views in legal philoso-
phy. Next, in section 3.3, I explain different sources of legal knowledge. Finally, 
in section 3.4, I make some concluding remarks on the issue. However, I first put 
some effort into explaining the present enterprise of discussing the concept of 
legal knowledge from a legal epistemic viewpoint.
 The relevance of knowledge about the legal domain is twofold. First, there is 
the utility of knowledge. Compared to mere belief, knowledge can be used as a 
reliable ground for behaviour. It may also serve as a means of gaining authority 
relative to those only having belief. In the legal domain, knowledge provides 
grounds for authoritative decisions. Rather than basing one’s decision on rela-
tively unreliable beliefs, the basis for one’s inferences should be knowledge.
 Second, attaining knowledge is a goal that is worth aiming at as such, regard-
less of its utility. An argument with this content is put forward by Finnis (1980, p. 
59-80). He claims that the pursuit of knowledge is a value, in the sense of a good: 
a goal that is worthwhile independent of any further utility in the achievement 
of survival, power, and popularity. The value of attaining knowledge is a princi-
ple of practical reasonableness, Finnis claims. It provides us with a direction in 
which we can lay out lines of argumentation. It can be used to generate new 
principles, and to direct the application of rules. In his discussion of the value of 
knowledge, he emphasises the importance of truth. Having knowledge presup-
poses truth, whereas beliefs can be true or false. Knowledge and truth are very 
close relatives, if we may regard the following quotation as representative of 
Finnis’ opinion on the matter (ibid., p. 61):
“In explaining, to oneself and others, what one is up to, one finds oneself 
able and ready to refer to finding out, knowledge, truth as sufficient explana-
tions of the point of one’s activity, project, or commitment.”
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Finnis regards the value of knowledge as a self-evident principle. He asserts that 
self-evidence of some principle has little or nothing to do with our feelings of 
certitude about that principle. Rather, he claims, the self-evidence of a principle 
shows itself in its employment as a criterion for the assessment of feelings. A 
principle such as worthiness of knowledge cannot be proved. It can be adopted, 
though, on the assumption that its employment is fruitful, or rather, that, if it is 
not adopted, rational discourse becomes hard or impossible.
 In sum, legal knowledge is a better starting point for making inferences (the 
utility argument), and it is worthwhile in its own (the value argument). I adopt 
the two arguments as backings for a further investigation into the concept of 
legal knowledge from a legal epistemic viewpoint in the sections below.
. Object and subject intertwined: hermeneutics in the law
The dominant theory about judicial interpretation in The Netherlands in the 
second half of the 20th century has been Scholten’s (1974) theory, which is in-
spired by hermeneutics. This section provides an elaboration on hermeneutic 
theories in the law. First, I provide some general characteristics of such theories 
(subsection 3.1.1), then I discuss an example of a hermeneutic view, namely 
Dworkin’s theory (subsection 3.1.2). The purpose of the current section is to 
show that often, the seemingly clear-cut distinctions between categories of legal 
phenomena (for instance legal objects) cannot be maintained in every legal-the-
oretical stance. Actually, some of the central distinctions made in this thesis are 
challenged by hermeneutic theories of law, for instance the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology. This has a profound effect on building ontologies 
(conceptual models) of law; such ontologies presuppose basic ontological and 
epistemological choices.
.. Hermeneutic theories of judicial interpretation
Hermeneutic theories of law form the main stream in legal theory. Having 
said that, the differences among those theories are significant, and Dworkin’s 
theory, discussed in the next subsection, is one with relatively few relativistic 
connotations, i.e., the ontological and epistemological claims are stronger than 
one might expect in a hermeneutic theory. In the following discussion, onto-
logical and epistemological claims in hermeneutic theories of law are discussed. 
According to Smith (1998, p. 224), in hermeneutic theories of the law, the law 
is defined as an interpretation of a practice. The interpretation should lead to 
an identification of what the law is. To clarify the nature of hermeneutics, I list 
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three distinctions that cannot be held in such theories: there is no clear distinc-
tion (1) between the descriptive and the normative, (2) between rules and facts, 
and (3) between the law and its interpretation.
 The descriptive/normative distinction typically signifies the difference be-
tween what there is and what there ought to be. To describe something means 
to list its properties, while we assume that these properties are independent 
of their description. To prescribe something is to say that something ought 
to be the case, independently of the question whether it is the case: there is a 
norm, with which reality must comply. Hermeneutics says that such a distinc-
tion cannot be maintained, because we cannot describe reality independently 
of some idea about what reality should look like. In a reflection on the law, 
the descriptive/normative distinction means that there is no clear distinction 
between a rule of a law and a fact it applies to, but that there is an interaction 
between rule and fact, which yields a new characterisation of both the applica-
ble rule and the fact. In the light of hermeneutic theories, brute facts (facts that 
need not be perceived or interpreted by a human agent) constitute an empty 
notion, because facts can only be characterised meaningfully in the light of a 
rule, and a rule can only be formulated meaningfully in the light of the fact.
 The third distinction, namely between the law and the interpretation of the 
law, is related to the second distinction. However, in the third distinction, we 
regard the law as independent of its application. The distinction between the 
law and the interpretation of the law assumes that the law exists, and that its 
interpretations are about that independently existing law. Hermeneutics denies 
that this distinction can be made. In practice, the law is only ‘found’ or ‘formed’ 
in its interpretations. When we interpret the law without referring to individual 
cases, we systematise the law. Systematisation requires us to form an idea about 
the meaning of the individual rules of the law and their connections with each 
other, and to find out structural distinctions and patterns. Systematisation can-
not be seen as an activity that leaves the original rules undisturbed. Instead, the 
systematisation activity is also an interpretation activity that establishes the con-
tent of the law.
 Now that I have given a characterisation of the distinctions that cannot be 
made in a hermeneutic theory of law, I give some properties of such a theory 
with respect to a concept of knowledge. Knowledge about the world, or about 
the law, is acquired through a form of understanding (Verstehen, cf. Smith 1998, 
p. 61). The subject/object distinction – the distinction between the person who 
knows something and the thing he knows something about – is denied. Before 
one can know anything, one has to have some form of knowledge about the 
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world; one has to be a part of that world. Any acquired knowledge is related 
to the position one has in the world; the knowledge that one has previously 
acquired. Thus, knowledge is neither completely subjective, nor completely ob-
jective. The same is valid for the meaning of language. The language one uses is 
related to the particular stance a person has in the world, and there is no objec-
tive relation between a sentence and some part of the world. Therefore, there is 
no such thing as objective truth either. The fact that all knowledge is the result 
of interpretation, and that this interpretation constitutes a part of reality, means 
that an objective distinction between a sentence and the fact that the sentence 
refers to cannot be established (cf. Smith 1998, p. 68).
.. Dworkin: constructive interpretation
In his book ‘Law’s Empire’, Dworkin (1986, p. 45-86) gives an account of in-
terpretation in the law. This account is a hermeneutic one, because it regards 
interpretation as a constructive activity. In order to explain the concept of inter-
pretation, Dworkin distinguishes among four types of interpretation (ibid., p. 
50-51): conversational interpretation, scientific interpretation, artistic interpreta-
tion, and interpretation of social practice. Conversational interpretation occurs 
when we talk and listen to each other, and try to find out what other persons 
mean. Scientific interpretation is deemed not to be purposive, i.e., the raw data 
should speak for themselves, and the interpretation of those data is led by their 
content. Artistic interpretation consists of attempts to discover the meaning of a 
work of art, which is projected in that work by the interpreter. The interpreta-
tion of social practice covers legal interpretation. It resembles artistic interpreta-
tion to the extent that it is about an object created by human beings, but distinct 
from those human beings. Thus, the types of interpretation are defined relative 
to their objects. People’s words are the objects of conversational interpretation, 
nature’s products are the objects of scientific interpretation, and people’s prod-
ucts are the objects of artistic interpretation and interpretation of social practice. 
The agreement in object of artistic interpretation and interpretation of social 
practice leads Dworkin to accommodate them both under the denominator 
‘creative interpretation’ (ibid., p. 50).
 The interpretation of social practice is an activity that scrutinises a certain 
case. It starts with a preinterpretive demarcation of what is the issue at hand: we 
have to find out what are the rules and the standards that determine the tenta-
tive content of the practice to be interpreted (ibid., p. 65-66). Then the actual 
interpretation is carried out, by isolating those arguments that contribute to 
the justification of the main elements of the practice (ibid., p. 66). Finally, in the 
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postinterpretive stage, an attempt is made to incorporate the deviant charac-
teristics of the original practice into a new version of that practice that fits the 
justification established in the second stage (ibid., p. 66). Dworkin expresses the 
view that the preinterpretive stage serves to isolate the practice, the interpretive 
stage serves to construct the interpretation (where the main direction of rea-
soning is from interpretation to practice), and the postinterpretive stage serves 
to reconstruct the practice (where the main direction of reasoning is from the 
practice to the interpretation, altering that interpretation if necessary).
 Most notable in Dworkin’s view on interpretation, is that he rejects scepti-
cism. Interpretations can be “right or wrong”, even “true or false” (ibid., p. 78). 
Although he adheres to a constructive type of interpretation, where the inter-
pretation does not necessarily reflect the intentions of (members of) a com-
munity, he claims that one interpretation can be better than another. According 
to Dworkin, there are two sceptical stances: internal scepticism says that there is 
no way to determine whether one interpretation is better than another, in fact, 
there is no way that an interpretation can earn priority over others, because no 
actual interpretation provides the unity required for such an enterprise (ibid., 
p. 78). External scepticism, instead, makes an ontological claim, namely that 
there is no way to test the correctness of an interpretation, as there is nothing in 
reality it can be tested against (ibid., p. 79-80). Dworkin emphasises that many 
sceptic attacks to claims on priority relations among interpretations (one inter-
pretation is better than another) employ externally sceptic arguments, but make 
internally sceptic claims. However, the claim that there is no independent reality 
to which interpretations can be checked is quite a different claim from saying 
that no interpretation can be deemed better than another (ibid., p. 83). Dworkin 
does not challenge the former claim, but he does dispute the latter one.
. Knowing the law: epistemic claims in legal theory
The current section contains a discussion of epistemic claims that can be de-
rived from five different theories about the law: natural law (subsection 3.2.1), 
legal positivism (subsection 3.2.2), institutional legal theories (subsection 3.2.3), 
a conventional-cum-institutional approach (subsection 3.2.4), and hermeneutic 
theories of law (subsection 3.2.5). These theories address the question what the 
law is: this ontological question should be answered before we can start making 
epistemic claims. Therefore, for each of the theories mentioned, I discuss the 
basic characteristics of its concept of law. Then, I explain under what conditions 
we can say that we know the law, based on that concept of law. 
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.. Natural law
Cliteur (1989, p. 363) provides six characteristics of the natural law view. I discuss 
them briefly below. First, there is law that has absolute validity. Second, this law 
can be derived from human nature or the nature of reality. Third, human reason-
ing capabilities are sufficient to know this law. Fourth, the validity of positive 
law depends on the test of content constituted by natural law. Fifth, positive law 
that does not pass this test is invalid. Sixth, the test consists of a set of speculative 
and metaphysical ideas. In a natural-law view, the epistemological claim is that 
abstract ‘knowing that’ of natural law, i.e., abstract factual knowledge of legal 
norms, is possible. Concrete ‘knowing that’ can be established through knowl-
edge of legal norms and knowledge of cases (knowing a case in the light of the 
legal norms that apply). A claim about abstract ‘knowing that’ of positive law is 
not made, but we may assume that such knowledge can be acquired. 
 Whether positive law is really valid law, can be known by testing positive law 
against natural law. This test consists of checking whether the content of posi-
tive law complies with the principles expressed in natural law. Thus, knowing 
the law from a natural-law perspective should be divided into knowing natural 
law and knowing positive law. Knowing natural law means knowing the abstract 
principles that natural law consists of. Knowing positive law means knowing the 
rules and norms that are part of the human-constructed legal system. Knowing 
the law then amounts to knowing those rules and norms of positive law that 
comply with the principles of natural law. 
.. Legal positivism
The legal positivist view is summarised by Brouwer (1997) in five character-
istics. First, authority is the source of the law. The validity of a norm as a legal 
norm is based on a human source. Second, the validity of a legal norm does not 
depend on the contents of that norm. Third, there is no necessary connection 
between the law and morality. The question what is law does not depend on 
what is morally justified. Fourth, legal norms claim to have the highest author-
ity; norms that are not recognised in the legal system are legally irrelevant. Fifth, 
the meaning of a legal norm is a factual matter, not a moral one; it refers to the 
meaning the authorities provided that norm with.
 In case of legal positivism, obtaining knowledge of valid law is possible 
through acquiring knowledge of the formal sources of law and knowledge of 
their being issued by the proper authorities. In the natural law view, the ‘knowl-
edge check’ is performed by comparing positive law with moral principles, 
whereas in the legal-positivist view, the valid origination history of positive law 
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is the only criterion for the ‘knowledge check’; knowledge of positive law can 
be obtained through knowledge about its being issued validly.
.. Institutional legal theories
Institutional theories of law give, according to Hage (1998), accounts of differ-
ent themes in legal philosophy. However, they do have something in common, 
namely their primary point of departure. Institutional theories assume that legal 
reality supervenes the world that consists of material facts. Legal reality, how-
ever, unites the factual and the normative in its supervenience (ibid., p. 141-142). 
An institutional theory of law consists of a framework describing the relation 
between brute facts and institutional legal facts. Brute facts are the object of 
traditional ontology, institutional legal facts are claimed to be the entities gain-
ing existence through a system of rules. These legal facts are the object of legal 
ontology. Below I discuss two institutional theories of law.
 First, the institutional theory of law developed by MacCormick and Wein-
berger (1986) claims that legal institutions, such as property and marriage, can 
yield institutional legal facts under certain conditions. These facts are brought 
about or terminated by way of institutive rules and terminative rules. Moreover, 
by means of consequential rules, their (legal) consequences are defined. Institu-
tional legal facts exist in time between the point where they are established by 
an institutive rule, and the point where they are abolished by a terminative rule. 
In the meantime, the consequential rules hold for those facts. The existence of 
legal rules themselves can also be considered as institutional fact (cf. subsection 
4.2.3). 
 Second, Ruiter (1993) proposes an institutional theory of law. In this theory, 
he emphasises the importance of speech act theories (such as in Searle 1969) 
for the establishment of institutional legal facts. Ruiter’s theory covers the crea-
tion and abolishment of legal norms, based on the different types of speech acts 
distinguished by Searle. The idea is that a legal system can be analysed in terms 
of speech acts. These are acts that occur when people say certain things. For in-
stance, when a civil servant says ‘I hereby declare you husband and wife’ under 
appropriate circumstances, these words have the result that the two people in 
front of him are married. Legal acts can be analysed in terms of such speech acts. 
In this example, the speech act implies a declarative legal act. A speech act can 
succeed or fail. For instance, when the person performing the speech act has no 
right to do so, the speech act fails. In that case, no legal act is performed (at least 
not the one leading to a marriage). Alternatively, the speech act is performed by 
the proper person, but the community in which the marriage has taken place, 
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does not recognise it. In that case, there is a legal act, but the necessary recogni-
tion of that legal act does not occur. The validity of legal norms thus depends on 
two characteristics; an ‘ideal’ characteristic and a ‘factual’ characteristic, where 
the former is achieved through the proper performance of legal acts, and the 
latter through social recognition of the norm (see Hage’s discussion of Ruiter; 
Hage 1998, p. 137).
 From the viewpoint of institutional legal theory, knowing the law requires 
knowing positive law, and knowing whether positive law complies with the spe-
cific demands that are set by institutional rules. In a legal-positivist approach, we 
have to know whether a rule was issued by a proper authority. In institutional 
legal theory, this demand is further specified by scrutinising the specific rules 
with which the validity of positive law is attained from the moment it is issued. 
In both cases, the validity of the knowledge obtained depends on its conformity 
with its object.
.. A conventionalist-cum-institutional approach
In Peczenik and Hage (2000), a conventionalist-cum-institutional (ci) theory of 
law is taken as a starting point for a discussion of the ontology of law. The ci the-
ory fits in with the need for a more precisely defined object of legal knowledge, 
as it offers a detailed account of the different types of fact in the legal domain. 
The theory can be discussed by an explanation of three concepts on which the 
theory is based: supervenience, conventional fact, and institutional fact.
 The first concept that is adopted in the ci theory is supervenience. Hage 
(1998, p. 128) defines supervenience as follows. A set of characteristics a is super-
venient relative to another set of characteristics b if there cannot occur a change 
in set a without the occurrence of a change in set b, whereas there can occur 
a change in set b without the occurrence of a change in set a. Thus, while the 
supervenient characteristic (say, the colour red) can rest on different phenomena 
(a red sheet of paper versus a white sheet of paper illuminated by red light), the 
supervenient characteristic is always the same when the set of characteristics on 
which it rests remains the same (a red sheet of paper remains red).
 The second concept adopted is conventional fact. The existence of a con-
ventional fact rests on the conditions that a sufficiently large number of people 
within the relevant community believes that fact, and also believes that everyone 
believes that fact. In addition, the situation in which the relevant community 
believes that fact is partly reason for the people belonging to the community to 
perform actions. Those actions are meaningful because of the existence of the 
conventional fact (Peczenik and Hage 2000).
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 The third concept adopted is institutional fact. An institutional fact derives its 
existence from the following conditions. There should be a rule in the relevant 
population, of which the conditions are fulfilled, and there is no exception to 
that rule, and the conclusion of the rule is that the fact exists (ibid.).
 Together, conventional facts and institutional facts can account for the struc-
ture of a legal system. The definition of an institutional fact can be applied in a 
recursive manner. The definition takes conventional facts, institutional facts and 
brute facts as its input, and produces conventional facts and institutional facts as 
its output. On their turn, the resulting facts may again be used as an input to the 
definition of an institutional fact. Rules, according to Peczenik and Hage (ibid.) 
may be considered as facts. Thus, rules can exist, either as conventional facts, or 
as institutional facts, or as both.
 In the ci theory, knowledge of the law can be acquired by knowing positive 
law, and knowing whether positive law complies with the institutional and con-
ventional demands imposed by the ci theory. The ci theory provides the means 
to describe the structural properties of a legal system, i.e., to explain how facts 
and rules are interconnected. Suppose, for instance, that a legal rule is only valid 
if it is issued by a proper authority and if it is recognised by a population. In that 
case, knowledge of that rule can be obtained by knowing, in addition to its con-
tent, the fact that it is issued by a proper authority, and knowing the population’s 
acceptance of the rule. 
.. Hermeneutic theories of law
Hermeneutic theories have a different approach towards knowledge. As I 
explained in section 3.1, in these theories, there is no clear demarcation line 
between the knowing subject and the known object. As a consequence, the 
distinction between knowing that and knowing how is somewhat vague. In 
the hermeneutic view, knowledge is always the product of an interaction be-
tween the subject and the object of knowledge. Therefore, factual knowledge 
(knowing that), and a competence to do something (knowing how), are both 
partially based on knowledge that was already present. The epistemic claim that 
can be made about legal knowledge in general is that such knowledge is always 
dependent on the background knowledge one has. Legal knowledge cannot be 
acquired without some sense of what the legal domain amounts to. The proc-
ess of acquiring such knowledge is a circle in which new knowledge is assessed 
from the perspective of the knowledge that is already present.
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. Sources of legal knowledge
The term ‘legal knowledge’ refers to all knowledge that is about the law. In the 
three subsections below, I clarify the sources of such knowledge. Such sources 
are content sources, i.e., they provide the content of legal knowledge. I discuss 
the distinction between material and formal sources of law (subsection 3.3.1), 
and I deal with knowledge sources for the law (subsection 3.3.2). Finally, I ex-
plain in what sense reasoning can be regarded as a source of knowledge (subsec-
tion 3.3.3).
.. Formal and material sources of law
Sources of law are the starting point for the acquisition, qua content, of legal 
knowledge. Depending on the ontological stance taken, knowledge of the law 
may be derived directly or indirectly from sources of law. The concept ‘source 
of law’ is ambiguous. There is a distinction between formal and material sources 
of law. Formal sources of law are, as some authors state (cf. Algra and Van Duy-
vendijk 1989, p. 19), the knowledge sources for the law. These are statute law, 
treaties, legal precedents (ibid.), and customary law. 
 Material sources of law are the origination sources of law, i.e., the factors on 
which the content of laws is based. Thus, material sources contribute to the 
drafting of new laws; they help determine their content. Material sources of law 
do not themselves amount to legal rules or legal norms. They form, however, 
the grounds for those rules and norms. Algra and Van Duyvendijk (1989, p. 20) 
distinguish the following material sources of law: political powers, civil servants, 
pressure groups, religious beliefs, moral beliefs, socioeconomic developments, 
geographical circumstances, and technological developments.
.. Knowledge sources for the law
Knowledge sources for the law are the sources through which we acquire 
knowledge about the law. There are two properties of having factual knowledge 
about the law: knowing its content and knowing its validity. As noted earlier, 
knowledge sources for the law are sometimes regarded as equivalent to the cat-
egory of formal sources of law. However, I would prefer to make a clear distinc-
tion between formal sources of law and knowledge sources for the law.
 In a legal-positivist stance, formal sources of law coincide with the sources 
of valid law. In such a stance, if one acquires knowledge of the formal sources 
of law, one will acquire knowledge of both the content and the validity of law. 
In a natural-law stance, this is not necessarily the case; the validity of law is de-
termined by principles that are not part of the positive legal system. In such a 
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stance, knowledge about the content of law is derived from the formal sources 
of law and from principles outside law. 
 In legal-positivist and natural-law stances, knowledge about the content and 
validity of the law may also be derived from material sources of law. Material 
sources of law do not provide knowledge about valid law directly, but they are 
helpful in interpreting the content of formal sources of law. Both formal sources 
of law and material sources of law can thus function as knowledge sources for 
the law. Their precise role may differ, depending on the specific view on the law 
taken: in a legal-positivist stance, material sources of law may help explaining 
how certain formal sources of law acquired their specific content, and in a natu-
ral-law stance, material sources of law may provide part of the demarcation line 
between what is morally right and morally wrong, and thus, which part of law 
is valid and which is not.
.. Reasoning as a source of knowledge
Hage (1997) elaborates on the concept of reasoning in the legal domain, in 
which proper justification plays a central role. He states that there are two stages 
in legal reasoning. In the first stage, there is a set of principles. Principles have a 
more general nature than rules; they are less concrete. Principles are checked for 
their validity. If the conditions of a principle are satisfied, and the principle is not 
excluded, it can be used to generate reasons for or against the conclusion of an 
argument. These reasons for and against an argument are, on their turn, weighed 
against each other, and then lead to the conclusion of an argument. Approxi-
mately the same two-step process applies to reasoning with rules. The reasons 
resulting from the two two-step processes can be used in order to support the 
conclusion of a legal rule.
 Hage’s (1997) account of the nature of legal rules takes into account the aspect 
of defeasibility. In the case of legal rules, this means that a rule whose application 
conditions are satisfied, may still not be applicable. First, there are scope limita-
tions for a legal rule, for instance that it applies only to facts that have taken 
place on Dutch territory. Second, exceptions exist which are formulated in the 
legal rule itself. Third, there are proper exceptions to legal rules, for instance 
the grounds for justification in criminal law. Instead of the traditional model of 
legal reasoning, in which a rule applies whenever all conditions of the rule are 
satisfied, Hage focuses on the justification of the conclusion of the rule. Legal 
reasoning is about giving reasons for a conclusion, and legal rules may (as a con-
sequence of defeasibility at several levels) fail to generate their conclusion under 
certain circumstances.
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 Reasoning constitutes a source of legal knowledge, because it can generate 
new legal knowledge. In that respect, reasoning in the legal domain is a rational 
construction or a rational reconstruction (depending on one’s ontological view) 
of the way in which, for instance, a legal decision is realised. Note that much of 
the actual work is done by an unconscious process which I call interpretation. 
A rational construction of the reasoning process underlying such a decision 
consists of a line of argument that reaches the actual decision, while a rational re-
construction should in some way reflect the actual steps leading to that decision; 
some kind of analogy should exist between the actual interpretation process and 
the rational reconstruction of that interpretation process. Clearly, the dividing 
line between the two is thin.
. Combining the general and legal epistemic views
The previous chapter was based on the first research question. This question 
was: What are the characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain, given 
the viewpoint of general epistemology? The current chapter is based on the 
second research question. This question was: What are the characteristics of 
knowledge about the legal domain, given the viewpoint of legal epistemology? 
With respect to the first research question, I have explained the dimensions 
along which we can assess knowledge: its acquisition, object and justification. 
Moreover, I have outlined distinctions along which theories of knowledge can 
be classified, criteria used to assess whether something may be called knowl-
edge, distinctions along which types of knowledge can be classified, and the 
assessment of the freedom with which knowledge is acquired. With respect to 
the second research question, I have discussed the intertwinement between the 
object and subject of knowledge, the way in which we can know the law from 
different legal-theoretical stances, and the sources of legal knowledge. The vari-
ous distinctions made in chapters 2 and 3 are classified as related to one of the 
three main dimensions: acquisition, object and justification in table 3.1.
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acquisition object justification
distinctions in 
the theory of 
knowledge
doxastic - 
non-doxastic
internalist - 
externalist
distinctions 
regarding 
knowledge
legally-relevant
- legal
abstract - concrete
regular - moral
practical - factual
knowledge criteria reliability truth proper justification
coherence
sources of belief 
and knowledge
belief sources formal sources 
of law
material sources 
of law
formal sources 
of law
material sources 
of law
Table 3.1. Overview of distinctions regarding belief and knowledge
Given the main dimensions, we can immediately see that studying the object of 
knowledge is an important part of studying knowledge. However, it seems that 
knowledge of the law and the law itself are hard to distinguish. Hermeneuti-
cally-inspired theories are based on this assumption. If knowing and being are 
intertwined, then there is a bidirectional relation between the two, in which 
knowing constitutes being, and being constitutes knowing. The circle that 
seems to arise from this, is only a circle at first sight. If we refrain from taking a 
hermeneutic stance, we can find a clear difference between the way in which 
new legal entities are constructed, and the way in which knowledge about these 
entities is acquired. For instance, the realisation of a legal decision by a judge is 
an implicit process in which many types of knowledge are applied. The result is 
a decision, about which knowledge can be acquired through a different route. 
Rather than a circle, knowing the law constitutes two entirely different proc-
esses, pointing in opposite directions: the process of interpretation and reasoning 
leading to legal conclusions, thus establishing legal entities (from the epistemic 
to the ontological), and the process of obtaining knowledge of the law (from the 
ontological to the epistemic).
 Anticipating on the next chapter, I would like to stress that there are two 
distinctions of crucial importance to disentangle knowledge of the law and the 
law itself. First, of course, there is the distinction between legal epistemology 
(discussed in the current chapter) and legal ontology (discussed in the next 
chapter). In the previous paragraph, I explained that the relations between these 
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two levels can be isolated as unidirectional processes that do not cause a circu-
larity problem. Second, there is the distinction between the context of discovery 
(the acquisition and object dimensions of knowledge) and the context of jus-
tification (the justification dimension of knowledge). It seems that in the legal 
domain, the circularity is found here. Instead of discovery alone, acquiring legal 
knowledge involves justification as well. In the next chapter, these distinctions 
are further elaborated on in the discussion of different stances in legal ontol-
ogy, and the clarification of the object of legal knowledge in the light of these 
stances.
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 Legal ontology
In this chapter, legal ontology is regarded as a branch of general ontology. Thus, 
following the subject matter of general ontology, legal ontology investigates the 
existence of elements in the legal domain. More specifically, it concerns the ex-
istence of such entities as laws, norms, and principles. But as it is about the legal 
domain, it should also regard non-legal entities that are relevant to this domain. 
Views on legal ontology are influenced by the philosophical insights into the 
law in general. Practising legal ontology means examining what objects there 
are in the legal domain, how they are brought into existence, how they relate to 
each other, and how they change through time. The results of this examination 
provide a part of the basis for the knowledge-based ontology in chapter 6.
 In order to be able to express ontological claims from different theories of law, 
I first need to explain some basic concepts of ontology. I explain these concepts 
in section 4.1. Ontological claims (claims about the existence of individual ob-
jects or object types) depend on the theory of law adhered to. In section 4.2, I 
list the ontological claims of five theories of law, and I compare these claims. In 
legal ontology, we may discuss objects we encounter in the legal system, or we 
may discuss the legal system as a whole. Therefore, in section 4.3, I discuss two 
object types that play an important role in the legal domain (systematisations 
and interpretations), and in section 4.4, I explain the ways in which legal systems 
can exist. In some theories of law, argumentation constitutes the construction 
of legal entities. Hence, in section 4.5, I discuss elements of argumentation. In 
section 4.6, I give an overview of four ontological status layers that we can dis-
tinguish in the legal domain. Finally, in section 4.7, I explain how two relations 
(counting as and causality) can be used to represent different views on the exist-
ence of the law. 
. Introduction to ontology
Ontology is the discipline that investigates the nature of being. Two questions 
are central to ontology: first, what does it mean to exist?, and second, what 
things do exist? As a preliminary answer to the first question, I propose: the 
existence of a thing is its presence independent of the perception of human be-
ings. The answer to the second question obviously depends on the way in which 
we define the nature of existence. The preliminary answer to the first question 
yields the following dilemma. Each attempt to make claims on reality depends 
on our ability to know that reality. In order to say something about the inde-
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pendent existence of things, we need our senses and our brains. Thus, statements 
about reality are not independent of our ability to know.
.. Realism
Realism is a philosophical position that focuses on existence alone. A typical 
form of realism claims the existence of tokens of certain scientific or com-
mon-sense types (e.g., atoms), independent of the mental (cf. Devitt 1991, p. 303). 
Realism is nothing else but that claim; it says nothing about whether tokens or 
types are knowable. For this reason, it also endangers itself: we cannot reason-
ably make any ontological claim without the knowledge needed to make that 
claim. Thus, a realist position demands an epistemology that enables us to know 
the world (at least partly). If we can establish such an epistemology, the realist 
doctrine is to be preferred, because, in combination with a realist epistemology, 
it enables us to say something about the world as it really is.
 If we claim the independent existence of certain parts of reality, we make 
such claims, for instance, with regard to the object of our scientific or com-
mon-sense knowledge. If we claim that scientific entities (such as electrons) 
exist, a scientific realism emanates from that claim. If we claim the existence of 
common-sense objects (such as chairs), this yields a common-sense realism. To 
specify such types of realism, we have to include claims that regard the problem 
of universals. The problem of universals is the question what general terms in 
natural language (such as ‘judge’ and ‘car’) refer to. Concrete things are called 
‘tokens’ or ‘particulars’, abstract things are called ‘types’ or ‘universals’ (in some 
positions, there is a difference between tokens and particulars, and between 
types and universals, but I use them interchangeably). Different views on the 
problem of universals lead to different forms of realism. 
 Using the type/token-distinction, we can make general ontological claims. 
We can either claim the existence of tokens, of types, or of both tokens and 
types. For instance, if we claim the existence of the type ‘judge’, we say that the 
term ‘judge’ refers to an objectively existing universal. If we claim the existence 
of tokens of the type ‘judge’, we say that specific judges exist objectively. And if 
we claim the existence of both the type ‘judge’ and tokens of this type, then we 
say that there are both an objectively existing universal and objectively existing 
judges.
.. Alternatives to realism
In philosophy, there are more theories about reality than just the hard-boiled 
kind of realism described before. The two most important alternative paradigms 
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for realism are constructivism and relativism. I regard both doctrines as anti-real-
ist, in that they deny us the possibility of saying something about the objectively 
existing reality. Although constructivism claims that there is a reality, it also says 
that we are not able to investigate it in order to determine whether this reality 
contains certain structures. Reality is comparable to a Kantian ‘Ding an sich’. 
People can create their own ‘realities’ by projecting structures into the ‘Ding 
an sich’. Such ‘realities’ emanate from an epistemological source (cf. Putnam’s 
internal realism for an example of constructivism; Putnam 1990). Relativism 
is a denial of the possibility to know anything at all about the real existence of 
things. Relativism does not make an ontological claim, but an epistemic one 
(we cannot know what really is). If we take a relativist stance, we will lose grip 
on reality as well as on our knowledge. 
 Realism, constructivism, and relativism cannot easily be placed on one scale, 
because they make claims in different philosophical disciplines: realism is pri-
marily an ontological doctrine, while constructivism and relativism make epis-
temic claims. Ontology, epistemology, and semantics are, however, related to a 
high degree. Semantic theories depend on both ontological commitments and 
epistemology for the relations they describe between symbols and entities in 
reality, ontology cannot be practised without making epistemic commitments 
and vice versa. Ontological claims should be argued for by epistemic means, 
for humans can only gain knowledge about anything at all through epistemic 
means. Epistemic claims should be grounded in ontological commitments, for 
otherwise knowledge is not based upon reality. This is why a strict distinction 
between ontology and epistemology is difficult to maintain; but it is important 
for explanatory purposes. 
.. Rules and norms
The difference between rules and norms has to be explained prior to discussing 
the ontological claims in different theories of law. I regard rules as entities that 
define a consequence of the occurrence of an object. Their general structure is: 
‘if there is an x, then there is a y’, although, of course, their precise formulation 
may diverge. Rules may, for instance, qualify an occurrence of an object (an act, 
an entity, a fact) in a certain way, such that it gains a new status layer, or they 
may define the consequence for some kind of behaviour. Examples of rules are 
‘killing on purpose counts as manslaughter’, and ‘a person who commits man-
slaughter is punished with a prison sentence of at most fifteen years’.
 I regard norms as entities that explicitly guide some kind of behaviour or ac-
tion. The presence of a norm can be identified by the normative modalities it 
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contains, for instance ought-not, ought-to-do, or can. Norms can have a broad 
or narrow range of application. For instance, general norms such as ‘one ought 
not kill other people’ are widely applicable, whereas ‘people working on the 
premises of the nuclear plant ought to carry a radiation detection card’ is ap-
plicable to only a limited number of employees of the plant.
 Whether rules and norms are legal often depends on the legal-theoretical 
stance taken with respect to the identification of law. For instance, if authorita-
tive recognition is the main criterion, a rule is only a legal rule if it is issued by 
a proper authority. The difference between a legal rule and a legal norm is not 
always entirely clear. It is often more a matter of precise formulation than of the 
precise content. For instance, we may very well take a rule like ‘a person who 
commits manslaughter is punished with a prison sentence of at most fifteen 
years’ as implying the norm ‘one ought not kill other people’.
 Although rules and norms constitute two different categories, a rule may 
contain an embedded norm, or vice versa. A rule that says ‘a person who commits 
manslaughter ought to be punished’ contains an embedded norm ‘ought to be 
punished’. A norm that says ‘one ought to qualify killing on purpose as man-
slaughter’ contains an embedded rule saying that ‘killing on purpose counts as 
manslaughter’. This explanation of the difference between rules and norms may 
seem a bit artificial, but it helps to maintain a distinction between two different 
functions: the qualification task (ascribed to rules), and the behaviour-guiding 
task (ascribed to norms). 
. Ontological claims in different theories of law
Belief and knowledge are usually about something. This means that there is some 
state-of-affairs (or a property or relation) to which a belief is compared for the 
determination of its correctness. In other words: we may say that a belief is cor-
rect if it expresses something that is actually the case. But are there objects that 
the various entities we call ‘the law’ refer to? One of the issues in the natural 
law-legal positivism debate is precisely the ontological status of law: what are 
we talking about when we refer to rules and norms? In section 3.2, I discussed 
different theories of law, and the corresponding epistemic claims. In the present 
section, I explain the ontological claims that can be attached to natural law, legal 
positivism, institutional legal theories, the conventionalist-cum-institutional ap-
proach, and hermeneutic theories respectively (subsections 4.2.1 through 4.2.5). 
Subsequently, these claims are compared (subsection 4.2.6). At the end of that 
subsection, I provide a summary of the claims in table 4.1. The current sec-
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tion serves to show that different views on the law lead to different ontological 
claims, and to analyse the modes of existence distinguished in these claims (cf. 
section 4.6).
.. Natural law
The general ontological claim that can be derived from natural-law theories is 
that some norms objectively exist. Therefore, their existence does not depend 
on subjective factors, like societal conventions or personal preferences. These 
norms provide a framework for the assessment of positive law. The existence of 
positive law may also be claimed, but its existence status is less important than 
the existence of natural law. The validity of positive law depends on the content 
of natural law. There is a conceptually necessary between morality and the valid-
ity of the law (cf. Cliteur 1989, p. 363). If some law is morally objectionable, i.e., if 
it does not comply with the moral principles embedded in natural law, then that 
law is not valid. The source of validity of positive law is thus found in natural law, 
in addition to conventions or institutional conditions.
 The source of existence of positive law, however, may be different. If validity is 
not a necessary condition for the existence of positive law, it may exist in other 
ways, so that we may account for the existence of morally objectionable legal 
rules, for instance by their efficacy. To be more precise in stating the ontological 
claim, in a natural law view, norms that do not satisfy the criteria of natural law 
are not part of the system of positive law. Rather, positive law consists of norms 
and rules, whose (moral) validity is checked against the norms of natural law. 
.. Legal positivism
An ontological claim compatible with the general characteristics of legal 
positivism is that positive law is valid whenever it is issued by an authority. The 
absence of a conceptually necessary connection between morality and positive 
law means that a morally objectionable law can still be a valid law (cf. Brouwer 
1997). The only link between morality and positive law is that positive law will 
often be based on moral principles, and that interpretations of positive law will 
also be influenced by those principles. However, there is not a conceptually 
necessary link.
 Both norms and rules are part of positive law – here a major difference with 
natural law is found. The validity of positive law is derived from the issuing au-
thority. The rules of positive law can be translated into norms. These norms say 
what one may, ought or ought not do. They derive their normative power from 
the validity of the rules of positive law. 
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.. Institutional theories of law
The ontological claim that can be attached to institutional legal theories in 
general is that law’s existence is supervenient on brute facts. The law consists of 
institutional legal facts that combine the factual dimension of the law with its 
normative dimension (cf. Hage 1998, p. 141-142). MacCormick and Weinberger 
(1986, p. 38) claim that criteria of existence depend on the type of object whose 
existence is at stake. This implies that to say a stone exists means something dif-
ferent from saying that a marriage exists. The assumption that the meaning of 
the predicate ‘exists’ varies resembles the assumption that is made in this thesis 
about the varying meaning of the predicate ‘knowledge’. Both assumptions are 
indebted to Wittgenstein (1953) for his introduction of the concept of ‘family 
resemblance’, which places the meaning of natural-language terms in its actual 
use.
 MacCormick and Weinberger distinguish three modes of existence of norms 
(ibid., p. 40). These are all related to their existence ‘in the realm of human con-
sciousness’. First, the members of a norm-issuing authority are conscious of the 
fact that something ought to be the case. Second, the members of a community 
in which norms are issued, are aware of the obligatoriness of norms. Third, a 
member of a community may have knowledge of some norm (of the fact that 
something ought to be the case) without actually behaving in accordance with 
the norm. Norms influence behaviour. The mere awareness of the norm then 
constitutes part of its existence. Norms motivate people to behave in certain 
ways. People behave in those ways for different reasons, among which the vol-
untary acceptance of their normative character, the imitative instinct of people, 
behaving according to patterns that are institutionalised in law, and by the threat 
of coercion (ibid.).
 In addition, the authors distinguish three types of rules with which legal enti-
ties are manipulated: institutive, consequential, and terminative rules. Institutive 
rules bring into existence some kind of legal entity (e.g., a contract). Conse-
quential rules define consequences attached to there being in existence some 
legal entity (e.g., one has to comply with the conditions in a contract, if there is 
a contract). Terminative rules put an end to the existence of some legal entity 
(e.g., a divorce puts an end to a marriage) (ibid., pp. 52-53). An instance (token) 
of a legal institution (e.g., a particular marriage) exists in time, as consequence of 
it being created by an institutive rule, maintained by a consequential rule, and 
ended by a terminative rule. The institutions (as types) do not need that kind of 
existence (ibid., p. 53). Institutions exist prior to any of their instances. A legal 
system must contain an institutive rule in order to initiate the existence of an 
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institution as a type (ibid., p. 55). MacCormick and Weinberger (ibid., p. 9) do not 
articulate the kind of existence they assume for institutions as types. Although 
MacCormick compares such existence with the existence of Platonic ideas 
(ibid., p. 55), he immediately puts this remark into perspective as an attempt at 
jocularity (ibid., note 7, p. 75).
 The existence of rules and norms within institutional theories of law can be 
explained in a way similar to the existence of instances of legal institutions. For-
mally created rules and norms will generally start to exist as a consequence of 
an institutive rule, establishing the existence (validity) of a specific rule or norm 
(ibid., p. 14). In addition to this characteristic, MacCormick and Weinberger 
(ibid., p. 15) write:
“[...] [N]orms so understood as pure thought objects, are merely possible 
norms, not entities which become real merely in virtue of being thought 
about. They become real only by becoming operative as part of an action-
guiding system for some person or group.”
The point they make is that norms become only real norms because of their ef-
ficacy in an action-guiding system of rules applicable to a community or to cer-
tain persons or institutions. I discussed three modes of existence MacCormick 
and Weinberger (1986) distinguish for norms. They have in common that they 
amount to mental existence: their residence is ‘in the head’, not just as normative 
content, but also as action-guiding entities. In the institutional framework pro-
vided by MacCormick and Weinberger, norms have this extra layer of existence 
as an addition to the validity they derive from the underlying rules.
.. A conventionalist-cum-institutional approach
In a conventionalist-cum-institutional approach, the additional ontological 
claim is that existence of legal facts is attained through recognition by a suf-
ficiently large group of individuals, or by institutional rules, or by both. Thus, it 
introduces the conventional layer as constituting existence directly. In an insti-
tutional theory, existence is constituted by rules whose conditions are fulfilled 
and whose consequences establish or maintain facts. In a conventionalist theory, 
existence is constituted by agreement in belief among a relevant part of a com-
munity. Existence of a token of the consequence type of some legal rule (e.g., 
a specific marriage) can be constituted by both the institutional dimension (its 
existence is triggered by a rule) and the conventional dimension (its existence is 
generally agreed upon by a community) (Peczenik and Hage 2000). In the ex-
ample, the existence of a specific marriage can be both constituted by the legal 
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rule of which the application leads to the marriage, and by the acceptance of the 
marriage by a community.
 As to the existence of rules and norms, both types of entities can acquire their 
existence from either conventional or institutional establishment. In most cases, 
rules derive their existence from institutional establishment, whereas norms 
generally derive their existence from conventional establishment. 
.. Hermeneutic theories
As ontological and epistemological claims cannot be completely separated in 
hermeneutic theories, it is not possible to make purely ontological claims about 
the existence of legal entities. Still, the result of an interaction between the per-
son who knows something and the object of his knowledge yields, for instance, 
an interpretation. This interpretation may be claimed to exist, even if it does 
not itself correspond to some object whose existence was established before 
the interpretation activity took place. Hermeneutic theories do not assume that 
the result of the interpretation activity is completely arbitrary. On the contrary, 
Dworkin’s (1986) hermeneutic theory assumes that one interpretation can be 
better than another interpretation – better, in fact, than all other interpreta-
tions (cf. subsection 3.2.5). Such a claim is made from the internal point of view, 
though. This means that such claims primarily have meaning for the community 
within which the interpretation was made. 
 The dimension constituting existence of interpreted legal entities (norms 
etc.) within hermeneutic theories is the activity of Verstehen, carried out by an 
authority. The activity establishes such interpretations. In hermeneutic theories 
of law the activity of Verstehen is regarded a necessary step in articulating liter-
ally stated legal norms and rules. As there is no strict distinction between the 
descriptive and the normative, between rules and facts, and between the law and 
its interpretation, it is hard to leave room for clear existence claims. Still, it seems 
to me that the activity of Verstehen often induces individual or authoritative rec-
ognition as a mode of existence for an articulated norm or rule.
.. Comparing the claims
What is the difference between the ontological claims of the theories discussed? 
As regards the existence of ‘the law’, the claims apply to different objects, such 
as legal rules and legal norms. Because of this, in some of the views, a general 
ontological claim on the elements constituting the legal domain can hardly be 
made. Rather, we have to distinguish the different types of entities we regard 
as part of ‘the law’, and assess their ontological status. Moreover, the existence 
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claims have different natures. Most notable, however, is the fact that claims re-
garding the nature of the existence of objects influence claims regarding the 
existence of objects, and vice versa. If validity is taken to be the mode of existence 
of legal norms, then only valid legal norms exist. With respect to the nature of 
the existence claims, we have to distinguish between the different layers consti-
tuting existence (see section 4.6). 
 Ontological claims also depend on the perspective taken by the observers of 
entities; there is a distinction between the internal perspective and the external 
perspective. Hart (1961, 97ff.) explains the difference between the existence and 
the validity of a norm as becoming clear when we take a certain perspective 
towards the law. Validity is only a meaningful term from an internal perspective; 
it refers to the situation in which a legal rule complies with the rule of recog-
nition (cf. subsection 4.4.2). Existence is a meaningful term from an external 
perspective, where the actual rule-following behaviour of a social group may be 
a measure for the existence of a rule. Its efficacy determines its existence. 
 In a traditional natural-law view, the existence status claim applies to the law 
as an entity existing independently from human beings. In that case, the validity 
of positive law depends on its conformity with natural law. The ontological sta-
tus layer ‘existence’ applies to natural law itself. Moral principles are interwoven 
with natural law, and thus there is a link between the validity of law and the 
presence of moral principles. In legal positivism, the law is identified with posi-
tive law, and the validity of positive law depends on authorities promulgating 
positive law. In Hart’s view, however, in addition to the validity of positive law 
from the internal perspective, existence can be a meaningful dimension when 
the law is regarded from an external perspective.
 Institutional theories of law make explicit ontological claims about legal 
entities: the law is regarded as supervenient on brute facts. This supervenience 
can take the form of validity or constitution. The existence of normative enti-
ties, like norms, is thus given appropriate attention. However, by addressing the 
normative dimension of legal norms, one has not yet answered the question 
whether there is a link between law and morality. In their discussion of morality, 
institutional theories of law seem to conform with legal positivism. Apart from 
the institutional accounts that it shares with institutional theories of law, the 
conventionalist-cum-institutional theory of law also involves a different form of 
existence, namely the form of existence invoked by recognition. Recognition 
may count as a prerequisite for the existence of conventions: if most of the in-
dividuals belonging to a community believe that something is the case, and rec-
ognise this fact, the fact exists. Hermeneutic theories, finally, involve individual 
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and authoritative recognition rather than such claims as existence and validity. 
 In table 4.1, I provide an overview of the ontological claims in different legal-
philosophical positions with respect to norms and legal rules, and the phenom-
ena from which these ontological claims are derived.
view ontological status of legal 
norms and legal rules
derived from
natural law validity moral principles
legal positivism validity proper issuing authority
institutional theories 
of law
validity/mental existence/
efficacy
institutional establishment/
moral awareness etc.
conventionalist/ 
institutional approach
efficacy/validity conventions/institutional 
establishment
hermeneutic 
theories of law
recognition Verstehen
Table 4.1. Ontological claims with respect to norms and legal rules
. Two objects of legal knowledge
In this section, I discuss two objects of legal knowledge in more detail, viz. sys-
tematisations and interpretations. I set out with an explanation of the concept 
of systematisation (subsection 4.3.1). A systematisation is a categorisation of legal 
rules in terms of general criteria. Then I explain the concept of interpretation 
(subsection 4.3.2). An interpretation is the result of someone’s explanation of 
some fact, phenomenon or symbol. 
.. Systematisations
There exist different views in legal theory about the activity of systematisation, 
and, consequently, about the ontological status of the result of this activity (also 
called systematisation). I subsequently discuss the views of Aarnio (1987), Pec-
zenik and Hage (2000), and Brouwer (1999). 
 Aarnio (1987, p. 136) regards systematisation of the law as a theoretical, scien-
tific activity. The object of a systematisation, and its product, he claims, are both 
(part of) the legal system (ibid., p. 136-137). The systematisation activity classifies 
legal norms into different classes, according to some conceptual schema that has 
been prepared for that purpose. If some systematisation remains unchallenged, 
this does not yield any problem. But in many cases different, competing and 
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mutually inconsistent (or incoherent) systematisations exist for the same legal 
system and legal rules respectively. This characteristic is essential to the legal 
domain, but it may defeat the consistency of legal reality.
 In subsection 4.2.4, I discussed a conventionalist-cum-institutional theory of 
law. Peczenik and Hage (2000) embed this theory in a coherence theory of law, 
in which systematisations are accommodated. Legal dogmatics also connects 
the legal system “with its background in the form of morality and (political) 
philosophy” (ibid., p. 6). Thus, not only internal coherence (coherence in the 
system of legal rules), but also external coherence (coherence among the legal 
system and its background) is aimed at. But what does such a theory say about 
the existence of systematisations? Can there be a correspondence between some 
belief about an entity and the entity itself (such as a systematisation)? Or is a 
systematisation only established when it is introduced and – maybe – believed 
by a certain number of people?
 As an answer to these questions, Peczenik and Hage (ibid.) claim that a proce-
dural theory of law can account both for knowledge of the law and existence of 
the law. Procedures can be used to acquire knowledge of the law by using those 
procedures for exchanging reasons for a certain opinion. Thereby we attain (a 
form of) justification for that opinion. Thus, contrary to the situation in which 
we have a justification for believing some brute fact, we have a justification for 
a procedurally constructed fact. In case we have a belief about a brute fact, the 
justification itself does not influence that fact (as the fact is independent of our 
beliefs about it, and independent of our justification for those beliefs). In case 
we have a belief about a procedurally constructed fact, the justification (the rea-
sons we provide for the fact) constitutes – at least partially – the existence of that 
fact (cf. ibid., p. 9-10 and Hage 1997, p. 30-31).
 Brouwer (1999, p. 222-224) distinguishes between equivalent and non-equiv-
alent systematisations. Equivalent systematisations consist of legal material that is 
merely ordered according to, for instance, date of issue. An equivalent systema-
tisation does not add to the content of the basic material it is constituted by 
(e.g., codified legal rules). In a non-equivalent systematisation, an interpretative 
step is taken. Such a systematisation is the result of interpreting legal material. 
In a non-equivalent systematisation, the criterion of coherence (or some other 
criterion) may lead us to reject some part of the basic material. Therefore, the 
systematisation is not equivalent to the basic material it is based on (i.e., it does 
not consist only of that material). Brouwer’s approach towards systematisation is 
a non-equivalent one. 
 Brouwer (ibid.) claims that the systematisation of positive law is an attempt at 
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rationality. The rationality consists in the demands that an individual legal deci-
sion should be sufficiently justified, and that the justifying reasons for individual 
legal decisions should cohere (ibid., p. 219-220). Justifying reasons derive their 
status from legal norms, and thus, according to Brouwer, one could also say that 
legal norms should cohere. The activity of constructing a systematisation starts 
from certain assumptions. On the basis of these assumptions, systematisation 
criteria are developed. The resulting systematisation depends on these criteria. 
Three elements play a role in determining such criteria: (1) the view on the 
elements present in the domain, that is subject to the systematisation, (2) the 
relations among these elements, and (3) the demands that are deemed necessary 
to attain a well-ordered system (ibid.). 
 The systematisation activity thus partly depends on the view one has on the 
ontology of the domain: what are the elements in that domain, and what are the 
relations among them? These are ontological questions that have to be answered 
prior to establishing a systematisation. In addition, we can make claims about the 
ontological status of systematisations themselves. From Brouwer’s discussion, we 
may cautiously conclude that, insofar as we can attach any ontological status to a 
systematisation, it depends on ontological decisions made earlier, on a level be-
low the systematisation. However, the systematisation’s ontological status need 
not be the same as the ontological status of the components it is constructed 
from.
.. Interpretations
In this subsection, I subsequently discuss the views on the ontological status of 
interpretation put forward by Aarnio (1987) and Brouwer (1997). 
 Aarnio (1987, p. 136) regards interpretation as a practical activity, essential to 
legal practice. He claims that the object of interpretations, and the product of 
the interpretation activity are both part of the legal system (ibid., p. 136-137). In 
the interpretation activity, the interpretation of a specific norm is chosen from 
the realm of all possible interpretations. Both activities make up legal reality. If 
some interpretation remains unchallenged, this is not even problematic. But dif-
ferent, competing and mutually inconsistent (or incoherent) interpretations may 
exist for the same legal rules.
 On the nature of interpretation, from a legal-positivist viewpoint, Brouwer 
(1997, p. 141) remarks that the meaning of a legal norm is given by the authori-
ties responsible for establishing that norm and/or modifying it. The meaning of 
a norm is determined by the rules of language and the rules stating conventions 
for some of these terms (the meaning of legal terms may differ from the ‘natural’ 
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meaning of the same term, which is the case with terms like ‘murder’). In most 
cases, the meaning of legal norms is clear, and sufficient to determine whether 
it applies to a certain case. There are also cases in which the meanings of legal 
norms are not clear. In such a case, a judge determines the meaning of a norm 
by filling it in for that specific case, and he thereby performs judicial construc-
tion (on the assumption that judicial construction starts where judicial applica-
tion ends).
 What matters in this subsection is the ontological status of the result of the in-
terpretation activity (as opposed to the interpretation activity itself). But because 
of the nature of the interpretation activity, different demands may be imposed 
on the way the existence of the interpretation activity result is secured. A judge’s 
recognition of an interpretation may outweigh a community’s recognition of 
that interpretation. Because of the specific function and capabilities of a judge, 
either his recognition of his own interpretation, or the efficacy of his interpreta-
tion, may be deemed necessary to call the interpretation existent. For instance, a 
judge’s decision to sentence a suspect to four years of imprisonment only exists 
when it is actually enforced (if efficacy is the main criterion for existence).
. Two views on the existence modes of legal systems
As to the existence of legal systems, and of the different entities belonging to it, 
different claims were made in the history of legal philosophy. What is more, the 
leading philosophical positions center on existence claims. These were briefly 
discussed in section 4.2. Legal philosophy in the twentieth century is dominated 
by two different versions of legal positivism. Kelsen (1960) and Hart (1961) are 
the main representatives of this view in legal philosophy. Kelsen’s positivism 
is more extreme than Hart’s. Whereas Kelsen takes a validity-conferring basic 
norm as a starting point of a legal system, Hart employs a rule of recognition, 
which is embedded in an empirical view on the law. Recognition is an apparent 
social phenomenon: the legal system exists by virtue of its acceptance by a sig-
nificant part of the community to which it applies. In the following subsections, 
I discuss Kelsen’s Grundnorm (subsection 4.4.1), Hart’s rule of recognition 
(subsection 4.4.2), and the difference between validity and existence (subsection 
4.4.3). 
.. Kelsen’s Grundnorm
Kelsen’s positivism arises from the assumption that the existence of a so-called 
basic norm (Grundnorm) is supposed, that provides the ground for the validity 
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of the norms in a legal system (Kelsen 1979, p. 203ff.). Kelsen states that the basic 
norm is a fictitious norm because it not only fails to reflect a factual situation 
(there is no act of will constituting such a norm), it is also inherently contradic-
tory, because such a norm both poses the authority of its own content, and it 
requires that its authority is confirmed externally (ibid., p. 206-207): the basic 
norm cannot attain the authority of its own content without external confir-
mation of that content.
 The basic norm confers validity to the top of a pyramid. This pyramid reflects 
the hierarchy among norms. The validity of the norms at a lower level in the 
pyramid is ultimately derived from the basic norm. At the top of the pyramid we 
find the constitution. This is the constitution in a material sense, i.e., the norms 
that enable authorities to create and abolish legal norms (Kelsen 1960, p. 228). 
Below the constitution, we find the general norms that were created by legisla-
tion and custom, as regulated by the constitution (ibid., p. 230-235). These norms 
regulate what institutions and procedures are to be observed, and what the con-
tent of the individual norms is that have to be created by these institutions and 
procedures (ibid.). Below these general norms, we find the individual norms: the 
norms that apply to specific cases, derived from the nature of the general norm 
and the characteristics of the case (ibid.).
.. Hart’s rule of recognition
In ‘The Concept of Law’, Hart (1961) sketches a moderate form of legal positiv-
ism, in which the so-called rule of recognition broadens the basis of the legal 
system from mere validity to existence. He distinguishes between primary rules 
and secondary rules. The former are typical legal rules such as obligations. The 
latter are rules that identify the former: a rule of recognition comprises of the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to make some primary rule part 
of the legal system. Except for rules of recognition, there are rules of change, 
enabling, among other things, the enactment of rules, and rules of adjudication, 
conferring the power to make an authoritative decision on whether some pri-
mary rule has been broken to a certain person or institution and determining 
the procedure to be followed (ibid., p. 92-94). 
 The rule of recognition is a validity-conferring source. Hart (ibid., p. 97ff.) 
opposes validity of rules to existence of rules. He states that the term validity in 
most cases refers to a situation in which statements are made on legal rules from 
the internal perspective. Existence claims are made from the external perspec-
tive. Validity is only a meaningful term from an internal perspective; it refers 
to the situation in which a legal rule complies with the rule of recognition. 
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Existence is a meaningful term from an external perspective, where the actual 
rule-following behaviour of a social group may be a measure for the existence 
of a rule. Its efficacy determines its existence. However, there is no necessary 
connection between the validity of a rule and its efficacy. The validity of a rule 
is determined entirely by its compliance with the criteria defined in the rule of 
recognition. The rule of recognition arises from legal practice, and, in contrast 
with the validity it confers to legal rules, it is not itself valid. Its existence is not a 
matter of validity, but a matter of fact (ibid., p. 107). In table 4.2, the ontological 
status of rules is summarised.
rules internal perspective external perspective
ontological claim validity existence
source of 
ontological status
rule of recognition efficacy
Table 4.2. Ontological status of rules in Hart’s view
.. The difference between validity and existence
Ruiter (1993, p. 17ff.) explains what he sees as the differences and similarities 
between Hart’s and Kelsen’s views with respect to the status and structure of 
legal systems. He claims that Hart’s and Kelsen’s views are very similar, and that 
they only have a terminological controversy, namely on the question whether to 
use the term ‘validity’ (Kelsen) or ‘existence’ (Hart) for characterising the status 
of a legal system. According to Ruiter, the accounts of validity and existence 
essentially amount to a single phenomenon: the status of a legal system is that 
of “a presumed source of legal validity, provided that it is accepted as such in 
practice” (ibid., p. 19).
 In my opinion, such an attempt to regard two views as equal is not desirable. 
Validity is only one of the phenomena contributing to existence. Hart explic-
itly distinguishes between validity and existence, and between the perspectives 
from which these status layers can be perceived. Kelsen focuses on validity and 
efficacy (cf. Kelsen 1960, p. 10). Ruiter locates the element of recognition in the 
relation between a community and a legal system, and derives validity from the 
recognised legal system: the legal system is a source of validity for legal rules.
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. Weaving cloth: elements of argumentation
In distinguishing the entities present in the legal domain, we could be distracted 
from the relations that exist between those entities, and the ways in which both 
the entities and the relations between them are brought into existence. A phe-
nomenon of considerable importance to the legal domain is argumentation. 
Argumentation is the process that leads to – or justifies – decisions, systematisa-
tions, interpretations etc. This process can be executed in different forms and 
configurations: an individual may develop an argument, or two individuals 
may do so in a dispute that is subject to a number of rules. For a discussion of 
dialogical reasoning in the legal domain, in which two parties exchange argu-
ments, I refer to Gordon (1995), Leenes (1998) and Lodder (1998). The structure 
and content of an argumentation process can be regulated to different degrees. 
Argumentation in the legal domain is bound to certain conditions laid down 
in law. These conditions regard legal procedure and applicable material law. But 
argumentation is not restricted by these conditions alone. Rather, it is subject 
to rhetoric traditions that may be present in the societies in which legal systems 
subsist.
 It is important to note that legal argumentation often does not seem congru-
ous with logic. Logic, the discipline that investigates valid argumentation, is 
often too rigid in its demands on validity to be able to accommodate rhetoric 
elements in its formalisations. Attempts have been made to incorporate some 
of the typical aspects of legal argumentation. Such attempts resulted, e.g., in the 
development and application of defeasible logics. These logics are not monoto-
nous, which means that a valid conclusion may no longer be valid if new infor-
mation is added to the body of information on which the conclusion was based. 
For accounts of defeasible reasoning in law, I refer to Prakken (1993, 1997), 
Verheij (1996) and Hage (1997). 
 Prakken clarifies the layers into which the application of logic to legal argu-
mentation can be divided. First, in the logic layer, individual arguments are con-
structed, i.e., pieces of information are arranged in such a way that they support 
a proposition. Second, in the dialectical layer conflicting arguments are compared. 
In this layer arguments may be defeated, and it may be determined whether an 
argument is justified. Third, in the procedural layer, disputes are regulated. Rules 
about the introduction and withdrawal of premises etc. are implemented on this 
level. Fourth, the strategic layer is the layer where it is tried to conduct disputes 
in a rational manner, i.e., to settle a dispute following effective tactics (Prakken 
1999, p. 86).
 Logic does not play a substantial role in those areas where the content of 
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argumentation is most important, i.e., where the main concern is to represent 
meaning. Most logical languages (for instance predicate logic) are hardly capable 
of representing the many subtleties in the meaning of natural language. It may 
function, however, as a means for structuring the argumentation process. The 
diverse structuring functions of logic are expressed in Prakken’s (1999) typology 
of argumentation layers. In the following subsections, I discuss Toulmin’s (1958) 
argumentation scheme (subsection 4.5.1), the notion of a reason (subsection 
4.5.2), and the notion of a defeater (subsection 4.5.3). The goal of the current 
section is to show the role of different elements in the construction of an argu-
ment. These elements are a part of the knowledge-based model of the law in 
chapter 6.
.. Toulmin’s argumentation scheme
Toulmin’s (1958) seminal work on argumentation contains different notions; 
together they constitute a so-called argumentation scheme. These notions are 
datum, warrant, backing, claim, rebuttal, and modal qualifier. Data are facts that are 
appealed to in support of a conclusion (ibid., p. 97). A datum can, for instance, be 
‘Harry was born in Bermuda’ (ibid., p. 98). Warrants are general, hypothesis-style 
statements. They relate two phenomena to each other, for instance in the form 
‘all x are y’, or ‘an x will be a y’. Toulmin (ibid., p. 99) provides the example ‘A 
man born in Bermuda will be a British subject’. Warrants can be supported by 
a so-called backing. A backing often has a factual nature. In case of the example 
above, the warrant takes the following form: “[a] man born in Bermuda will 
generally be a British subject” (ibid., p. 105), and the backing consists of legal 
statutes on British nationality (ibid.). A claim or conclusion is the statement that 
should be justified through the other items (‘Harry is a British subject’, ibid., p. 
99). A rebuttal is a condition under which the claim does not hold (for instance 
the fact that Harry has become a naturalised American, ibid., p. 105). The notion 
of a modal qualifier is used to indicate the expression with which the claim or 
conclusion is restricted. For instance, the phrases ‘almost certainly’ and ‘presum-
ably’ may serve as modal qualifiers (ibid., p. 105, 109).
 Although many amendments have been made on Toulmin’s (1958) scheme, 
its basic categories have played a major role in current argumentation research. 
It forms the basis for the notion of defeasible reasoning, not only by making 
exceptions an explicit part of arguments, but also by focusing on the nature of 
argument instead of on the possibilities of logic. Rather than using good-old 
hard-boiled deduction, Toulmin rationally reconstructed the nature of reason-
ing and concluded that different entities play a role: data (facts), warrants (rules 
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and principles), backings (facts counting as reasons), rebuttals (defeaters) etc. 
(ibid.). The terms between brackets can all be found in the knowledge-based 
model of the law in chapter 6.
 Toulmin’s scheme is a static one; it does not provide a procedural framework 
in which the building or exchange of arguments is analysed. Still, by distin-
guishing the different elements, he provides an onset to a procedural account of 
argumentation: he stresses the importance of the natural order of argumentation 
for his research into the subject (ibid., p. 17). 
.. Reasons
Reasons play a crucial role in argumentation. They can help us to justify a cer-
tain belief, decision or interpretation. For instance, a lawyer may be convinced 
of the guilt of his client by reasons as diverse as the sweat he sees on his client’s 
forehead and the fact that his client has admitted a crime. Hage (1997, p. 11) 
claims that reasons form the most important and basic element of a theory of 
reasoning. The content of a reason determines its relevance and nature with 
respect to the entity it applies to. In most cases, a reason for a particular belief is 
not a reason for another belief. A reason for a belief may have a nature different 
from a reason for an action. Furthermore, a reason may either support the belief 
in a fact, or constitute that fact (Hage 1997, p. 60). Hage (ibid.) calls the former 
category epistemic reasons (reasons to believe), and the latter category constitutive 
reasons (reasons for existence). 
 Reasons are often explicit (I cannot have a reason for a belief without know-
ing what the content of that reason is, although there can be a reason for my 
belief without me knowing it), and because of this, reasons can be similar to 
beliefs. Apart from facts that qualify as reasons, beliefs can acquire a specific 
status: beliefs that are qualified as reasons. This may seem to contradict with the 
assumption that there are such things as constitutive reasons. After all, constitu-
tive reasons operate at an ontological rather than an epistemological level. The 
presence of some rule may be an immediate reason for the establishment of, 
for instance, some duty, without someone knowing that duty. Raz (1975, p. 17) 
writes:
“Beliefs are sometimes reasons, but it would be wrong to regard all reasons 
as beliefs. It should be remembered that reasons are used to guide behav-
iour, and people are to be guided by what is the case, not by what they 
believe to be the case. To be sure, in order to be guided by what is the case 
a person must come to believe that it is the case. Nevertheless it is the fact 
and not his belief in it which should guide him and which is a reason. If p 
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is the case, then the fact that I do not believe that p does not establish that p 
is not a reason for me to perform some action.”
Raz’ (1975) observations about the difference between beliefs and reasons are a 
ground for me to distinguish between personal and impersonal reasons. Personal 
reasons are beliefs or facts qualified as a reason by a particular individual (the 
fact that it rains is a reason for me to stay at work). Impersonal reasons derive 
their status as a reason from their particular meaning in a system of rules or from 
their place in a causal chain (the fact that someone has was born as the child 
of two British citizens is a reason for him to have the British nationality). The 
notion of an impersonal reason is based on a reconstruction of some process, in 
which certain elements clearly function as reasons. Impersonal reasons arise from 
systemic recognition: the recognition of something (a proposition, a fact) as a 
reason is based on the presence of rules that produce such reasons.
 In order to provide a more fine-grained typification of reasons, I describe 
seven distinctions. The first distinction is made according to the type of sub-
ject who recognises the reason. The resulting reason types are personal reasons, 
impersonal reasons, and authoritative reasons. Personal reasons are personal 
beliefs qualified as reasons by individual recognition. A personal reason applies 
to a belief, i.e., it is a reason for a certain belief. Impersonal reasons are things 
(propositions, facts) qualified as reasons by systemic recognition. Their content 
and validity depend on the content of rules in the system in which they are is-
sued. Authoritative reasons are personal beliefs qualified as reasons by authorita-
tive recognition. For instance, a decision of a judge can be backed (partially) by 
authoritative reasons: reasons the judge cannot derive from applicable law, but 
that he can propose and use due to his function. The content of authoritative 
reasons is not determined by the system in which they are used. However, their 
‘validity’ (the fact that they are authoritative) is a consequence of the system; the 
system contains rules that leave discretionary power to individuals. The differ-
ence between impersonal reasons and authoritative reasons is analogous to the 
difference between deductive justification and second-order justification made 
by MacCormick (1978).
 The second distinction is between explanatory and guiding reasons (Raz 
1975, p. 18-19, cf. also Hage 1997, p. 35). They regard the nature of the relation 
between the reason and the object it applies to. Explanatory reasons are causes 
for behaviour or events. An explanatory reason for someone’s behaviour really 
holds as a reason for that person’s behaviour in a specific case. Guiding reasons 
are reasons why we should act in a certain way, or should refrain from that act; 
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they determine what ought to be the case (Raz 1975, p. 18). Raz (ibid.) claims 
that explanatory reasons presuppose the existence of guiding reasons; to explain 
one’s behaviour in terms of explanatory reasons implies that one knows what 
guiding reasons there are in a specific case for one’s actions. Reasons for physi-
cal actions, however, are not my main concern. Rather, reasons for beliefs, and 
reasons for decisions are at stake.
 This takes us to a third distinction of reasons: the distinction which regards 
the object of the reason; the thing, the event, or the belief it is a reason for. I 
distinguish between reasons for beliefs, reasons for actions, reasons for decisions, 
reasons for classifications, reasons for interpretations, and last, but not least, rea-
sons for reasons (for the former three reason object types, cf. Hage 1997, p. 60). 
This is not an exhaustive enumeration of objects, but it suffices for the legal 
domain.
 The fourth and fifth distinctions are between the sources of reasons. We have 
to distinguish between content sources and origination sources. In a legal con-
text, the content of reasons arises from formal sources of law, material sources of 
law, or mere deliberation by some person. The origination sources of reasons are 
the same as the sources of legal belief (cf. subsection 2.5.2): perception, memory, 
testimony, consciousness, reason, and interpretation. For instance, a reason for 
the fact that Napster furthers copyright infringement may be that it does not 
prevent its users from making available copyright-protected materials. The con-
tent sources of this reason are two observations: (1) the way in which Napster 
works (its users make available music), and (2) the fact that Napster refrains from 
acting upon these infringements. The origination sources of this reason can be 
perception and testimony.
 The sixth distinction is between external modalities: what characteristic 
qualifies the relation between the reason and its object? Hage (1997, p. 60) 
distinguishes between epistemic, deontic and anankastic modalities, related to 
the corresponding types of reasons. Epistemic reasons are reasons to assume 
something, or reasons that make something probable (ibid., p. 73-74). Deontic 
reasons are reasons that contribute to the establishing of obligations, permis-
sions, or prohibitions (ibid., p. 65-66). Anankastic reasons regard the necessity or 
possibility of facts (ibid., p. 71-72). For instance, if a competent judge decides that 
Napster infringes copyright, this makes it probable that a damage claim from a 
record company will be rewarded. Thus, the external modality of the reason (the 
establishment of copyright infringement by Napster) is probability. The prob-
ability regards the likelihood that a damage claim will be rewarded.
 The seventh distinction also regards modalities. In this case, however, the inter-
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nal modalities of reasons are concerned. Reasons may contain modalities such as 
‘it is likely that...’, ‘this induces an obligation to...’, and ‘it is permitted to...’. The 
modalities that are used to specify the object that a reason refers to, may also be 
used to specify the reason itself. For example, in case a damage claim on Nap-
ster will probably be rewarded, and this constitutes a reason to believe that such 
claims can also be made on Napster’s users, the internal modality of the reason 
is probability. 
 I have thus specified the characteristics of a reason: a reason has a content, 
a subject, an object, and a specific relation between subject and content, and 
between content and object. The content of a reason reflects (part of) its mean-
ing relative to its subject and object; it reflects why it is a reason. The subject of 
a reason is a person, a group of persons or an authority, or there is no subject 
at all. The object of a reason is a belief, an action, a decision, a classification, an 
interpretation, or another reason. The nature of the relation between the subject 
and the reason depends on the nature of the subject; in case of a personal reason, 
the individual has a belief, which means that he has a ‘believing attitude’ towards 
the content of the reason. But he may also have a reason to act in a certain 
way without believing that reason. In case of an impersonal reason the relation 
should be causal or systemic (constitutive). In case of an authoritative reason the 
relation is systemic (constitutive); its systemic nature is derived from the discre-
tion ascribed to the subject. The nature of the relation between the reason and 
the object is explanatory (description of causes) or guiding (normative). 
recognising subject reason type object content source
personal
impersonal
authoritative
explanatory
guiding
belief
action
decision
classification
interpretation
reason
formal sources
material sources
deliberation
origination source external modality internal modality
perception
memory
testimony
consciousness
reason
interpretation
epistemic
deontic
anankastic
epistemic
deontic
anankastic
Table 4.3. Characteristics of reasons
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In brief, the characteristics of a reason are: it has a content, a subject (in most 
cases), an object, and a specific relation between subject and the reason’s content, 
and between the reason’s content and object. Furthermore, the reason’s content 
has two sources: one for its content and one for its origination, and there are 
modalities involved in two places: with respect to the content of the reason, and 
with respect to the object of the reason. In table 4.3, I give an overview of the 
characteristics of reasons.
.. Defeaters
A special class of reasons is formed by defeaters. Defeaters undermine reasons. 
Defeaters that directly attack the conclusions of an argument are called ‘rebut-
ting defeaters’. Defeaters that attack the relation between a reason and its con-
clusion are called ‘undercutting defeaters’. With an undercutting defeater, the 
assumption is challenged that some statement or fact is indeed a reason for a 
conclusion (Pollock 1999, p. 196). Just as reasons, defeaters can be classified ac-
cording to the distinctions made above. A defeater has a content, a subject, an 
object, and there is a specific relation between subject and content, and between 
content and object. Defeaters are not always regarded as reasons. Rather than 
considering defeaters as individual entities, Verheij (1996, p. 121) takes a holistic 
approach, in which a defeater is a relation between challenging and challenged 
arguments. 
 Defeaters can be both beliefs classified as defeaters and facts classified as de-
featers. However, the object of a defeater can only be a reason or a belief. De-
featers do not apply to actions, decisions, classifications, and interpretations. A 
defeater d for a reason r is a reason why the reason r does not hold with respect 
to some object (e.g., a belief). Focus is thus on r’s status as a reason. A defeater for 
a belief r is a reason why the belief r does not hold. If some entity has multiple 
statuses (it is a belief and a reason at the same time), a defeater may apply to its 
status as a belief as well as to its status as a reason. Generally, if there is a defeater 
for the belief, this will influence the status of that belief as a reason as well. But 
if there is a defeater for the belief ’s status qua reason, this need not influence the 
status of the belief itself. 
 Defeaters can be classified according to the type of attack they are used for. 
With respect to a belief, defeaters can attack one of its status layers, its content, 
the assumption that it is held by a certain person, or the state-of-affairs it refers 
to. It is not a coincidence that these modes of attack are reminiscent of the 
knowledge criteria listed in section 2.3; reasons and defeaters (as a special class of 
reasons) are based on the same phenomena and relations as knowledge criteria. 
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Thus, the belief that Napster’s users make copyright infringements may be de-
feated. The example below shows this.
p: Napster’s users make copyright infringements
q: Napster’s users make available copyright-protected material via the Inter-
net
r: The fact that Napster’s users make available copyright-protected material 
via the Internet does not constitute a form of reproduction or publication, 
and hence, does not constitute copyright infringement
s: Napster does not have any users any more
In this example, proposition q counts as a reason for proposition p; it inconclu-
sively supports that proposition. If John believes that q, and John’s believes that p, 
then proposition q is a reason for John to believe that p (that is to say: to hold the 
belief that p). Proposition r counts as an undercutting defeater for reason q. Thus, 
if John believes p on the basis of reason q, then r makes him not believe p on the 
basis that q no longer supports p. Proposition s counts as a rebutting defeater for 
reason q. Whereas q is a reason for p, q and s together cannot possibly support p.
 Defeaters can be typified in terms of the characteristics of reasons listed in 
subsection 4.5.2. Thus, the nature of a defeater depends on, among other things, 
the type of subject, the nature of the relation between defeater and object, and 
its object. First, as regards the type of subject, the defeater is a personal reason, 
an impersonal reason, or an authoritative reason. The relevance of this distinc-
tion is caused by the fact that a defeater may only function as a defeater for an 
individual, but that it also may function as a defeater for a community, or for an 
authority. The recognition of a belief as a defeater by a legal authority may have 
major consequences for a judgement. 
 Second, the nature of the relation between a defeater and its object is relevant 
because, like a reason, a defeater may be either guiding or explanatory. Guiding 
defeaters say why something ought not be the case. Explanatory defeaters say why 
something is not the case. The difference boils down to a normative/descriptive 
distinction for defeaters.
 Third, the different types of defeaters specified above (rebutting and under-
cutting) can be traced back to a defeater’s object: if the object is the content of 
some proposition, then it is a rebutting defeater. If a defeater’s object is the rea-
son status of some proposition, it is an undercutting defeater. In the specification 
of a defeater, its sources and modalities also play a role. 
 The specification of a defeater in terms of these characteristics is comparable 
to the specification of a reason. The other three distinctions (sources of defeat-
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ers, external modalities and internal modalities) are the same as those for reasons. 
However, external and internal modalities work negatively; because they are 
formulated negatively, their presence enables us to attack reasons instead of sup-
porting them.
. Ontological status layers
The discussion of ontological claims with respect to the law in general (section 
4.2) and with respect to legal systems (section 4.4) is summarised in the current 
subsection. Rather than discussing ontological claims from different viewpoints 
in philosophy of law, I give an overview of ontological status layers that can be 
derived from those different viewpoints. I distinguish between the following 
status layers: validity and existence (subsection 4.6.1), recognition (subsection 
4.6.2), constitution (subsection 4.6.3), and efficacy (subsection 4.6.4).
 In brief, these status layers amount to the following. A legal entity (a legal 
rule, norm, or decision) is valid if a legal system implicitly or explicitly provides 
the criteria for the validity of that entity, and these criteria are fulfilled for that 
entity. A legal entity is legally recognised if it is accepted by an individual in his 
capacity as a legal professional, or by a legal institution. A legal entity is legally 
constituted if that entity is the result of applying a valid legal rule, or if the entity 
is the result of the use of a discretionary power backed by the legal system. A 
legal entity (a legal rule, norm or decision) is legally efficacious if it has a signifi-
cant effect on the mental condition and the actions of a group of individuals, 
i.e., if it affects their actions, and it does so because of its being part of a legal 
system.
 Some status layers can only be applied to a limited number of legal entity 
types. Status layers can be combined. For instance, a legal rule may be valid, con-
stituted, recognised and efficacious at the same time. It is legally valid because it 
was enacted through legal procedures, it is legally constituted because it is a rule 
that counts as a legal rule (because of its validity in a legal system), it is legally 
recognised if it is accepted by a relevant legal institution, and it is efficacious if it 
is actually followed by a community.
.. Validity and existence
To elaborate on the difference between validity and existence, we have to distin-
guish between the internal perspective and the external perspective on the law 
(for a discussion of this distinction, cf. Brouwer 1997, p. 109-117). The internal 
perspective is taken by a person who considers himself as a subject of a legal 
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system. For this person, the law consists of binding norms, that impose rights 
and obligations (ibid., p. 110). Legal decisions and acts are being justified with an 
appeal to valid (binding) law. The external perspective is taken by someone who 
is not the subject of the legal system he observes, at least he does not consider 
the system in that capacity. Rather, he takes a descriptive and explanatory stance 
towards the law, or even a predictive one (ibid., p. 111-112). The judgements such 
a person makes on the characteristics of a legal system are not legal judgements. 
The aim in employing an external perspective is to make true statements about 
the legal system instead of making justified legal decisions.
 Validity and existence should be distinguished, as they do not necessarily co-
incide. Validity arises from adequate validity-conferring sources; it is a status lay-
er, imposed on certain objects. Validity may require the existence of the object 
it applies to. Existence is then employed as a term for a basic ontological claim 
with respect to objects (something is, but we do not know yet in what way). 
Their actual type of existence is constituted by the status layers that are im-
posed on them, such as recognition and validity. Still, validity and existence are 
intertwined, not only because validity is a potential characteristic of existence 
(and thus, it is one of the ontological status layers), but also because validity may 
invoke existence. Moreover, in Kelsen’s legal-positivist view, validity is equal to 
existence: validity is the only way in which legal norms can exist. The validity of 
some object, for instance a legal decision, may contribute to its existence in the 
sense that the validity status is a necessary (and maybe even sufficient) condition 
for the existence of a legal decision. Without its validity, a legal decision may not 
be a proper legal decision, and thus not exist as such. So, rather than identifying 
existence with validity, I adopt a position in which existence in itself is an almost 
empty concept, to which other status layers grant meaning. This enables me to 
accommodate different ontological claims in the knowledge-based model of 
the law (cf. chapter 6).
.. Recognition
Recognition occurs if a person or institution acknowledges something as be-
longing to some category (cf. for instance Hart 1961, Hage 1998, Peczenik and 
Hage 2000). I distinguish four types of recognition, based on their subject (a 
person or institution whose recognition is relevant in the legal domain): indi-
vidual recognition, collective recognition, systemic recognition, and authorita-
tive recognition. Individual recognition occurs if an individual recognises the 
qualification of a situation (for instance, if I qualify a specific act of a person as 
manslaughter). Collective recognition occurs if a substantial part of some rel-
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evant community recognises the qualification of a situation (for instance, if the 
community qualifies a specific act of a person as manslaughter). Systemic rec-
ognition occurs if the qualification of a situation is recognised through the ap-
plication of some rule within a system, for instance a legal system (for instance, 
if I automatically get a fine for my speeding on a highway, in which case my 
behaviour is systemically recognised as an offence). Authoritative recognition 
occurs if some person or institution, that has acquired a specific (authoritative) 
role within a community, recognises the qualification of a situation (for instance, 
if a judge qualifies a specific act of a person as manslaughter). The difference 
between systemic recognition on the one hand, and the other three types of 
recognition on the other, is that systemic recognition does not require explicit 
human intervention; it is based on indirect human interference, for instance by 
the establishment of rules that take care of the indirect recognition.
 The occurrence of systemic recognition is based on the assumption that there 
are rules that can be applied to cases without involving human judgement. Sys-
temic recognition may be posited in cases in which we speak about legal acts, 
or offences, without needing a judge to qualify and recognise the facts as such. 
In such cases, the recognition is derived from a general act of recognition, for 
instance the establishment of a rule that enables the automated recognition of 
certain acts as offences (we could classify the automated transaction of speed 
limit exceeding offences as such). Systemic recognition may be combined with 
other types of recognition: for instance, the systemic recognition of a computer 
system’s ‘decisions’ may be backed through authoritative recognition by the in-
stitution that has established the system.
 In a legal positivist view, the validity of law depends on its being issued by 
a proper authority. This is a case of authoritative recognition, often combined 
with systemic recognition. The existence of judgements also depends on rec-
ognition. The recognition of judgement is derived from the recognition of law 
through systemic recognition, not only from the rules applied for the ruling, but 
also the rules determining a procedure. Even more importantly, from the fact 
that a judge has room to make his own ruling. Though it might be intuitively 
inattractive, my claim is that, since a judge has the authority of making his own 
decisions, he provides a part of the recognition of those decisions.
.. Constitution
New buildings and clothes are manufactured by putting bricks on one another 
and by cutting pieces of cloth and sewing them together. Other things, such 
as reasons, decisions and rules are not tangible. Things we cannot see, hear, or 
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smell, but that definitely play a role in our society. Without asking how they exist, 
we may claim that they exist, and we may attempt to find out how they were 
brought into existence. Entities such as reasons acquire their existence as a rea-
son from their qualification or use as such. The qualification yields a constitu-
tion relation between the underlying entity and the new entity.
 Constitution is the non-legal equivalent of validity. An entity is constituted 
whenever it is consequence of applying a rule or a certain practice. In order for 
an entity to attain constitution as a status layer, it should be initiated by the ap-
plication of a rule or a practice. The constitution dimension helps to maintain a 
form of existence in cases where other ontological status layers do not apply. An 
institution, such as money, may not only derive its existence from efficacy and 
from legal validity, but also from constitution: qualifications attained from (non-
legal) rules and practices applying to the nature and use of money. 
.. Efficacy
The efficacy of a legal system can be used as a condition for its existence. The 
efficacy criterion can also be applied to individual legal rules. Raz’ (1970, p. 5-
26) account of Austin’s theory of a legal system explains the use of this condi-
tion (cf. Austin 1954). Raz (ibid., p. 16) summarises:
“A system exists if its laws exist. One can, therefore, derive from what has 
hitherto been said on the existence of a law the following criteria for the 
existence of a legal system: A legal system exists if and only if (1) its supreme 
legislator is habitually obeyed, that is to say the laws of the system are by and 
large efficacious; (2) its supreme legislator does not habitually obey anyone; 
(3) its supreme legislator is superior to the subjects of every one of his laws 
relative to the sanction of that law. To these we should add a fourth condi-
tion, (4) that all the laws of the system were actually legislated and were 
legislated ultimately, by one person, or group.”
In this efficacy-based account of the existence of legal systems, individual laws 
exist under the criteria that they are part of a legal system, and that this legal 
system is generally efficacious. This is claimed to ensure that individual laws that 
are not efficacious in themselves but are clearly part of a legal system, do indeed 
exist. Habitual obedience means that a substantive part of a community will 
generally conform to most laws that constitute a legal system. The other criteria 
(2 through 4) determine the hierarchy of the system, necessary to ensure its effi-
cacy: there should be a legislating authority that is not accountable to any other 
authority, and that did indeed enact the laws that are part of the system.
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 Although this definition of a legal system is subject to criticism, for instance 
the comment that the existence of a legal system cannot be reasonably made 
dependent entirely on the presence of a single legislator, the importance of the 
concept of obedience (and, thereby, efficacy) should be stressed. The coercion 
that accompanies (or precedes, or follows) the establishment of a legal system 
may not be a necessary and sufficient condition for its existence, but it is still an 
important characteristic of such a system. Efficacy need not always be caused 
by coercion. Legal rules may work simply because they are reasonable conven-
tions that are easy to follow. The consequence of not following such rules would 
have a negative effect on those breaking them, not through coercion, but by the 
natural and cultural consequences arising from the rule-abiding behaviour. Such 
consequences (being yelled at when passing a red traffic light) are not induced 
by the legal system itself.
 Due to this observation, the following characteristics of a legal system should 
be distinguished: efficacy, coercion, and obedience. The relations among these 
three concepts are as follows. The coercion accompanying a legal system may 
cause its efficacy through enforcing obedience. Obedience may also be enforced 
through other means than mere coercion. Coercion does not necessarily en-
force obedience. Thus, there are no necessary consequence relations between 
the three concepts; rather, the presence of coercion may function as an explana-
tory reason for obedience, and the presence of obedience as an explanatory 
reason for efficacy.
. A meta-ontological conception of law
Rather than employing a specific view on the ontological status of the law, I 
provide a framework in which different ontological views can be accommo-
dated. In this framework, there are three basic layers. The first layer consists of 
non-legal entities that are legally-relevant. The second layer consists of poten-
tially legal entities whose existence status (qua legal entity) is not yet established. 
The third layer consists of legal entities. Transitions between these three layers 
are possible through varying sets of criteria. A potentially legal entity, such as a 
judge’s decision, becomes a legal entity by checking whether the status layers re-
quired do indeed apply. Thus, for instance, an immoral decision is not classified 
as a legal entity in a natural-law view, whereas it is classified as such in a legal-
positivist view. Entities on these three different levels are connected to each oth-
er through two different relations. These are the counts-as relation (subsection 
4.7.1) and the causation relation (subsection 4.7.2), which are discussed below. 
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.. Counting as
The counts-as relation is based on Searle’s (1995, p. 18) work about constitutive 
relations. It is used to link concrete objects or object types to each other. Searle 
uses it, among others, to point out the logical structure of institutional reality 
(ibid., p. 79ff.). In his account of institutional reality, the formula ‘x counts as y in 
c’ represents a general status-assigning function. It says that under the circum-
stances referred to by c, a fact x is regarded as a fact y, transcending the mere 
fact x by the status assigned to it. This structure can be iterated and combined 
into complex systems of interrelated institutions (ibid., p. 80). For instance, the 
relation can be used to provide insight into the structure of the judiciary, in 
which natural persons are assigned certain roles. According to Searle, there are 
different types of functions assigning status: symbolic powers create meaning, 
deontic powers create rights and obligations, honourific powers create status for 
its own sake, and procedural powers create conditions on the way to power and 
honour (ibid., pp. 99-103). These different functions can all be put in the format 
of the counts-as relation. For instance, we may express symbolic power with the 
function ‘the presence of a red light counts as a stop sign; it does so in the con-
text of traffic and the presence of a traffic light’. 
 A theory about the structure of social reality, adjusted to the legal domain, was 
proposed by MacCormick and Weinberger (1986). They distinguish institutive, 
consequential, and terminative rules. Institutive rules bring into existence some 
kind of legal entity (e.g., a contract). Consequential rules define consequences 
attached to there being in existence some legal entity (e.g., one has to comply 
with the conditions in a contract, if there is a contract). Terminative rules put an 
end to the existence of some legal entity (e.g., a divorce ends a marriage) (ibid., 
p. 52-53). An instance of a legal institution (e.g., an occurrence of the concept 
of marriage) exists in time. Its existence starts when the concept instance is 
created as the consequence of an institutive rule. Its existence is maintained by 
a consequential rule, and it is ended by a terminative rule. The concepts and 
institution types themselves (for instance divorce and marriage) do not have 
that kind of existence (ibid., p. 53). Searle’s (1995) theory and MacCormick and 
Weinberger’s (1986) theory have in common that instances of legal concepts are 
claimed to exist, and that the existence of these instances is supported by some 
kind of constitutive rules. Rules establish relations among concepts, and other 
rules produce instantiations of these concepts. The instantiations exist, and if we 
ascribe some kind of property to them, or if they are the argument of some rela-
tion, they constitute institutional facts. Searle provides no explicit solution for 
the question how such facts are brought into existence, whereas MacCormick 
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and Weinberger use their institutive rules for that purpose.
 The constitutive relation functions in an intensional context: the fact that 
something counts as something else is often the result of a community thinking 
or believing that this is the case. This means that the terms that are filled in for 
x and y in ‘x counts as y’ often cannot be changed for extensionally identi-
cal expressions without changing the meaning of the expression. A different 
way to state the same is that it is not allowed to substitute co-referring terms 
in case they are under the reach of an intensional predicate (for instance, ‘the 
community thinks’). Intensionality plays an important part in natural-language 
semantics. An example of intensionality is Frege’s ‘evening star - morning star’ 
example (for a more extensive explanation, cf. Gamut 1991b): a sentence like ‘the 
morning star is the evening star’ is true, as both expressions refer to the same 
entity. But a sentence like ‘John thinks the morning star is the evening star’ need 
not be true, as ‘to think’ is an intensional verb. The extension of ‘morning star’ 
(the actual entity) is something different from the intension of ‘morning star’ 
(its meaning). Frege’s distinction between extension and intension is a basis for 
conceptual definitions.
 The intensionality of the context in which the counts-as relation is used, is 
important, because there may be changes in definitions of legal concepts. These 
changes are reflected in the application conditions of the concept, but they are 
not visible in the concept name. The counts-as relation enables us to express a 
situation in which the collective recognition of a constitutive relation between 
two concepts may depend on the concept names instead of their precise mean-
ing. This enables the stable recognition of open-texture concepts, even through 
their meaning changes. Within the context of a constitutive relation that is 
recognised by a community, the terms that are related to each other cannot be 
interchanged with extensionally equivalent terms, as that could threaten the 
recognition of the constitutive relation.
 In addition to the intensionality of the context in which it is used, the consti-
tutive relation is non-transitive, asymmetrical, and irreflexive. These constraints 
are expressed in terms of relations between types; abstract categories of entities. 
The non-transitivity constraint to the counts-as relation means that, whenever 
there are two relations: s counts as s’, and s’ counts as s’’, there is no relation s 
counts as s’’. The asymmetry constraint means that whenever there is a relation s 
counts-as s’, there is no relation s’ counts-as s. The irreflexivity constraint means 
that if there is a relation s counts as s’, then types s and s’ are not equal.
 An example illustrates the consequences of these characteristics. When we 
say that killing a person on purpose counts as manslaughter, we establish a re-
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lation between conditions (someone kills someone else, and he does this on 
purpose), and the occurrence of ‘manslaughter’, which is supervenient on the 
fulfilment of the conditions. The conditions and ‘manslaughter’ are expressed as 
types, which are combined in a constraint, expressing a meaningful relationship 
between conditions and consequences arising from them. The antecedent type 
of the constraint expresses the conditions, while the consequence type expresses 
the ‘concept name’ (a legal type) itself. 
 The non-transitivity of the counts-as relation says that, if o counts as o’, and 
o’ counts as o’’, then o need not count as o’’ (there is no direct constitutive rela-
tion between the two types, even if all conditions are fulfilled). The asymmetry 
constraint says that if o counts as o’, o’ need not count as o. And the irreflexiv-
ity constraint says that o cannot count as o (if a reflexive constitutive relation 
existed, it would be meaningless). It is hard, if not impossible, to illuminate the 
first constraint with an example, because we would need differently named, 
intensionally identical legal concepts for that. The asymmetry constraint can 
be illustrated by inverting ‘killing on purpose counts as manslaughter’, as ‘man-
slaughter counts as killing on purpose’ is a useless expression. And irreflexivity 
is easily shown for the concept of manslaughter, as the phrase ‘manslaughter 
counts as manslaughter’ is also useless.
 A constitutive relation between legal concepts is often based upon legal rules. 
A legal rule, for instance a rule that defines the conditions for an instance of 
manslaughter, contains the ingredients to define such a constitutive relation. 
But concrete legal cases are also constructed with the help of such relations. An 
instance of manslaughter is a result of qualifying certain facts as such; the abstract 
constitutive relation between two types becomes a concrete constitutive rela-
tion between two facts.
.. Causation
Rather than a matter of physics, legal causation is a matter of human construc-
tion. For instance: what can be reasonably attributed to a person? The circum-
stances under which a certain state-of-affairs or action is deemed to cause a 
different state-of-affairs or action in a legal manner, has been thoroughly dis-
cussed in legal theory. When can we rightly say that a person causes a certain 
fact or situation? The answer to this question is important in the determination 
of the liability of a person. In Remmelink (1996, p. 172ff.), four legal causality 
theories are discerned: conditio sine qua non, causa proxima, relevance theories, 
and adequacy theories. The latter three theories restrict the reach of the former. 
I discuss these theories of causality in order to find out what the legal causation 
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relation amounts to, which is necessary to give some kind of formal translation 
of the relation later on.
 Von Buri’s theory of causality neatly translates into the phrase ‘conditio sine qua 
non’ (Remmelink 1996, p. 175-176). In this theory, each link in a causal chain 
leading to a certain fact is as good as any other link in that chain in its relation 
to the final consequence. The criterion with which we determine whether 
some phenomenon a causes another phenomenon b, is that if we removed a, 
b would not have taken place. Thus, a is a necessary condition (conditio sine qua 
non) for the occurrence of b. This theory has three major disadvantages. First, it 
does not directly limit the length of the causal chain. Thus, one may go back in 
time infinitely to find a cause for a phenomenon. This problem, however, can 
be overcome by taking into account the certainty with which a certain fact or 
state-of-affairs can be causally linked with the consequence. If there is a long 
causal chain, the link becomes less certain. Second, this theory attracts the epis-
temic problem that we can hardly know long causality chains. Third, should we 
not center on what can be reasonably attributed to a person, rather than regard-
ing long causal chains?
 Causality theories in which ‘causa proxima’ plays a role, are similar to the ‘condi-
tio sine qua non’ theory in that they presuppose the possibility of knowing causal 
chains. However, they restrict these chains in length by employing the demand 
that the causal chain between the two phenomena among which causality is 
presupposed, should not be too long (ibid., p. 176-177). Variants of such a ‘causa 
proxima’ theory demand for instance that the most effective cause or the deci-
sive cause should be selected. 
 The relevance theory (ibid., p. 177-178) tries to isolate those causes that relate 
to intent or culpa. These causes often form the (implicit or explicit) core of the 
offence description, and were meant to be punishable by the legislator. If they 
have not made an explicit part of the offence description, they may be recon-
structed as a part of the intention of the legislator. Remmelink uses the follow-
ing example. Someone has been maltreated, and he is transferred to a hospital 
that burns to the ground. He dies in this fire. Can we qualify this as ‘maltreat-
ment inducing death’? We cannot, as the fire in the hospital is not a relevant 
cause for his death (it has not been proposed as a relevant cause by the legisla-
tor), even though he was in the hospital as a consequence of being maltreated.
 Adequacy theories (ibid., p. 178-181) are based on the idea that a phenomenon 
can be considered as a cause for a specific consequence, if this phenomenon 
would cause this consequence in general, i.e., in most cases. Adequacy theories 
depend on our knowledge of laws or patterns: what would generally be the con-
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sequence of a phenomenon? They also depend on our knowledge of what the 
cause in a specific case is. Subjective adequacy theories stress the knowledge of 
the perpetrator at the time of his act, while objective adequacy theories empha-
sise the actual situation. In objective adequacy theories the cause-consequence 
chain is reconstructed afterwards: what acts are suitable for bringing about the 
consequence that occurred? The knowledge and intention of the actor are not 
important here, just the general consequences of her act. So even if some con-
sequence seemed unlikely to occur at some moment, its occurrence should be 
ascribed to the actor. Subjective theories state that the cause-consequence chain 
is evaluated through the foreseeability of the consequence by an individual.
 The meaning of these different theories of causality can be clarified by an ex-
ample: the ‘slipper - egg skull’ judgement (‘pantoffel-eierschedel’, Appeal Court 
Amsterdam, June 14, 1939, nj 1940: 34). On February 5 1939 a man (W.G.) 
throws a slipper to the head of his 51-year-old wife. He hits her temple. She 
dies a few hours later. On the autopsy it appears that she has an abnormally thin 
skull. Her husband did not know this. When we consider this case through the 
different theories of causality, we notice the following. Seen from the perspec-
tive of ‘conditio sine qua non’ we find that if the man had not thrown the slipper, 
his wife would not have died. Her death can thus be ascribed to him. From 
the viewpoint of the causa proxima theory, the result is the same: throwing the 
slipper does not only count as a conditio sine qua non, but also as a causa proxima. 
Seen from the perspective of the relevance theory, I assume that this theory does 
not solve the dilemma, because it is not clear whether the legislator wanted to 
punish the behaviour explained in the example. Seen from the viewpoint of 
‘adequate causation’ we can take two stances. First, an objective one: only one 
person in two thousand has an egg skull. Still, in this case the woman has one, 
and the fact that she dies should be ascribed to her husband throwing a slipper 
to her head, because this will be fatal for almost anyone with an egg skull. Sec-
ond, a subjective one: as the man did not know that his wife had an egg skull, he 
could not have foreseen the consequence of his deed. He cannot be punished 
for something that he could not foresee.
 The goal of the discussion of causality theories is not to choose among those 
theories. Instead, I attempt to leave open the possibility of accommodating dif-
ferent causality theories in the knowledge-based model of law. From the over-
view of causality theories we may derive claims with respect to the ontological 
and epistemic characteristics of the causation relation. The causation relation 
can be regarded as having either an ontological or an epistemic basis. In the 
former case, causation reflects a relation in reality that we may – or may not 
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
106
le gal  ontolog y
107
– know. In the latter case, causation is a relation that we project on reality. This 
projection need not be entirely arbitrary; it can be based on the conventions laid 
out in causality theories. The existence of such causation relations thus emanates 
from the epistemic: we may justifiedly believe that something causes something 
else in a legal manner, because we know the accepted causality theory within 
some jurisdiction. In subjective adequacy theories, for instance, what counts as 
an adequate cause depends on the current knowledge of a person. If we know 
that the adequacy theory is accepted within Dutch penal law, and we know 
that our suspect did not know his wife had an egg skull, then we have sufficient 
reasons not to project the causation relation between the act of the husband and 
the death of his wife.
 In summary, the following factors play a role in the different causality theories: 
the presence of a conditio sine qua non, the proximity of the cause, the relevance of 
the cause, and the adequacy of the cause. The conditio sine qua non is found at the 
ontological level. The proximity, relevance, and adequacy of the cause, however, 
largely depend on human judgement. These judgements are not arbitrary; they 
are based on conventions on the matter. What we may learn from the discussion 
of different causality theories is that legal causation is only secondarily related 
to what we may denote as ‘ontological causation’. Legal causation is not only 
based on the actual causal chain between the act and the consequence (as sug-
gested by the conditio sine qua non theory), but also on that chain as perceived by 
some person. The alleged length of this causal chain (or the proximity of cause 
and consequence), the possibility of producing alternative readings of the same 
event, the alleged communis opinio about the extent to which a consequence can 
be ascribed to an act, the specific knowledge of the person involved in the act, 
her intention at the time of her act, the general intention ascribed to a person 
when she acts in a certain way, they all play a role in determining the causation 
relations.
 Rather than regarding the legal causation relation as a purely physical, me-
chanical phenomenon, thus modelling it as an extensional relation, I choose 
to model it in accordance with the counts-as relation. If a phenomenon p is 
regarded to cause a different phenomenon q, then this is expressed as ‘p counts 
as a cause for q’. We can model general patterns of legal causation in the same 
way: if phenomena of type p are generally regarded to cause phenomena of type 
q, then we express this as ‘phenomena of type p count as a cause for phenomena 
of type q’, or abbreviated: ‘p counts as a cause for q’.
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. Constituents for a model of the law
The third research question was: what characteristics of knowledge about the 
legal domain are useful as constituents for a model of the law? In this chapter, 
I explained different views on the existence of the law. These views have a far-
reaching influence on what types of entities we can discern in the legal domain, 
and on the kind of existence they have. Additionally, I discussed some of these 
types of entities, and several ways in which legal systems and legal entities can 
be claimed to exist. From this discussion, I derived five ontological status lay-
ers and two relations that are central in the knowledge-based model of the law 
discussed in chapter 6. 
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 Legal knowledge representation
After discussing the characteristics of legal knowledge, I now turn to the ques-
tion how we can represent it, focusing on the ontological and epistemological 
characteristics of the legal domain. In section 5.1, I explain the concept of rep-
resentation, the languages used for knowledge representation, and the charac-
teristics of representing legal knowledge. In section 5.2, I discuss the concept 
of meaning, exploring the way in which the meaning of legal concepts can be 
pinpointed. In section 5.3, I outline three ontologies that were built specifically 
for the representation of the legal domain, or the representation of knowledge 
about the legal domain.
. The concept of representation
The core of representation consists of symbolising something else; the object 
represented. The representation of an object (be it a physical entity or something 
else, such as knowledge) requires conventions or similarity. Conventions serve to 
indicate what the symbols used in the representation refer to, whereas similarity 
is based on ‘implicit conventions’ that are self-explanatory; i.e., the resemblances 
between the representation and its object are such, that we do not have to know 
explicit conventions to be able to recognise the similarity between the two. 
There is no clear dividing line between convention and similarity. Similarity 
is often based on and strengthened by widely accepted conventions, such as 
perspective in art (for a discussion of representation in art, cf. Gombrich 1977). 
If the object of representation is not tangible, it becomes harder – if not impos-
sible – to talk about similarity, because the object has no ‘face’ to represent. After 
all, similarity is often thought about as a depiction relation; and invisible objects 
are hard to depict. Invisible objects, such as institutions, cannot be represented 
through similarity. However, we are still able to use conventions to represent 
them.
 Bench-Capon (1990, p. 11) provides the following definition of representa-
tion: “a set of syntactic and semantic conventions that makes it possible to de-
scribe things”. The syntactic conventions determine how the language in which 
knowledge is represented is constructed from its smallest constituting parts, 
while the semantic conventions determine what the sentences constructed in 
that language mean. Bench-Capon’s definition of representation illustrates one 
of the basic assumptions of artificial intelligence, namely that all representations 
are given in the form of some language, i.e., a set of syntactic and semantic con-
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ventions. Bench-Capon calls natural languages, such as English, the most power-
ful representation languages. It is, however, not at all clear whether it is possible 
to construct a set of syntactic and semantic rules to describe a natural language. 
A natural language is a suitable means for knowledge representation because we 
know how to use and understand it. However, we do not know the exact rules 
that exist for interpreting them, if there are any.
 Instead of using representation languages with sets of syntactic and semantic 
rules, one could choose to employ other means to represent knowledge, such as 
neural nets. In such an exemplar-based approach, no set of syntactic and seman-
tic rules is established in advance. Instead, neural nets are claimed to show an 
approach to learning similar to that of human beings. I do not pay attention to 
this form of representation. Rather, focus is on the ways to represent knowledge 
explicitly. For this purpose, I discuss representation languages (subsection 5.1.1), 
with which such explicit representation can be constructed. Subsequently, I ex-
plain the trade-off between the richness of representation and the practical use 
of a language in representing legal knowledge (subsection 5.1.2).
.. Representation languages
A representation language is a combination of syntactic and semantic rules 
with which expressions can be built or parsed and with which the meaning of 
the structures can be determined. There is a trade-off between two important 
features of a representation language: its expressiveness and its computational 
tractability. The more expressive a language is, i.e., the more syntactic and se-
mantic detail can be articulated through it, the harder it becomes to manipulate 
expressions in that language (cf. Bench-Capon 1990, p. 15). The need for com-
putational tractability becomes acute when we try to infer new knowledge from 
the knowledge that has been represented in a computer system.
Proposition logic
Many representation languages are based on logic. Two of the most common 
logics are proposition logic and first-order predicate logic. These two types of 
logic form the basis for other types of logic, such as modal proposition logic and 
modal predicate logic. The language of proposition logic consists of symbols 
representing propositions: for instance p and q (propositions p and q). Further-
more, the language consists of symbols representing connectives: → (implica-
tion), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), and ¬ (not) (cf. Gamut 1991a). If I want to express the 
sentence ‘If John gets his diploma, he will be admitted to Berkeley’, I use p for 
the first part of the sentence, q for the second part, and the connective → for the 
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conditional relation between them. The sentence would thus be represented as 
‘p → q’. The expressiveness of this representation is not very impressive; proposi-
tion logic enables us to represent structural relations among sentences or large 
sentence parts only. However, we can easily make inferences from this type of 
representation. Rather more interesting is the question if these are the inferences 
we wish to make. They are not. Proposition logic as a knowledge representation 
language is not sufficiently fine-grained to fulfil the representation needs of the 
legal domain – we have to able to express properties and relations. In first-order 
predicate logic, this is possible.
First-order predicate logic
First-order predicate logic adds some important features compared to proposi-
tion logic (cf. Gamut 1991a). The basic building blocks of first-order predicate 
logic (henceforth called ‘predicate logic’) suffice to speak of an ontology. The 
building blocks of the language of predicate logic are predicates, variables, 
object constants, quantifiers, and connectives. Properties and relations are rep-
resented by so-called predicates. A predicate says something about one or more 
objects. If it says something about one object, this ‘something’ is a property of 
that object. If it says something about the connection between two or more ob-
jects, it expresses a relation among those objects. Variables are place-holders for 
object constants. They thus enable quantification over multiple objects. Objects 
constants are symbols referring to objects or individuals. 
 Quantifiers enable us to state things about specific sets of objects, i.e., to say 
that a property holds for at least one object, or that a property holds for all ob-
jects. Connectives roughly have the same function in predicate logic as in prop-
osition logic, except that in predicate logic they can be used to combine the 
more detailed expressions containing predicates and the objects these predicates 
apply to, instead of combining sentence parts without any further structure (as 
in proposition logic). In first-order predicate logic, it is not possible to express 
properties of properties. We would need a higher-order predicate logic for that 
purpose.
Modal logic
To be able to give a detailed representation of specific predicates, modal logics 
can be employed (cf. Gamut 1991b). Modal logics enable us to represent par-
ticular modalities, i.e., operators such as possible, necessary, obliged, permitted etc. 
With these modalities, we can represent sentences like ‘It is necessarily the case 
that bachelors are not married’ and ‘It is not permitted to use vehicles in the 
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
112
le gal  k nowle dg e  r e p r e s e ntat i on
113
park’. Modal logics with operators like ‘permitted’ and ‘obliged’ are called deontic 
logics. They are used to reason about permissions and obligations. For instance, 
deontic logics enable us to derive the fact that something is permitted from the 
fact that something is obliged. Work on deontic logics in the area of ai and law 
has been done by, among others, Royakkers (1996) and Van der Torre (1997).
Natural language and situation semantics
Natural language is the language (for instance English or Dutch) that we em-
ploy to communicate with other human beings. It is the most widely applicable, 
flexible and most efficient means of communication we have at our disposal. 
But it also lacks the preciseness that we need to use it as a formal representation 
language. To overcome this problem, attempts have been made to represent the 
meaning of natural language, i.e., to find methods to translate natural language 
into expressions in formally specified artificial languages. Whereas computers 
cannot make inferences directly on natural language yet, we can apply auto-
matic inferencing techniques on represented natural language. Thus, we have to 
represent the meaning of natural language, which can be regarded as a represen-
tation language itself, in a formal language. I discuss one of these representation 
languages, viz. situation semantics, because the underlying ontological theory 
(situation theory) has contributed to the elements of the knowledge-based 
model of the law presented in this thesis. 
 Situation semantics was developed as a representation language for natural 
language in the general framework of situation theory, developed by Barwise 
and Perry (1983). Situation theory is a theory of information and meaning based 
on ecological realism. The central idea of ecological realism is that meaning 
is found in the world (in the objects that are part of it), and in the interac-
tion between individuals and their particular environments (called ‘ecological 
niches’) (Gibson 1979). This is different from many other semantic theories, in 
which meaning is a relation between language and reality. Situation semantics 
has rather extensive ontological commitments. It recognises states-of-affairs, 
courses-of-events, individuals, relations, and space-time locations as elements of 
its ontology. States-of-affairs are situations as they are in the world. Courses-of-
events are combinations of such situations, linked to different locations in space 
and time. Attempts to describe such states-of-affairs and courses-of-events force 
us to give their characteristics. In situation semantics, the resulting (incomplete) 
descriptions are called abstract states-of-affairs and courses-of-events.
 An abstract state-of-affairs or course-of-events consists of one or more con-
stituent sequences, each expressing a certain relation between different indi-
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viduals or constants, and linked to a certain place and time. An infon can be 
compared to a predicate with arguments, with the added information of a link 
to a space-time location and a truth value. The elements of the ontology of situ-
ation semantics show its foundation in ecological realism: rather than abstract 
entities, real situations, individuals, and space-time locations are its central ele-
ments. In addition to abstract states-of-affairs and courses-of-events, situation 
semantics distinguishes situation types and event types. Whenever a certain part 
(a relation, an individual, or a space-time location) of an infon is not instanti-
ated, a state-of-affairs becomes a situation type, and a course-of-events becomes 
an event type. For instance, ‘John walks’ constitutes an abstract state-of-affairs, 
whereas ‘someone walks’ constitutes a situation type.
 A constraint is a relation between situation types. Barwise and Perry (ibid., p. 
97) introduce three types of constraints: necessary constraints, nomic constraints, 
and conventional constraints. Necessary constraints hold between relations. For 
instance, they express the necessary relationship between the situation type that 
Jane is guilty of theft and a situation type that someone is guilty of theft. Nomic 
constraints generalise over patterns caused by the laws of physics, e.g., the relation 
between a type expressing that an object has a mass and the type expressing that 
this object exerts gravitational force. Conventional constraints indicate what re-
lations exist between phenomena as a result of conventions in a society, e.g., the 
relation between a type expressing that a person has intentionally killed another 
one, and the type expressing that he has committed manslaughter. Conventional 
constraints are especially important in the legal domain, where conventions are 
an important factor in determining legal facts and legal consequences. Each 
constraint type is either conditional or unconditional. A conditional constraint 
is linked to a certain space-time location. An unconditional constraint is valid 
in all space-time locations. Constraints were already used in subsection 4.7.1 to 
express the characteristics of the counts-as relation. They are also suitable for 
expressing counts-as relations themselves. 
 Depending on the goal with which a representation language is built, its focus 
is on different parts of the structure and content of the object to be represented. 
In general, representation may have an ontological, an epistemic, or a semantic 
focus. If it has an ontological focus, it aims at representing the elements of a do-
main, and the relations among those elements. In brief, it attempts to represent 
facts. If it has an epistemic focus, it aims at representing knowledge. If it has a 
semantic focus, it is aimed at representing the meaning of language. Emphasis 
in situation semantics is on the ontology of situations, i.e., on determining the 
objects that are referred to in language, and on classifying these situations. 
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 A representation language is necessary to express knowledge and facts in 
terms of the knowledge-based model of the law. The ontology provides the ba-
sic conceptual framework, and the representation language is a means to express 
knowledge and facts in terms of that conceptual framework. However, repre-
sentation languages often show ontological presuppositions as well. For instance, 
with each of the languages discussed, disregarding proposition logic, we are able 
to represent entities, properties, and relations. These basic commitments are al-
ready quite far-reaching (please note that predicate logic does not require such 
ontological commitments; this is a matter of choice). The language used to rep-
resent knowledge in the domain of penal law in chapter 8 is based on predicate 
logic. In choosing this representation language (reason-based logic), expressive 
power is taken as the primary criterion, instead of computational tractability.
.. Representing legal knowledge
‘Knowledge representation’ is generally regarded as either representing our 
knowledge about facts, or representing facts. The question is whether, in the 
legal domain, it suffices to represent objects and relations among them, and 
knowledge about those objects and relations. Other features are sometimes 
considered more appropriate for representation. The research into legal argu-
mentation attempts, for instance, to establish the rules along which legal disputes 
are carried out. Such a procedural approach shows how legal decisions are ac-
complished, instead of merely positing that they are part of the domain to be 
represented. Thus, in addition to knowledge and entities, we may attempt to 
represent the way knowledge is acquired. Furthermore, we may try to add jus-
tifying reasons to represented facts. The elements that should be represented are 
discussed in other chapters, and an extensive overview is provided in chapter 6, 
which describes an ontology of law.
 After determining the object of legal knowledge representation, the next 
issue is what language should be used for legal knowledge representation. Of 
course, the answer to this question depends, among other things, on the goal 
with which knowledge is represented (automated reasoning, building queries 
etc.), and the suitability of a representation language (its expressive powers, its 
tractability). In the research project underlying this thesis, several representation 
languages were used to represent characteristics of legal knowledge. Although 
making a choice for a representation language is not among the main goals of 
this thesis, evaluating representation languages helped me to determine the de-
mands imposed on a conceptual model, the construction of which is one of the 
main goals of this thesis.
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 Following the goal of adequately describing a conceptual model of law, a 
number of demands applies to the choice of a representation language. First, the 
representation language may not limit expressive power in a manner that either 
distorts the representation of knowledge or leaves out essential characteristics. 
Second, the representation power of a language may not add wrong or distorted 
information because of superfluous expressive powers of the representation lan-
guage. Third, the expressive power should be adjusted to the characteristics and 
complexity of the domain concerned, though the necessity to attain tractabil-
ity for automatic inferencing can put limitations on this demand. Fourth, there 
should be some kind of isomorphy between the object represented and the 
representation, and thus between the domain to which the language applies, and 
the representation language. This isomorphy applies to either structure, content, 
or a combination of both. In section 8.1, I shall describe the representation lan-
guage adopted in this thesis. The demands above were applied to the choice of 
this language, with the exception of the tractability demand.
. The multiple meanings of ‘meaning’
To be able to characterise an object properly, its representation often requires 
us to capture some of its characteristics. In a Fregean view (cf. Frege 1892), the 
expression of such characteristics in a representation constitutes the meaning of 
that expression. Meaning is related to knowledge in an important sense. To have 
knowledge of some object implies carrying beliefs in which representations of 
the object play a role. Knowing that a judge has sentenced Pete to two years of 
imprisonment often means that we have some idea of what a judge is, who Pete 
is, and what two years of imprisonment is, and even if we do not know Pete, 
that Pete refers to some person. In addition, these beliefs have to fulfil specific 
criteria in order to qualify as knowledge.
 The meaning of ‘meaning’ has troubled generations of philosophers. I do not 
intend in any way to settle the dispute between proponents of different concepts 
of meaning. However, I do wish to establish understanding of the concept of 
meaning relative to the topics discussed in this thesis. A concept of meaning is 
needed to be able to speak about the representation of meaning in information 
systems or knowledge-based systems. For instance, a knowledge-based informa-
tion system may need a concept of meaning based on necessary and sufficient 
conditions in order to make inferences as to whether a legal rule applies. An 
information retrieval system may not need any concept of meaning, if it only 
contains full-text search, in which case the meaning of the query and the mean-
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ing of the documents stored are not relevant. Basically, if we wish to represent 
knowledge or information in a system, the concept of meaning will become 
relevant.
 In brief, there are four views on meaning: meaning is defined in terms of (1) 
behaviour, (2) necessary and sufficient conditions, (3) objects referred to, and 
(4) use. A concept of meaning in terms of behaviour supposes that there is no 
such thing as ‘meaning’ separate from symbols and people’s reactions on those 
symbols; the meaning of a term is found in the kind of reaction a person shows 
when he is confronted with that term. This concept of meaning is rejected, as 
it is obviously too simplistic to be adequate. A concept of meaning in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions says that the meaning of a term is defined 
with a set of conditions (the meaning of ‘bachelor’ is defined as an unmarried 
man). A concept of meaning in terms of objects referred to states that the mean-
ing of a term is defined by the set of objects that it refers to (the meaning of 
‘bachelor’ is defined as the set of men who are bachelors). A concept of meaning 
defined in terms of use, meaning is found in the actual use of a word or phrase 
(the meaning of ‘bachelor’ is determined by its use in everyday conversation).
 However, meaning is hard to catch in a single phrase. The concept of mean-
ing itself is an open-textured one, subject to the changes triggered by actual use 
of the concept. Attempts in legal knowledge-based systems to capture meaning 
often implicitly combine different meanings of ‘meaning’. A knowledge-based 
system may combine an intensional definition (in terms of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions) with an extensional definition (in terms of examples). A 
legal knowledge-based system may comply with the specific characteristics of 
the meaning of legal expressions. For example, such a system may reflect the 
changes in definitions that emanate from the open texture of legal expressions. 
 In the following subsections, I explain different views on meaning. Instead 
of leaving meaning out in the discussion of knowledge representation, I deem 
the role of meaning sufficiently important to integrate the concept in a discus-
sion of the representation of legal knowledge, as the elaboration on a concept 
of meaning may reveal useful starting points for representation. Below, I discuss 
the concept of meaning in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and the 
related phenomenon called ‘open texture’ (subsection 5.2.1) and the concept of 
meaning in terms of use (subsection 5.2.2). Subsequently, I shift my attention 
to the relation of the concept of meaning with the type of concepts whose 
meaning we wish to establish (subsection 5.2.3). Finally, I explain how sense and 
reference play a major role in the representation of meaning (subsection 5.2.4).
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.. Sense, reference and open texture
Frege (cf. Frege, 1892) developed a theory of meaning that distinguishes be-
tween two components of meaning: sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). 
The sense of an expression consists of the conditions under which it obtains: if 
we call an unmarried man a bachelor, then the concept ‘bachelor’ has as condi-
tions: being a man and being unmarried. The presence of each of these condi-
tions is necessary, and the presence of both of these conditions is sufficient for a 
person to be a bachelor. The reference of an expression consists of the set of all 
objects that fulfil the conditions that are part of its sense: ‘bachelor’ refers to all 
unmarried men. The sense of an expression determines its reference, and two 
expressions with the same sense have the same reference. But two expressions 
with different senses may also have the same reference. The paradigm example 
of this, as mentioned before, is the following: (1) the morning star, and (2) the 
evening star. We can describe the sense of ‘morning star’ as ‘the brightest heav-
enly body in the eastern skies at dawn’, and the sense of ‘evening star’ as ‘the 
brightest heavenly body in the western skies at sunset’ (Gamut 1991, p. 9). It is 
now well-known that the ‘evening star’ and the ‘morning star’ are identical; it is 
the planet Venus. So ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ have different senses, but 
identical references.
 Meaning may change, i.e., for instance, the conditions that determine the 
sense of a concept may change through time. This is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘open texture’ of a concept. Franken et al. (1995, p. 83) define open texture as 
the phenomenon that the definition of concepts can be revised on the basis of 
new insights. They give an example of an open-texture concept in the Linden-
baum-Cohen judgement. In this judgement, the definition of ‘wrongful act’ was 
changed. Before the judgement, a wrongful act was defined as an act that in-
fringes another one’s rights or an act that is in contrast with one’s statutory duty. 
The new definition was that a wrongful act is an act or neglect that infringes 
another one’s rights or is a violation of one’s legal duty, or is a violation of the 
duty of care that should be regarded in social intercourse towards some person 
or property (ibid., p. 84).
 The open-texture nature of legal concepts can thus be more precisely defined 
as the possibility that elements of the definition of some concept may change, 
may be left out, or may be added at some point in time, from which point in 
time the new set of elements will constitute the definition of that concept. In 
other words: the sense of an open texture concept changes through time. The 
concept of open texture is not a purely legal phenomenon. It was introduced by 
Waismann (1952, p. 120), who distinguishes between open texture and vagueness 
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of empirical concepts. If we consider vagueness to be the unclear (or missing) 
demarcation lines of application of a concept, then open texture can be defined 
as the possibility of vagueness. Vagueness may apply to both the intension (sense) 
of a concept, in which case there is no (clear) set of necessary and sufficient 
application conditions for the concept, and to the extension (reference) of a 
concept, in which case we cannot (completely) determine the set of objects the 
concept refers to. Waismann writes that most or all empirical concepts have an 
open texture (ibid., p. 121):
“[...I]t is this texture which prevents us from verifying conclusively most 
of our empirical statements. Take any material object statements. The terms 
which occur in it are non-exhaustive; that means that we cannot foresee 
completely all possible conditions in which they are to be used; there will 
always remain a possibility, however faint, that we have not taken into ac-
count something or other that may be relevant to their usage; and that 
means that we cannot foresee completely all the possible circumstances in 
which the statement is true or in which it is false. There will always remain 
a margin of uncertainty. Thus the absence of a conclusive verification is 
directly due to the open texture of the terms concerned.”
In the legal domain, we do not only regard empirical statements, but also state-
ments containing normative concepts. The open texture of normative concepts 
is not a consequence of a non-exhaustive description of reality, but of the non-
exhaustive description of the norm content. What is more important, is that 
the non-exhaustiveness is not a consequence of the inability to describe reality 
completely, but of an inability to determine all the different ways in which a 
certain legal concept can be applied. Hart introduced the concept of open tex-
ture in the legal domain; he discusses it in his ‘The Concept of Law’, in which 
we find the following fragment (Hart 1961, p. 124-125):
“Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communica-
tion of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the 
great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in 
question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open 
texture. So far we have presented this, in the case of legislation, as a general 
feature of human language; uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be 
paid for the use of general classifying terms in any form of communication 
concerning matters of fact.”
From this fragment, we may conclude that Hart explains vagueness rather than 
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open texture, i.e., his description of open texture does not seem to distinguish 
between the vague borders of concept application and the radical changes of 
application conditions. Bix (1991, p. 66) claims that Hart’s concept of open 
texture differs from Waismann’s primarily in that Hart applies this concept on 
normative entities like rules and norms, instead of just to empirical concepts. 
Waismann (1952, p. 123) states that statements about an event have an open-tex-
ture character because something new and unforeseen may occur. In such cases 
we do not know whether we have applied all possible tests to check whether a 
certain event has occurred. One of Waismann’s examples involves a cat (ibid., p. 
119):
“Suppose I have to verify a statement such as ‘There is a cat next door’; 
suppose I go over to the next room, open the door, look into it and actually 
see a cat. Is this enough to prove my statement? Or must I, in addition to 
it, touch the cat, pat him and induce him to purr? [...] What, for instance, 
should I say when that creature later on grew to a gigantic size?”
Waismann’s statement concerns empirical statements. But similar obstacles bear 
on normative entities. 
 In my view, the following characteristics give an adequate impression of what 
open texture amounts to in the legal domain. Open texture is a characteristic of 
legal concepts. It amounts to the potential changeability of the conditions with 
which we determine whether a certain case, fact, or part of reality is referred to 
by a legal concept. The open texture character of legal concepts has a normative 
cause, i.e., to check whether a certain instance is referred to by a legal concept is 
to make a deliberation not only about the question whether that instance is re-
ferred to by the concept, but also whether it should be referred to by that con-
cept. A normative deliberation is made whenever the application of the standard 
conditions leads to an undesirable consequence. From an internal perspective, 
the change of open-textured concepts is a normative phenomenon. However, 
from an external perspective, it is an empirical phenomenon (cf. subsections 
4.2.6 and 4.6.1). 
.. Meaning as use
The view of meaning as use, introduced by Wittgenstein (cf. Wittgenstein 1953), 
always is subject to the danger of becoming a slogan rather than a serious idea. 
It has to be more strictly defined (or rather, explained by examples, as Wittgen-
stein did) to make sense, because otherwise, it raises questions such as: whose use 
constitutes meaning? and: what kinds of use constitute meaning? Putnam (1975, 
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p. 145) has an approach that may clarify the ‘use’ aspect of meaning:
“[E]veryone to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the 
word ‘gold’; but he does not have to acquire the method of recognizing if 
something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. 
The features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a 
general name – necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the 
extension, ways of recognizing if something is in the extension (‘criteria’), 
etc. – are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective 
body; but that collective body divides the ‘labor’ of knowing and employing 
these various parts of the ‘meaning’ of ‘gold.’”
The question whose use constitutes meaning becomes acute when only a small 
part of the community is able to determine whether some substance is really 
gold. Is only their use of the term ‘gold’ relevant? The majority of people, who 
do not distinguish gold from many other substances that look like gold, use the 
term ‘gold’ in a way that makes it impossible to determine its reference. Should 
we then exclude reference from our understanding of meaning? Any definition 
of meaning that is related to use yields such problems. 
 In the determination of the meaning of ‘meaning’ we can employ the ap-
proaches to the concept itself. For an intensional approach, this would mean 
that we can define the meaning of ‘meaning’ in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. As ‘meaning’ itself is an open-textured concept, we need to con-
sider the possibility of changes in this set of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Meaning regarded as use also enables us to integrate open-texturedness into the 
concept of meaning. Because the use of the concept of meaning varies through 
time and through communities, we should incorporate use in its definition. The 
meaning of ‘meaning’ thus becomes dependent on the actual occurrence of the 
concept in natural language use, or, more specific, in the legal domain, or even 
in the domain of the employment of legal information systems.
.. Meaning with respect to types
The discussion of different meanings of ‘meaning’ can be further elaborated on 
by regarding the meaning of ‘meaning’ with respect to different types of con-
cepts. For instance, there may be a difference between the meaning of natural 
kind terms (terms referring to things occurring in nature, such as water, gold, 
trees) and other terms, e.g., social or legal type terms (please note that ‘kind’ 
refers to both countable and uncountable things, for instance sheep vs. water, 
whereas ‘type’ refers only to countable things). Institutional reality (of which the 
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legal domain forms a part) transcends individual perception and thought. The 
existence of a legal system is based on ontological status layers, most of which 
are intersubjective, such as recognition and efficacy. This observation influences 
the meaning of ‘meaning’ for different kinds. Meaning is related to the onto-
logical and epistemic properties of a type: for instance, in a legal-positivist view, 
the meaning of legal types depends on criteria established in the law by certain 
authorities.
 This means that the existence of an instance of a legal type depends on the 
presence of an authority that establishes its existence, and that the truth of 
statements about instances of such kinds depends on whether these statements 
comply with the actual presence of instances of legal kinds. This observation in-
fluences the way in which we can establish or discover the meaning of a specific 
kind. The observation that the meaning of a legal concept is established mainly 
by convention, and that this convention is formed and polished by its daily use, 
or its use by a group of legal professionals, may direct us towards different con-
cepts of meaning, though. Given a legal-positivist view on the law, for instance, 
we may be tempted to introduce some kind of ‘meaning is use’ concept, and 
consider only its use within a limited group of legal professionals and politi-
cians.
.. Sense and reference revisited
I already dedicated some words to the meaning of legal concepts, as opposed 
to the meaning of, for instance, natural kinds. By taking natural language as a 
starting point for legal expressions, we can hardly do without the content that 
it creates in the minds of people. The meaning of legal concepts does not seem 
to reside in the physical world containing mountains and stones, but rather in 
the heads of the members of a community, and in particular in the heads of legal 
professionals. At least, it seems that the intensions of legal concepts can be found 
there, and in law books. We are far from being able to interpret natural language 
mechanically, which means that the potential legal language has for creating 
content is hardly usable in an artificial context. 
 Sense and reference of legal concepts, contrary to sense and reference of natu-
ral kind terms, are for the larger part determined post hoc, i.e., the meaning of 
legal concepts is developed in their use, partly by normative decisions. Statute 
law provides parts of the senses of such concepts, whereas case law may consti-
tute additions to or changes in those senses, and, moreover, constitutes the cases 
or facts that concepts refer to. The extensions are determined by application of 
the senses that underlie the concepts, and by additional considerations that are 
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constituted by the current case. Those considerations may also find their way 
towards the senses of the concepts. In practice, this means that the change of the 
sense of an open-textured legal concept like ‘good’ is triggered by the lack of 
a fit between the ‘old’ sense and, for instance, the necessity to classify electric-
ity as a good in order to protect a certain interest. To attain this protection, the 
classification of electricity as a good has to be put into correspondence with the 
sense and reference of ‘good’ in the current legal context. Thus, the sense of this 
concept is changed accordingly, and ‘electricity’ is added to its reference (in the 
context of this case). 
 Loth (1988, p. 55) rejects the Fregean view of meaning. He claims that the 
application conditions, that are part of the sense of an expression, and that 
constitute the meaning of that expression, are grasped by an interpretation act 
applied to the expression. However, these application conditions are linguistic 
expressions as well. To define the meaning of these application conditions means 
that we have to establish application conditions for these application conditions, 
and so on ad infinitum: we fail in establishing the reference of an expression. Ac-
cording to Loth (ibid.), this should be done by participating in a language game; 
in actually using a language together with other people. My opinion on this 
matter is that we cannot possibly demand that Fregean senses help us to establish 
their references all by themselves. We need the help our syntactic and semantic 
capabilities. In the interaction of our syntactic and semantic capabilities with a 
Fregean sense, the kind of content is created that refers to the world: intentional 
content.
 This discussion of meaning with respect to legal types is thus still based on 
the sense and reference concept of meaning. Meaning as use, be it in the sense 
Wittgenstein gave to it, or in Quine’s (Quine 1960, 1990) behaviourism-in-
spired sense, tempts us to revise our meaning concept into a concept that does 
not consider concepts alone; instead, we need to employ a more holistic sense of 
meaning, i.e., a concept that applies to sentences and combinations of sentences. 
Words are not employed outside a context of other words, and (at least for spo-
ken language) a context of use. Thus, we have to determine whether we can 
distinguish the meaning of separate words, and if we can, whether this is useful. 
In a legal context, it is indeed useful to consider the meaning of individual con-
cepts, because they refer to the qualifications and institutions that carry so much 
import in this domain. Even though meaning as use is certainly not an empty 
slogan in the legal domain, use is restricted to a number of legal professionals, 
and much of the meaning of legal concept is actually codified, i.e., at least the 
codified conditions can be constructed as a Fregean sense.
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. Conceptualisations of the legal domain
Ontologies are conceptual models of a specific domain. This use of the term 
‘ontology’ in the context of computer science and artificial intelligence differs 
from the use of the term in a philosophical context (cf. Mommers, Schmidt and 
Oskamp 1997). Gruber (1993) defines an ontology as a specification of a con-
ceptualisation, and, more specifically, as a description of concepts and relations 
that exist for an individual or a community of individuals. A conceptualisation 
is a representation of the world that is both simplified and abstract (ibid.). On-
tologies are meant to provide a basic framework for knowledge representation: 
the entities and relations distinguished in an ontology provide a user with the 
means to represent knowledge in the domain that the ontology covers. Below, I 
discuss three ontologies of law: Valente’s (1995) functional ontology (subsection 
5.3.1), Van Kralingen’s (1995) frame-based ontology of law (subsection 5.3.2), 
and Verheij and Hage’s (1997) abstract model of the law (subsection 5.3.3). Next, 
I compare these three models (subsection 5.3.4).
.. Valente’s functional ontology
Valente models an ontology of law from the perspectives of both information 
science, following the definition of ‘ontology’ given by Gruber, and of legal 
theory, following such legal theorists as Kelsen and Hart. His so-called func-
tional ontology of law is introduced in Valente (1995). The functional ontology 
distinguishes between six different basic types of knowledge (cf. Breuker, Valente 
and Winkels 1997). These basic types are: normative knowledge, meta-legal 
knowledge, world knowledge, responsibility knowledge, reactive knowledge, 
and creative knowledge (Breuker et al. 1997, p. 27-30).
 Normative knowledge is regarded the most obvious kind of legal knowledge. 
It consists of the elements of the legal domain prescribing the behaviour of the 
people constituting a society, and a description of the way social reality should 
look like (ibid., p. 27). Meta-legal knowledge consists of the entities not directly 
regulating behaviour. These entities are empowering and derogating norms, and 
norms regulating the mutual relations among primary norms (ibid., p. 27). World 
knowledge consists of elements telling us what the world looks like. Respon-
sibility knowledge consists of the knowledge that links normative knowledge 
to reactive knowledge: in case some agent causes a certain event, responsibility 
knowledge helps to establish the extent to which the agent can be held respon-
sible for what he did (ibid., p. 29-30). Reactive knowledge consists of the sanc-
tions imposed if an agent breaches a norm and is held responsible for that (ibid., 
p. 30). Creative knowledge, finally, consists of information about newly created 
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institutions and other entities that arise from the application of the law (ibid., p. 
30).
.. Van Kralingen’s frame-based ontology of law
Van Kralingen (1995) distinguishes between three kinds of so-called frames: 
concept frames, norm frames and act frames. I briefly explain the principles be-
hind these frames and their contents. An act frame consists of fourteen elements: 
an act identifier, promulgation, scope, agent, act type, means, manner, temporal 
aspects, spatial aspects, circumstances, cause, aim, intentionality, and final state. 
To distinguish different acts from each other, each act has a unique identifier. 
This identifier constitutes the first slot. The promulgation slot of an act frame 
contains the source of the act description. This information serves a purpose as 
a means of reference. The scope slot contains the range under which the act de-
scription is applicable. The agent slot contains the individual or legal body that 
performs the act. The act type slot is the main predicate in an act frame. It is the 
act itself, regardless of intentions and circumstances. 
 The means slot specifies the material objects used in the act described, or 
gives more details about the act. In the manner slot, it is indicated in what way 
a specific act is performed. In the temporal aspects slot, the information given 
about time and time intervals is stored. In the spatial aspects slot, information is 
given about locations. Relevant aspects of the situation in which the act takes 
place, are collected in the circumstances slot. Of course, this enumeration of 
circumstances can never be complete. The cause slot specifies what reasons there 
are for the act to take place. In the aim slot, we find the goal the agent aims at 
in performing the specified action. The aim of an action is related to the action 
by an intention of the agent; this relation is teleological. The intentionality slot is 
used to represent this. In the final state slot, we find the results and consequences 
of the specified action.
 The slots of a norm frame are described in Van Kralingen (1995, p. 57). They 
are respectively the norm identifier, promulgation, scope, conditions of applica-
tion, subject, legal modality, and act identifier. The norm identifier slot contains 
a unique identifier for the norm. The norm type slot contains the norm type: a 
norm of conduct or a norm of competence. In this slot it is indicated whether 
the subject of the norm has a competence to do something, or the duty to 
perform the act referred to. A norm of competence confers powers, a norm 
of conduct determines what the norm subject ought to do or ought to refrain 
from. The promulgation slot contains the source of the norm. The scope slot 
contains the range of application of the norm. The conditions-of-application 
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slot contains the circumstances under which the norm is applied. Conditions 
of application limit the circumstances under which the norm can be applied 
to the norm subject. The conditions-of-applications slot contains predicates, 
complex conditions (conjunctions or disjunctions of predicates), or references 
to act descriptions. The subject slot contains the person or group of persons to 
whom the norm is addressed. The legal modality slot contains the legal modality 
(ought, ought not, may, can). Finally, the act identifier slot contains a reference to 
an act description.
 The third type of frame, concept frames, consists of a concept, concept type, 
priority, promulgation, scope, conditions, and instances (Van Kralingen 1995, p. 
106). The concept slot contains the name of the concept that is referred to. The 
concept type slot indicates what type the concept belongs to. Concept types 
are definitions, deeming provisions, factors or meta-concepts. The promulgation 
slot indicates where the original text of the concept description can be found. 
The scope slot contains the area of application for the concept. The conditions 
slot contains the application conditions for the concept (its intension). The in-
stances slot is a set of instances of the concept (a part of its extension).
.. Verheij and Hage’s abstract model of the law
Verheij and Hage (1997) develop a model consisting of three main elements: 
states-of-affairs, events, and rules. States-of-affairs are (possible or real) situations 
that can be described by descriptive sentences. Events bring about changes in 
the current states-of-affairs. Rules express direct relations among states-of-af-
fairs. Thus, there are two different relations among states-of-affairs: either the 
transition from one state-of-affairs into another is caused by an event, or the 
transition from one state-of-affairs into another is the result of the application of 
a rule, which makes the former constitute the latter.
 States-of-affairs have four characteristics. First, they have different temporal 
aspects. They can be either temporary (Wim Kok is the Prime Minister of the 
Netherlands, but this state-of-affairs has a beginning and an end in time) or 
durable (Wim Kok will always be the Prime Minister who was in function in 
the year 2000). Temporary states-of-affairs can be either normal (such as the 
example given) or momentary. Momentary states-of-affairs obtain only for a 
very brief period of time. This kind of states-of-affairs is expressed in English 
by, e.g., the simple past: ‘the bullet hit jfk’s head’ can never be expressed as ‘the 
bullet was hitting jfk’s head’. Second, states-of-affairs often supervene on other 
states-of-affairs. This means that a state-of-affairs exists only due to the presence 
of some other state-of-affairs. Third, states-of-affairs can have different modali-
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ties, of which three are discerned: anankastic, deontic, and probabilistic states-of-
affairs. Anankastic states-of-affairs concern the necessary, the possible and the 
impossible. Deontic states-of-affairs concern what is obligated, forbidden, or 
permitted. Probabilistic states-of-affairs concern what is probable, certain, or 
uncertain. Fourth, states-of-affairs differ according to the point of view taken. 
Points of view can differ across disciplines (e.g., in case of a biological as opposed 
to a legal point of view), or within disciplines (e.g., in case of a criminal law view 
as opposed to a civil law view) (ibid., p. 5-7). Events, as noted above, bring about 
changes in states-of-affairs. Occurrences of events are momentary states-of-af-
fairs. Events can cause different states-of-affairs. 
.. A comparison of the three models
Although all three models aim at providing a conceptual framework for the rep-
resentation of the law, they are very different. In Valente’s (1995) model, primary 
focus is on different types of knowledge. Van Kralingen’s (1995) model provides a 
detailed analysis of three main entity types in the legal domain. Verheij and Hage 
(1997) also provide three main entity types in the legal domain, but these focus 
on the dynamic properties of a legal system. The normative element, clearly 
present in both Valente’s and Van Kralingen’s models, respectively as normative 
knowledge and as norm frames, lacks in Verheij and Hage’s model, although the 
latter model contains a clear account of rules.
 In the models discussed, I have observed the absence of the following three 
elements, that are valuable in the framework of this thesis.
- In the models, there is no room for accommodating different legal-philo-
sophical stances on the nature of law. Such stances influence what entities are 
to be distinguished in the domain, and the way in which knowledge about 
these entities is acquired.
- The difference between entities and knowledge about entities is not made 
within the ontologies discussed; there is no explicit distinction between an 
ontological level and an epistemological level.
- There is no way of distinguishing the normative difference between belief 
and knowledge, partly because there is no way to express attitudes (such as 
believing), and partly because justifying entities, such as reasons, are not re-
garded as a separate category – although they would fit in nicely with Hage 
and Verheij’s (1997) ontology.
In the next chapter, I give an overview of a knowledge-based ontology of the 
legal domain, which can accommodate (1) legal-philosophical stances on the 
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nature of law, (2) the distinction between the ontological level and the episte-
mological level, and (3) the difference between belief and knowledge.
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 A knowledge-based model of the law
This chapter describes a knowledge-based model of the law. It provides a frame-
work for the representation of different ontological and epistemological claims 
bearing on the representation of knowledge about the legal domain. The chap-
ter builds on the findings of the previous chapters. The chapters 2 and 3 showed 
what legal knowledge amounts to. Chapter 4 provided different views on the 
ontology of law. Chapter 5 indicated what difficulties we run into when we try 
to represent meaning. The ideas acquired in these chapters are combined into a 
ontology of law (in the ai sense of this term, i.e., a conceptual model). The on-
tology can accommodate different views on the existence of law. It can be used 
for the construction of a more specific ontology of law for a certain legal system 
with an accompanying view on the existence of legal entities. It should be not-
ed, however, that the applicability of the ontology depends on the ontological 
view involved, and on the degree to which we can make that view explicit. 
 Although the ontological status layers adopted are based on widely acknowl-
edged views in legal philosophy, this does not guarantee the availability of all sta-
tus layers and object categories needed for specific ontologies. Rather, the idea 
is that building an ontology of law is a theory-laden activity. Hence, an ontology 
should provide sufficient opportunities for accommodating different views on 
the existence of the law. The ontology described in this chapter consists of the 
following six basic categories: entities, ontological status layers, epistemic roles, 
relations, acts and facts. Each of these categories has legally-relevant and legal 
representatives. In each of the sections 6.1 through 6.6, the legally-relevant and 
legal representatives of the basic categories of the knowledge-based model of 
law are listed and explained briefly. In section 6.7, an overview of the model is 
provided in the form of a number of tables. Finally, in section 6.8, I discuss the 
question what it takes to know the law.
. Entities
The entities distinguished in the knowledge-based ontology do not have ad-
ditional ontological status layers or epistemic roles. They are considered as the 
basic entities in the ontology, and can be assigned ontological status layers or 
epistemic roles. For instance, a belief (a basic entity) can be qualified as a reason 
(an epistemic role, cf. section 6.3). 
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.. Legally-relevant entities
Below, seven legally-relevant entities are listed and briefly explained: sentences, 
statements, propositions, beliefs, rules, concepts and artefacts.
 Sentences – Sentences are meaningful sequences of words, put in a natural lan-
guage. Sentences can be uttered by persons. Some types of sentences, uttered by 
persons, are statements. 
 Statements – An assertive sentence (‘It is nine o’clock’) becomes a statement 
(“It is nine o’clock”) if it is uttered by some individual. An assertive sentence is 
a sentence that makes a claim.
 Propositions – Propositions amount to what is expressed by assertive sentences: 
in case of the example, the assertive sentence (‘it is nine o’clock’) expresses that 
it is nine o’clock.
 Beliefs – Beliefs are propositions that are within the reach of a propositional 
attitude (believe). Propositional attitudes express mental states or mental atti-
tudes towards a proposition. In case of the example, the proposition (it is nine 
o’clock) falls within reach of the propositional attitude (I believe), thus resulting 
in the belief ‘I believe that it is nine o’clock’. Characteristics of beliefs are listed 
in table 6.2.
 Rules – Rules are linguistic expressions that relate two types of phenomena to 
each other (such as ‘guiding dogs are not regarded as pets’). 
 Concepts – A concept is an abstract idea, containing the characteristics of con-
crete instances of the concept. In most cases, a concept has a name. There are 
concepts without concrete instances to refer to. Concepts that refer to institu-
tional entities do not always have tangible referents. The meaning of a concept 
(the abstract idea) is sometimes equated with its intension, i.e., the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that – if fulfilled – constitute an instance of the concept.
 Artefacts – Artefacts are tangible objects made by human beings. These should 
be distinguished from both natural objects (which are tangible but not made by 
human beings) and institutions (which are made by human beings but are not 
tangible).
.. Legal entities
In this subsection, eight legal entities are discussed: legal principles, legal norms, 
legal decisions, legal systematisations, judicial interpretations, judicial classifica-
tions, legal rules, and legal concepts.
 Legal rules – Legal rules, just as rules, are expressions that relate two types of 
phenomena to each other. They are legal in the sense that they are valid and that 
they are part of a legal system.
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 Legal principles – Legal principles are general values that apply to certain areas 
within the law. The meaning of a legal principle is not fixed; it is often further 
specified when it is called upon in a specific discussion or case. An example of a 
principle is ‘freedom of contract’ within the law of obligations.
 Legal norms – Legal norms are entities that explicitly guide some kind of be-
haviour or action. The presence of a norm can be identified by the normative 
modalities it contains. Legal norms are based on legal sources, and they govern 
behaviour. Some legal norms are explicitly expressed in legal sources (they con-
tain normative modalities), other norms can be derived from legal rules (the 
rules can be formulated in a different way, using normative modalities). Rather 
than legal rules, which contain conditions for some kind of qualification, legal 
norms express duties, permissions, and competences (cf. subsection 5.3.2).
 Legal decisions – Legal decisions are decisions in some legal case, made by a 
qualified legal authority under suitable circumstances (as prescribed in proce-
dural law).
 Legal systematisations – A legal systematisation is the result of an attempt to im-
pose a more general structure on a relatively unstructured part of a legal system, 
or the implicit presence of such a structure in a part of a legal system. To attain 
or uncover such a structure, one has to employ or discover ordering principles 
or ordering rules. An example of an ordering principle is ‘lex superior derogat 
legi inferiori’. 
 Judicial interpretations – A judicial interpretation is the result of an assessment 
that a judge (or a different qualified authority) makes of some complex of (le-
gal) rules and (legal) norms. It is attained through a choice between conflicting 
norms and rules, or a specification or clarification of the meaning of norms 
and rules. The process by which a judicial interpretation is attained, is called 
interpretation (see also section 6.5). The way the process of interpretation works 
is partly unclear; the best way to clarify a judicial interpretation is to provide 
proper justification for it.
 Judicial classifications – Somewhat similar to judicial interpretations are judicial 
classifications. Classification also involves a kind of interpretation. To classify 
some event or state-of-affairs as a legal act or a legal institution requires us to 
find and apply the conditions under which this classification can take place. It 
is not always clear what exactly these conditions are. Even if the conditions are 
known, they cannot be unambiguously applied to events or states-of-affairs. 
Although in this respect, classification and interpretation are similar phenom-
ena, the object of the process of classification differs from that of interpretation. 
Classifications apply to facts, whereas interpretations apply to rules and norms. 
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Classifications abstract from reality, while interpretations make rules and norms 
more concrete.
 Legal concepts – Legal concepts are concepts whose definition is given (at least 
partly) in formal sources of law. Additionally, they are used in a legal context. 
Many legal concepts have a meaning that differs from their meaning in a non-
legal context. But even if the meaning of a concept does not differ from its 
natural-language meaning, its explicit introduction into a legal context provides 
it with the status of a legal concept (cf. subsection 5.3.2).
. Ontological status layers
Ontological status layers are the ontological characteristics of legally-relevant 
and legal entities, acts, and facts (the latter two are described in sections 6.5 and 
6.6. Sometimes more than one status layer applies to an object. For instance, a 
legal decision can be both valid and efficacious.
.. Legally-relevant ontological status layers
This subsection provides a brief overview of legally-relevant ontological status 
layers: existence, constitution, and recognition.
 Existence – Existence amounts to ‘real being’; the existence of some object. 
At this point, I ignore the philosophical problems attached to this notion. For 
an elaboration on the issue of existence, I refer to section 4.1. The issue is not 
important here, because existence fits in rather smoothly with a common sense 
notion of existence, in which both physical existence and the existence of ideas 
can be accommodated.
 Constitution – When an object is constituted, it means that it is emergent on 
some other object, and that there is a relation that has established the constitu-
tion between the two objects, which has not been ended yet. An actual constitu-
tion relation can, e.g., exist between a fact and a social fact; slapping a person in 
the face (a fact) constitutes an insult (a social fact), after the fact is qualified as 
such.
 Recognition – An object is recognised if its existence is accepted by an indi-
vidual, or a group of individuals.
.. Legal ontological status layers
In addition to the legally-relevant ontological status layers discussed in the pre-
vious subsection, there are four legal ontological status layers: legal efficacy, legal 
validity, and legal recognition.
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 Legal efficacy – A legal entity (a rule or a norm) is efficacious if it has a notice-
able effect on the mental states and/or behaviour of a significant part of a com-
munity, and the effect amounts to a higher degree of conformity with the rule 
or norm (cf. subsection 4.6.4).
 Legal validity – A legal entity is valid if it has been issued by a proper author-
ity, or if it derives its validity from an entity that has been issued by a proper 
authority through (systemic) recognition (for instance, the automatic issuing of 
a speeding ticket can be deemed a valid legal decision) (cf. subsection 4.6.1).
 Legal recognition – A legal entity is recognised if it is accepted by an individual 
in his capacity as a legal professional, or by a legal institution. The two types of 
legal recognition are authoritative recognition and systemic recognition. The 
status layers arising from these types are authoritatively recognised and systemi-
cally recognised (cf. subsection 4.6.3).
. Epistemic roles
Just as existence layers, epistemic roles are claims regarding objects. However, 
these roles signify the function these objects have in acquiring or justifying 
knowledge. An epistemic role is applied to an object by employing the counts-
as relation: for instance, a statement may count as a reason. In that case, the state-
ment acquires an additional status layer or characteristic, which enables us to 
express the specific (epistemic) role that an entity plays. 
.. Legally-relevant epistemic roles
Legally-relevant epistemic roles, discussed in this subsection, are reasons, defeat-
ers, factual knowledge and practical knowledge.
 Reasons – Reasons are statements, propositions or facts that are employed for 
the explanation or justification of some other statement, proposition or fact. An 
extensive typology of reasons is given in subsection 4.5.2.
 Defeaters – A subclass of reasons is formed by defeaters. Defeaters are negative 
reasons, i.e., they attack some belief or reason in such a way that it is no longer 
correct.
 Factual knowledge – If an object complies with certain so-called knowledge 
criteria, it counts as factual knowledge.
 Practical knowledge – If an ability complies with certain knowledge criteria, it 
counts as practical knowledge.
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.. Legal epistemic roles
Apart from the legally-relevant epistemic roles, there are two legal epistemic 
roles: factual legal knowledge and practical legal knowledge.
 Factual legal knowledge – If a legal object (a belief, a proposition) complies with 
certain so-called knowledge criteria, it counts as factual legal knowledge.
 Practical legal knowledge – If a legal ability complies with certain knowledge 
criteria, it counts as practical legal knowledge.
. Relations
Relations express interdependencies among phenomena. A relation may state 
the consequences of some event, or impose new roles on existing objects. For 
instance, the counts-as relation may impose epistemic roles on entities.
.. Legally-relevant relations
Three legally-relevant relations are briefly discussed in this subsection: causa-
tion, counting as, and recognition.
 Causation – Causation is a two-place relation between phenomena: a certain 
event causes a different event or state-of-affairs if the occurrence of the former 
event is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of the latter. Physical causa-
tion is described (not prescribed) by the laws of physics. Intentional causation 
amounts to the patterns of perceived causation in human behaviour (cf. Searle 
1999). For instance, we say that some event (an attack) caused someone to be-
have in a certain way (strike back). This event, then, can be regarded as a neces-
sary and sufficient reason for that person’s behaviour.
 Counting as – Counting as is a two-place relation that associates two types of 
phenomena to each other. The relation causes the phenomena of the first type 
to be regarded as phenomena of a different type, sometimes under additional 
contextual conditions. There are two types of legal counting as: establishment 
and maintenance. The first relation establishes the constituting relation, while 
the latter maintains it through time. The first relation triggers an event, while 
the latter constitutes a state-of-affairs.
 Recognition – Recognition is a two-place relation that says what individual, 
what group of individuals, or what institution recognises a certain phenom-
enon. The object of recognition may be a fact (an event or a state-of-affairs), 
or an instantiated counts-as relation. Three types of legally-relevant recognition 
are distinguished: individual, collective and systemic. Individual recognition is 
recognition of some object by one person. Collective recognition is the recog-
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nition of some object by the majority of some relevant community. Systemic 
recognition is the recognition of an object within a rule system.
.. Legal relations
Legal relations are legal causation, legal counting as, and legal recognition. They 
are briefly discussed below.
 Legal causation – Legal causation is actually a subtype of the legal counts-as 
relation. Legal causes are events or state-of-affairs qualified as causes for cer-
tain phenomena within a legal context. What counts as a cause in a legal sense 
depends on the specific demands that are imposed in a legal system on, for in-
stance, the attribution of a consequential event to the behaviour of a person.
 Legal counting as – Legal counting as is similar to the counts-as relation de-
scribed above, except that at least one legal type should be part of the relation. 
There are two types of legal counting as, just as there are for the normal counts-
as relation: establishment and maintenance. The first relation establishes the legal 
constitutive relation, while the latter maintains it through time. Thus, the first 
relation triggers a legal event, and the latter constitutes a legal state-of-affairs.
 Legal recognition – Legal recognition is similar to ordinary recognition, with 
the additional demand that the recognition needs to take place by a legal institu-
tion or by a legal professional in his capacity as such. There are two types of legal 
recognition: authoritative recognition and systemic recognition. Authoritative 
recognition occurs if a legal professional or legal institution has the discretionary 
power to recognise some phenomenon, and systemic recognition occurs if the 
recognition takes place by the application of a legal rule.
. Acts
Acts play a role in, e.g., the interactions between the parties in a trial. They lead 
to a decision through a process of asking questions, assessing statements, inter-
pretation etc. Most of these are legally-relevant acts, and some of these are legal 
acts, in the sense that they have a legal status (they are qualified as legal acts). 
Apart from these, there are, e.g., acts leading to breaches of norms. In this section, 
only a small selection of legally-relevant acts and legal acts is provided.
.. Legally-relevant acts
Legally-relevant acts briefly discussed in this subsection are: applying rules, 
making decisions, making systematisations, making interpretations, and making 
classifications.
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 Applying rules – The act of applying rules amounts to deciding whether the 
conditions in the antecedent of the rule are fulfilled, and if so, recognising the 
occurrence of the consequent of the rule.
 Making decisions – Making a decision means to choose among alternatives, 
and, if necessary, to make up those alternatives. The actual decision is sometimes 
accompanied by a justification, which may add to its acceptability. 
 Making systematisations – Systematisations are made by applying ordering cri-
teria. They serve to increase the perceived coherence in a system of rules. The 
nature of systematisations depends only partly on the system they are about. 
Rather, they depend on the choice made for applicable criteria. Making a sys-
tematisation means to establish ordering criteria and apply them.
 Making interpretations – Making interpretations is the act that leads to the es-
tablishment of an interpretation of some kind. 
 Making classifications – Making classifications is the act that leads to the estab-
lishment of a classification. 
.. Legal acts
In addition to the legally-relevant acts explained above, I discuss legal acts in this 
subsection: applying legal rules, making legal decisions, making legal systemati-
sations, making judicial interpretations, and making judicial classifications.
 Applying legal rules – The application of legal rules is only effective if it is per-
formed by a qualified authority under certain conditions. The application of 
legal rules may result in classifications and decisions.
 Making legal decisions – Making legal decisions is, of course, also bound to legal 
conditions. These conditions say what authorities may make such decisions un-
der what conditions.
 Making legal systematisations – Legal systematisations are made by a process of 
applying ordering criteria. Such systematisations have a legal nature insofar as 
they are based on criteria that emerge from the legal system itself, or if they are 
generally recognised as correct by legal professionals.
 Making judicial interpretations – Judicial interpretations are made under certain 
conditions established in the legal system. The freedom of interpretation (such 
as by analogical reasoning) is, for instance, more restricted in the domain of pe-
nal law than in civil law.
 Making judicial classifications – The act of making a judicial classification serves 
to provide a legal status to a fact. The process of making such classifications is 
thus bound to criteria concerning the person or institution carrying out the 
classification.
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. Facts
Facts are events and states-of-affairs as they occur in reality. An event brings 
about a change (for instance: ‘John signed a contract on March 23rd 2001’), 
whereas a state-of-affairs refers to a static situation (for instance: ‘The contract is 
valid according to Dutch law of obligations’). Facts involve objects, the charac-
teristics of those objects, characteristics of characteristics, and relations between 
objects and between characteristics. An object alone is never a fact. Something 
has to be predicated for that object. For instance, the existence of an object is a 
fact, as well as the object’s lying on the table.
.. Legally-relevant facts
The category of legally-relevant facts is represented by four types of facts: brute 
facts, recognised facts, conventional facts, and institutional facts.
 Brute facts – Brute facts are facts that are tangible in some respects, i.e., they 
involve real objects. Events are momentary incidents that may exert some form 
of influence on states-of-affairs or other events. States-of-affairs are relatively 
stable situations. Events and states-of-affairs both involve a certain characteristic 
or an act of some object or agent, or a relation between objects or agents (cf. 
subsection 5.3.3).
 Recognised facts – Recognised facts are events and states-of-affairs that are rec-
ognised as such by an individual or a group of individuals. They are not tangible 
(as far as their existence as recognised fact is concerned). The fact that someone 
has an actual personal belief, for instance, is an individually recognised fact (if 
someone believes that the earth is flat, then the fact that he believes that the 
earth is flat is individually recognised). An actual collective belief is a collectively 
recognised fact.
 Conventional facts – Conventional facts are events and states-of-affairs that are 
based on agreement within a community, or at least among a considerable part 
of that community. 
 Institutional facts – Institutional facts are events and states-of-affairs that are (as 
far as their institutional existence layer is concerned) not tangible. They arise 
from the application of institutionalised qualification rules (i.e., qualification 
rules that are valid, seen from some system of rules). 
.. Legal facts
In this subsection, I briefly discuss three types of legal facts: recognised legal 
facts, conventional legal facts, and institutional legal facts.
 Recognised legal facts – Recognised legal facts are events and states-of-affairs 
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that have acquired their legal status by some form of recognition. 
 Conventional legal facts – Conventional legal facts are events and states-of-af-
fairs that are based on agreement within a community, or at least among a con-
siderable part of that community. The agreement should be supported by a part 
of the legal system, or in turn, should constitute a part of the legal system.
 Institutional legal facts – Institutional legal facts are events and states-of-affairs 
that are (as far as their institutional existence layer is concerned) not tangible. 
They arise from the application of legal qualification rules.
. Overview of a knowledge-based ontology of law
In the following overview of the knowledge-based ontology of law, I name dif-
ferent types of relations, entities, ontological status layers, epistemic roles, acts, 
and facts that we find in the legal domain (subsection 6.7.1). After that, I give an 
overview of the characteristics of beliefs (subsection 6.7.2), factual knowledge 
(subsection 6.7.3), and practical knowledge (subsection 6.7.4).
.. An overview of the basic categories
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the six basic categories of the model: entities, 
ontological status layers, epistemic roles, relations, entities, acts, and facts.
type legally-relevant legal
entities sentences
statements
propositions
beliefs
artefacts
rules
concepts
legal rules
legal principles
legal norms
legal decisions
legal systematisations
judicial interpretations
judicial classifications
legal concepts
ontological 
status layers
existence
constitution
recognition
legal efficacy
legal validity
legal recognition
epistemic 
roles
reasons
defeaters
factual knowledge
practical knowledge
factual legal knowledge
practical legal knowledge
Table 6.1. Basic categories of the model
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type legally-relevant legal
relations causation
counting as
recognition
legal causation
legal counting as
legal recognition
acts applying rules
making decisions
making systematisations
making interpretations
making classifications
applying legal rules
making legal decisions
making legal systematisations
making judicial interpretations
making judicial classifications
facts brute facts
recognised facts
conventional facts
institutional facts
recognised legal facts
conventional legal facts
institutional legal facts
Table 6.1. Basic categories of the model (continued)
.. Beliefs
Beliefs are further specified according to their content source, origination source, 
subject, and object. Table 6.2 lists possible values for these characteristics.
source (content) source (origination) subject object
legal statutes
legal principles
case law
perception
memory
reason
testimony
interpretation
individual
community
authority
legal
legally-relevant
abstract
concrete
Table 6.2. Beliefs
.. Factual knowledge
Table 6.3 provides a specification of factual knowledge. Factual knowledge can 
be specified according to the characteristics given in the table.
source 
(content)
source 
(origination)
subject object applicable 
criteria
legal statutes
legal principles
case law
perception
memory
reason
testimony
interpretation
individual
community
authority
legal
legally-
  relevant
abstract
concrete
truth
justification
reliability
coherence
Table 6.3. Factual knowledge
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.. Practical knowledge
Practical knowledge can be specified according to four different characteristics: 
its source, subject, object and the applicable knowledge criterion. Table 6.4 pro-
vides an overview.
source subject object applicable criterion
experience
learning
innate
individual
community
authority
legal
legally-relevant
reliability
Table 6.4. Practical knowledge
. Knowing the law
To know the law, one needs both practical and factual knowledge related to this 
object (cf. Mommers 1999). Practical knowledge includes the capacities to un-
derstand and interpret legal statutes and case law, and to classify legally-relevant 
acts and facts. Factual knowledge consists of statements, propositions and beliefs 
that comply with certain criteria. These beliefs are about sources of law and 
about legally-relevant acts and facts. Because of the different types of knowledge 
that we find in the legal domain, there is not a uniform set of criteria to deter-
mine whether some entity (a capacity, a statement, a proposition, or a belief) is 
knowledge.
 Rather, we should regard ‘knowledge’ as a term that shows the characteristics 
of family resemblance (put forward by Wittgenstein, cf. Wittgenstein 1953). For 
such a term, there is not a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
it has to comply with in order to be qualified as knowledge. Instead, the term 
‘knowledge’ has a large number of uses that we should take into account by 
offering a detailed (but not exhaustive) typology of knowledge about the legal 
domain. After this, we can decide whether (and if so, under what conditions) 
each of the resulting types is qualified as knowledge. 
 This attempt at qualification of some entity as knowledge arises from the 
basic assumption that to have knowledge is more valuable than merely to have 
a capacity or a belief. Thus, the qualification of some entity as knowledge ex-
presses a value judgement about that entity. The value judgement is the conse-
quence of a two-step process. First, we classify an entity as belonging to a certain 
type (for instance abstract factual belief). Then, we apply the knowledge criteria 
applicable to that type of entity. If the entity fulfils the applicable criteria, it may 
be qualified as knowledge.
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 As I noted before, the three most important dimensions of knowledge are 
its acquisition, its object, and its justification. These three dimensions provide 
us both with the criteria to assess to which type of knowledge a certain entity 
potentially belongs, and the criteria to assess whether it actually is knowledge. 
These criteria were elaborated on in section 2.3 (namely truth, proper justifica-
tion, reliability, and coherence). In the current section, I discuss the specific issue 
of what it takes to know the law. This question is closely related to the ontologi-
cal claims made with respect to the law.
 The framework presented in this chapter is suitable for representing the ex-
istence claims for the major positivist ontological positions in legal philosophy. 
The different ontological status layers distinguished in section 6.2 suffice for 
that purpose. To give an example, I explain what it takes to know the law in a 
conventionalist-cum-institutional approach. If we want to know the law, we will 
first need to find out what it is according to this approach. If ‘the law’ is under-
stood as a set of legal rules whose existence is established by convention and 
authoritative recognition (i.e., legal rules are conventionalist-cum-institutional 
facts), then we can know the law acquiring knowledge about the content of 
that set of legal rules, and acquiring knowledge about its actual establishment by 
convention and recognition.
 Checking whether a rule is constituted by convention is an empirical matter; 
we have to ask a representative part of a group whether they agree with that 
rule. Checking whether a rule is constituted is a different matter. To do this, we 
have to find other rules of law validating the rule, or we have to establish the 
existence of a valid discretionary power on behalf of which the rule was issued. 
It seems absurd to demand that someone executes an empirical investigation 
in order to know a legal rule, but this follows naturally from taking a certain 
ontological stance with respect to legal rules. To avoid such absurdities, we 
could take a different ontological stance (a Kelsenian approach does not involve 
convention, and thus it eliminates the problem of establishing whether there 
are conventions), or we may (like Hart) acknowledge some ultimate rule of 
recognition, which confers the conventional element onto the whole system of 
rules, without the necessity to establish the conventional recognition of each in-
dividual rule. Thus, using the building blocks provided by the knowledge-based 
model of the law, it is possible to express the epistemological and ontological 
claims attached to different views on the law.
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 Dutch penal law: a domain description
In this chapter, I explain the characteristics of Dutch penal law in order to show 
how the framework presented in the previous chapter can be applied to an ac-
tual part of the law. Of course, I do not intend to represent the complete body of 
Dutch penal law. Rather, the discussion will serve to show the expressive power 
of the knowledge-based ontology. To attain this goal, in section 7.1, the ques-
tions are discussed on the basis of which the guilt and punishability of a suspect 
are determined in a trial. In section 7.2, I discuss some important principles that 
apply to penal law. In section 7.3, central concepts of penal law are dealt with. 
Finally, in subsection 7.4, the characteristics of a subdomain of Dutch penal law 
are described, namely violent crimes and crimes against life.
. Guilt and punishability
In the following discussion of law of criminal proceedings, I restrict myself to 
the questions asked during the trial, starting with the formulation of the sum-
mons. The summons contains a charge (art. 261 sv) with the time and place of 
the fact that underlies the charge. The charge should contain the constituents 
of the offence description (Franken et al. 1995, p. 382). During the trial two 
groups of questions should be answered. The first group consists of four formal 
questions (ibid., p. 382). The first question of this group is whether the summons 
is valid. If it is not valid, the summons is void. The second question is whether 
the judge is competent. If he is not, he is incompetent. The third question is 
whether the public prosecutor is amenable. If he is not, he is not amenable. The 
fourth question is whether there is a reason for an adjournment. If there is such 
a reason, the trial is adjourned.
 Hereafter, the second group of four questions should be answered (ibid., p. 
382). The first question of the second group is whether it has been proved that 
the suspect has committed the fact as charged. If not, the suspect is acquitted. 
The second question is whether the proved fact is punishable. If it is not, the 
suspect is exempted of legal proceedings. There are different kinds of condi-
tions that can be satisfied so as to yield punishable facts (Franken et al. 1995, p. 
377). On the one hand there are conditions for punishability that are part of the 
offence description: the constituents of the punishable fact. On the other hand 
there are conditions for punishability that are not an explicit part of the offence 
description: elements of the punishable fact. Together they are called conditions 
for punishability. The third question is whether the suspect is punishable. If he is 
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not, he is exempted of legal proceedings. The fourth question is what punish-
ment should be imposed. A denial of the first question thus leads to acquittal. A 
disaffirmative answer to the second and/or third question leads to exemption of 
legal proceedings (ibid., p. 382).
 I should clarify the notion of evidence that we need to determine whether 
the suspect has committed the fact as charged. The Dutch phrase ‘wettig en 
overtuigend bewijs’ can be translated into English as ‘legitimate and convincing 
evidence’. The import of the phrase is that the judge should be convinced of the 
fact that the suspect has committed the act as charged. Also, there should be le-
gitimate evidence for that fact. The judge determines to what extent he attaches 
significance to the statements given by, for instance, a suspect (ibid., p. 383).
 When the answers to the two groups of questions are given, we can deter-
mine the punishment that should be imposed on the suspect. The themes that 
are induced by the two groups of questions in this section are discussed in the 
subsequent sections, starting with a discussion of three groups of meta-princi-
ples.
. Central principles of penal law
Besides the specific regulations that we find in statute law, we can also discern a 
number of principles. These precede the specific regulations; any application of 
a regulation that does not satisfy these principles may be disputed. I divide these 
principles into three groups: legitimacy and legality (subsection 7.2.1), subsidi-
arity and proportionality (subsection 7.2.2), and priority principles (subsection 
7.2.3).
.. Legitimacy and legality
The first group contains the legitimacy and legality principles. The legitimacy 
criterion protects the suspect against an undesirable (i.e., illegitimate) applica-
tion of law. The legality criterion protects the suspect against an illegal applica-
tion of law.
 The legitimacy principle for penal law, on the one hand, demands that the 
way a judgement is argued for, is acceptable for us. The principle of legitimacy is 
basically what we call the justification criterion in philosophy. Without justifica-
tion of a judgement we cannot say why a judgement is right. In this sense we 
can compare the legitimacy principle with the justification criterion for knowl-
edge. Without justification we can have true knowledge, but the truth would be 
beyond our intellectual capacities to grasp if we did not have evidence for the 
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truth of a piece of knowledge. Without legitimacy a judgement may or may not 
in some sense be right, the rightness of the judgement only comes within our 
reach if we can legitimise it.
 The legality principle for penal law, on the other hand, can be divided into 
five sub-criteria (Franken et al. 1995, p. 372). First, no fact is liable to penalty 
without applicable legislation. Second, no penalty can be imposed without a law 
permitting the imposition. Third, no penalty can be imposed without a preceding 
law, a law that has been effectuated before the act has been performed. Fourth, 
analogous reasoning is not allowed in the argumentation of the judge. Finally, 
laws should be sufficiently clear so that in principle anyone is able to understand 
them.
.. Subsidiarity and proportionality
The second group contains two criteria that can also be characterised as ‘meta-
principles’. These are subsidiarity and proportionality. Subsidiarity can be de-
scribed as the rule that the least drastic means for attaining a certain goal is the 
most appropriate one. Proportionality says that the means should be in a reason-
able relation with the intended goal (Nijboer 1995, p. 138). These principles are 
especially important when a person has committed a certain offence and the 
question arises whether some exemption ground from punishment may be ap-
plicable.
.. Priority principles
A third group of criteria helps us to determine what regulations we should ap-
ply in the assessment of a specific case. These criteria are the following. First, lex 
specialis derogat legi generali; special laws are preferred above general laws. Second, 
lex posterior derogat legi priori; laws that are promulgated at some point in time 
are preferred above laws about the same subject that were promulgated at some 
point earlier in time. Third, lex superior derogat legi inferiori; laws that are prom-
ulgated by some authority are preferred over laws on the same subject that are 
promulgated by a lower authority.
. Central concepts of penal law
In the current section, I deal with concepts that play an important role in penal 
law. These are: facts (subsection 7.3.1), culpability (subsection 7.3.2), exemption 
grounds (subsection 7.3.3), causality (subsection 7.3.4), participation (subsection 
7.3.5), and attempt (subsection 7.3.6).
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
146
dutc h  p e nal  law: a  doma i n  de sc r i p t i on
147
.. Facts
With respect to the meaning of the concept ‘fact’ in Dutch penal law, I discuss 
three different possible situations that are described in artt. 55, 56, and 57 sr. Art. 
55 par. 1 sr says that when a fact can be brought under more than one regulation, 
only one of these regulations can be applied, and this should be the one with 
the severest penalty. This article constitutes the situation in which two or more 
offences arise from the same act. Art. 56 par. 1 describes a so-called continuous 
act. A continuous act occurs when comparable acts are performed subsequently, 
and they all arise from the same intention. Art. 57 par. 1 sr says that when two 
or more criminal offences can be regarded as being independent of each other, 
they should each be punished, though the total penalty (imprisonment or de-
tention) given should never exceed the severest penalty for an individual offence 
by more than one third. The situation in which one sentence is pronounced for 
various offences occurs when different acts have been carried out that cannot 
be classified under the same legal rule (Franken et al. 1995, p. 69). 
 As should be clear from these articles, it is important to know whether a fact 
can be seen as distinct from another fact. Until 1932, the Dutch Supreme Court 
considered one fact to be one “material behaviour”, one “externally perceptible 
deed” (Jörg en Kelk 1994, p. 113). The old notion of ‘fact’ included a simplified 
view on facts, as a fact actually includes human intentions, interactions with the 
world, and the situation of the world itself (ibid.).
 In a 1932 judgement (hr February 15, 1932, nj 1932: 289) the Supreme Court 
formulated a different approach towards the notion of ‘fact’. Two facts can be 
distinguished, even if they have taken place at the same place and time, if they 
can be seen as separate facts (their co-occurrence is not essential), if one fact is 
not part of the other, and if one fact cannot be seen as part of the circumstances 
under which the other took place (ibid., p. 114). In practice, this means that a 
drunk driver whose car has defective headlights, can be prosecuted for two facts, 
a case in which one sentence is pronounced for two offences.
 The notion of ‘fact’ in the above-mentioned articles is different from the no-
tion of ‘fact’ in the ne bis in idem principle, expressed in art. 68 sr. Art. 68 par. 1 
sr. The ne bis in idem principle says that a person can never be prosecuted twice 
for committing one offence (except in appeal cases). There are circumstances 
under which two facts in the sense of articles 55 and 57 yield one fact in the 
sense of article 68. For articles 55 and 57, we should take a look at the factual 
circumstances. For article 68, we have to consider applicable law. Whether a 
person can be prosecuted more than once given a complex of facts, depends on 
the question whether we can classify elements of this complex of facts under 
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different legal regulations. So, if someone kills two persons driving in his car, this 
will be seen as two facts in the sense of article 57, and as one fact in the sense of 
article 68. If someone drives too fast and ignores a red traffic light, this will be 
seen as an occurrence of two different facts in the sense of both article 57 and 68 
(ibid., p. 116-119). For the sake of clarity, I will call facts in the sense of articles 55, 
56 and 57 material facts (not to be mistaken with ‘fait materiel’), while I will call 
facts in the sense of article 68 judicial facts.
 How can we characterise the difference between material facts and judicial 
facts? Material and judicial facts are both construed facts, in that they are not ob-
server-independent. Construed facts are fact representations; they still refer to 
what happened in reality, but they are interpretations because their complexity 
partly depends on the legal rule they should comply with. In case of article 68 sr 
(ne bis in idem), the complexity of what is assumed to be ‘one fact’ in most cases 
depends on the question whether one regulation and one reproach of guilt are 
involved. In case of articles 55, 56, and 57 sr the complexity of single fact repre-
sentations largely depends on the unity of that act in reality. Note, however, that 
the difference between material and judicial facts is only a matter of degree. In 
both cases the interpretation of what a fact consists of depends on the contents 
of legal rules.
 What kind of consequence should be attached to this difference in these 
two types of facts in the knowledge-based ontology of law? We cannot give an 
ultimate representation of reality. However, the relations between objects and 
individuals we discern in representing knowledge can be considered as primi-
tives. Combinations of these primitives constitute material and judicial facts. If 
we have different represented situations in our model, e.g., a situation in which 
a certain person is drunk, and another situation in which this person is driving, 
both occur in a comparable moment in time, and at the same place, and there is 
a legal rule that says that drunk driving is a criminal offence, we may construe 
a new material fact by combining the two original situations. The new material 
fact consists of the two individual situations in which the person is drunk and 
he is driving. Given this new material fact, we may wonder whether in this case 
two or more offences arise from the same act. They do, because both art. 8 wvw 
(drunk driving) and art. 453 sr (public drunkenness) are applicable. Art. 453 sr 
applies to the agent being drunk at a particular location; he need not be driving. 
Because in this case two offences arise from the same act, the one with the sever-
est penalty applies (in this case, according to art. 176 par. 3 wvw, three months 
of detention or a fine of the third category for drunk driving). An application of 
the ne bis in idem principle here prevents the agent from being prosecuted twice. 
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The following schema indicates under what circumstances material facts and 
judicial facts can diverge (based on Jörg and Kelk 1994, p. 119).
1 concurrence of one act
one material fact, one judicial fact
2 concurrence of multiple acts
2.1 similar regulations
    2.1.1 similar reproach of guilt
     multiple material facts, one judicial fact
    2.1.2 dissimilar reproach of guilt
     multiple material facts, multiple judicial facts
2.2 dissimilar regulations
    multiple material facts, multiple judicial facts
With this schema, I conclude my discussion of the notion of fact in penal law.
.. Culpability
Jörg and Kelk (1994, p. 145-146) distinguish the following four forms of culpa-
bility. Culpability can be regarded as having committed some act, as carelessness, as 
intent and carelessness, or as reproachability. The following schema shows the mu-
tual relations between these notions (ibid., p. 146):
1 culpability
   1.1 legal notion
    1.1.1 having committed
    1.1.2 extensive notion (intent and carelessness)
     narrow notion (carelessness)
   1.2 theoretical notion (reproachability)
The legal notion of having committed can be more formally characterised as the 
condition that a suspect did something, or refrained from doing something, 
leading to a punishable fact. Thus, it is mainly a descriptive notion, while care-
lessness and intent and carelessness are more normative notions. Carelessness can 
be characterised as the qualification that a person can be held responsible for 
the consequences of his act, considering the knowledge he had at the moment 
of the act (culpa). Intent amounts to the degree to which a person aimed at the 
punishable fact. Reproachability amounts to the “absence of all circumstances 
that could excuse the suspect” (Remmelink 1996, p. 239).
 In section 7.1, I discussed eight questions that should be answered in a trial. 
The first question of the second group was whether it had been proved that the 
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suspect had committed the offence he was charged with. The corresponding 
culpability notion is ‘having committed’. The second question was whether the 
proved fact was punishable. Here the fact is considered, not the person, so a no-
tion of culpability is not directly at stake. The third and fourth questions were 
whether the suspect was punishable and what punishment should be imposed. 
Here either of the two other legal notions of culpability is applicable: ‘intent’ or 
‘intent and carelessness’. Moreover, also the theoretical notion of punishability, 
reproachability, can be considered at this point.
.. Exemption grounds
There are two situations in which a suspect can be exempted from the appli-
cation of criminal sanctions. These situations are the presence of a ground for 
justification, and the presence of an exemption ground from guilt (Franken et 
al. 1995, p. 383). Together, these constitute exemption grounds from punish-
ment. There are general and specific exemption grounds from punishment. This 
distinction cuts through the distinction between grounds for justification and 
exemption grounds from guilt. We find specific exemption grounds in the appli-
cable laws themselves (ibid., p. 383). General exemption grounds from guilt and 
grounds for justification are force majeure as necessity, self-defence, the presence 
of a legal regulation, and the presence of an authorised official order.
 General exemption grounds from guilt are being of unsound mind, psycho-
logical force majeure, unreasonable use of self-defence, and unauthorised of-
ficial order that was considered to be given authorised in good faith (Jörg and 
Kelk 1994, p. 156). There are written exemption grounds and unwritten ones. 
The ones listed above are the written ones. There are two kinds of unwritten 
exemption grounds, corresponding to the two categories of general exemption 
grounds from punishability. The first one is absence of substantive illegality. The 
second one is absence of all guilt.
 I give an overview of general grounds for justification (artt. 39-43 sr) and 
general exemption grounds from guilt respectively. I start with general grounds 
for justification. A person can call upon force majeure if he commits a fact he is 
forced to commit (art. 40 sr). We can discern between two main categories 
of force majeure: absolute and relative force majeure, where the latter one is an 
exemption ground from guilt, which will be discussed later. Absolute force ma-
jeure occurs if a person does not act himself, because he is used as a means, or 
when an absolutely impeded omission occurs. This is, e.g., the case when a person 
should report a birth, but is physically barred from doing so because of a flood. 
In this case that person cannot do anything that would cause him to fulfil an ob-
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ligation, which would lead to an omission offence under normal circumstances 
(Remmelink 1996, p. 297). In case of absolute force majeure the main criterion 
that needs to be fulfilled is that the person who appeals to this ground for jus-
tification should be in a physical position such that it is impossible for him to 
follow the law. Force majeure as necessity occurs if a person is forced to violate a 
legal rule in order to be able to attain a more important goal. This situation oc-
curs, for instance, if someone trespasses by entering someone’s property in order 
to extinguish a fire.
 Self-defence occurs when a person commits an offence because he must de-
fend his own or another’s body, decency, or property against assault. The assault 
should be both illegal and immediate (art. 41 par. 1 sr). For a formalisation of 
self-defence we need the following criteria. There is an external force that is 
sufficient to say that a person has good reasons to commit a certain fact. The ex-
ternal force is exercised by a human agent. The external force is a physical one. 
The defence act should be directed against the assaulting person. Assault should 
be understood as follows (Remmelink 1996, p. 316): an already commenced 
factual attack, or a behaviour that is an immediate threat to such an attack. Im-
mediateness exists in the relation between the assault and the reaction of the 
assaulted person. There should be a direct threat (be it the threat of a new assault 
or a threat of a continued assault) to the assaulted person, both in place and time. 
If there is no such threat, there can be no case of self-defence. The act that leads 
to self-defence should be illegal, i.e., against objective law. Finally, the reaction 
should be proportional with the assault; a defence of one’s property with physi-
cal violence while the assaulting person does not show any violent behaviour, is 
not justified (ibid., p. 313-325)
 A person is justified in his behaviour if he acts according to a legal regulation 
when he commits a fact (art. 42 sr). A legal regulation is a rule that is issued by 
some power that has been assigned legislative authority by way of the constitu-
tion or legislation (ibid., p. 330). A legal regulation should oblige a person to a 
certain act, otherwise he cannot appeal to this ground for justification. How-
ever, the criteria of proportionality and subsidiarity still apply: if, for example, 
the use of violence is necessary to suppress riots, and there has been given an 
instruction to restore order, excessive (disproportional) violence is not allowed, 
although the use of violence itself is permitted. A related ground for justification 
occurs when a person executes an authorised official order (art. 43 par. 1 sr). This 
rule is complementary to the ground for justification in which compliance to 
a legal regulation is demanded. It extends this rule to those cases where an of-
ficial orders a person to do something that is in itself illegal. If the official gives 
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the order in accordance with a legal regulation, we call it an authorised official 
order (ibid., p. 337-340). If the execution of the order occurs in a proportional 
way, the person committing the fact as a result of the execution of the order is 
justified in his behaviour.
 In addition to the four grounds for justification discussed above, there are four 
exemption grounds of guilt. First, a person is exempted from punishment if he is 
not accountable for his actions. This is the case if the committed fact cannot be 
ascribed to him because of either defective development or ailing disorder of his 
mental capabilities (art. 39 sr).
 Second, a person is also exempted from criminal sanctions if he can call upon 
relative force majeure. Relative force majeure occurs mostly in case of psycho-
logical pressure. These pressures are not absolute, in the sense that they can be 
ignored. To be able to appeal to force majeure successfully in such a case, it is 
necessary that it is reasonable to give in to the psychological pressure. A life threat, 
for example, is a reasonable motive for a bank employer to hand money from 
the bank’s safe to a robber, which would under other circumstances yield an of-
fence.
 Apart from psychological pressure, there are four other situations that may 
lead to a case of relative force majeure: moral pressure, affect, necessity, and scru-
ple (Remmelink 1996, p. 299-309). These four situations have in common that 
they do not always yield a case of relative force majeure. First, moral pressure 
occurs when there is a non-physical pressure that appeals to the moral sense of 
a person. Moral pressure can lead to a case of relative force majeure if the ele-
ment of psychological pressure, that is obviously apparent in all cases of moral 
pressure, is sufficiently strong. Second, an affect is a powerful emotion that may 
be considered as an overpowering psychological pressure from within the per-
son himself (ibid., p. 300). Third, in a case of emergency a person can sometimes 
deliberate on the consequences of his deed, and still decide to act in a way that 
makes him commit a punishable fact (ibid., p. 300). This may then be justified by 
the occurrence of a situation where the intervention of the person concerned 
is of greater importance than the punishable fact that comes about as a con-
sequence of the intervention. This case constitutes a ground for justification. 
Fourth, conscientious objections occur when a person has to choose between 
two options where both lead to an undesired situation, just as in a case of emer-
gency. However, one of these options leads to a moral conflict for the person in-
volved. This, however, is not taken as a valid excuse. An exception to this consists 
in explicit clauses in a law that allow an appeal to conscientious objections (ibid., 
p. 306-307).
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 A third exemption ground of guilt is unreasonable use of self-defence. A 
person can call upon unreasonable use of self-defence if he acts in a case of 
self-defence, while additionally the boundaries of necessary defence are crossed. 
This should happen as an immediate consequence of an intense emotion, which 
should on its turn be the result of the assault. 
 A fourth exemption ground of guilt occurs if a person complies to an ‘unau-
thorised official order that was considered to be given authorised in good faith’, 
this can be regarded as a defence precluding the application of criminal sanc-
tions (art. 43 par. 2 sr).
.. Causality
In subsection 4.7.2, theoretical notions of causality were discussed. Instead of 
trying to indicate what type of causality is generally accepted in Dutch penal 
case law, I only attempt to derive the formal characteristics of causality. The fol-
lowing characteristics can be discerned: the nature of a causal chain (length and 
interference), the nature of causal links (physical or intentional), the nature of 
intentionality (collective or individual), and the nature of interference (single 
cause or multiple causes). A causal chain has a certain length (the number of 
links between the first cause and the final consequence), and shows ‘interfer-
ence’, i.e., when some fact is not just caused by one preceding fact, but by 
multiple facts. 
 The nature of a causal links can be either physical or intentional. Physical 
causation, described by laws of physics, is (theoretically) predictable. Intentional 
causation occurs when a certain consequence arises through some mental act or 
mental state (Searle 1999, p. 104ff.). For instance, I decide to call the police, after 
which I actually call the police. Intentionality can be either individual or col-
lective, the former when one person is involved, the latter when a group of in-
dividuals has the same intention. The interference can be expressed by single or 
multiple facts causing another fact. In case of multiple facts we could try to in-
dicate what the individual relevance of the facts is. For instance, the intentional 
causation of the fact that there is a communis opinio about the necessity of a ‘zero 
tolerance’ policy can be caused by multiple incidents that are each discussed in 
national television channels and newspapers. 
 Note that any causal chain can be made complex in different degrees, and 
can be constructed in varying ways, in the sense that causal links can be added, 
deleted, or be arranged in a different manner. What causal links are mentioned 
depends on their relevance for the case. For example, in the ‘slipper - egg skull’ 
judgement (‘pantoffel-eierschedel’, Appeal Court Amsterdam, June 14, 1939, nj 
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
152
dutc h  p e nal  law: a  doma i n  de sc r i p t i on
153
1940: 34, cf. subsection 4.7.2), we could represent the relation between the slip-
per hitting the woman’s temple and the death of the woman in much more 
detail: what part of her head was hit, what kind of wound and/or fracture was 
caused, in what way did this lead to her death etc.
 Above, intentional and physical causes were distinguished. This distinction 
should not be confused with Aristotle’s distinction between efficient and final 
causes (Aristotle’s formal and material causes are irrelevant for the subject under 
discussion) (Shaver 1985, p. 9). Efficient causes precede the result of their work-
ings, while final causes are teleological, i.e., they are the ‘target’ for preceding 
events. Both intentional and physical causes are efficient causes. ‘Intentional’ 
should not be understood as teleological here. It should be understood in the 
philosophical sense, namely that of ‘aboutness’. An intentional cause is a mental 
cause; if someone is angry and wants to throw a slipper, his anger leads him to 
throw a slipper (physically). If we take a materialist stance, in which the mental is 
somehow built up from the material, intentional causes are ultimately based on 
physical causes. In the above-mentioned judgement, a final cause in Aristotle’s 
sense would be the intention (in the normal sense) of the man to kill his wife to. 
To reach this goal, he throws a slipper to her.
.. Participation
In order to be able to characterise some fact as participation, it has to fulfil a 
number of criteria (Jörg and Kelk 1994, p. 170). A punishable fact has been com-
mitted, and there are at least two persons of which one has committed the fact 
and is a perpetrator, and another one can also be characterised as a perpetrator 
or as an accomplice. These persons have jointly (i.e., interacting in some way) 
committed the fact. Each of the persons involved has played an essential role in 
the causal chain leading to the punishable fact. 
 Apart from the person who actually commits a criminal offence, there are 
several others that we can also call perpetrators (art. 47 par. 1 sr). These are per-
sons that make another commit a fact, that co-commit a fact, or that provoke a 
fact. Apart from the persons we can call perpetrators, there is also the notion of 
‘accomplice’. An accomplice takes part in a criminal offence in a modest way, so 
that we may not call him a perpetrator. Together with the three categories above 
the accomplice forms the group of participators (ibid., p. 172). I discuss each 
category below.
 A person commits a fact if he fulfils all conditions of the description of the of-
fence. A person makes another person commit a fact if the latter one is caused to 
commit that fact without being punishable for that matter. For example: a nurse 
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gives an injection to a patient, and she is unaware of the fact (and could not 
have known) that the syringe has been replaced by another one with a deadly 
poison. The patient dies, and the nurse has executed the deadly injection. She 
cannot be punished for that fact, but the person who made her do it, can. If 
two or more persons develop a plan to commit a punishable fact and execute 
that plan together, they co-commit that fact. We can distinguish three forms of 
co-committing a fact (Jörg and Kelk 1994, p. 177): (1) co-committing/co-com-
mitting occurs if two or more persons commit a fact together and are all held 
to be co-committing that fact, (2) co-committing/committing occurs if there 
is a main perpetrator and another perpetrator who co-commits the fact, and (3) 
committing/committing, where both are considered main perpetrators.
 Provocation is described in art. 47 par. 1 sub 2 sr. The description contains the 
following elements. First, the provocation of the fact is done on purpose; second, 
the provocation is deliberately realised by gifts, promises, misuse of authority, 
violence, threat, deceit, or the providing of an opportunity, means or informa-
tion; and third, the person who performs the fact is punishable – in contrast to 
a person who is made to commit a fact. The provocateur is punishable too, even 
though he has not directly participated in the actual committing of the fact.
 Complicity can both occur during or before the actual committing of the fact. 
The former kind of complicity occurs if the accomplice co-operates in the 
committing of the criminal offence on purpose (art. 48 sub 1 sr). The latter kind 
occurs if the accomplice provides the opportunity, means, or information for 
another person to commit the criminal offence (art. 48 sub 2 sr). An accomplice 
never takes the initiative to perform the criminal offence; in that case he would 
commit the offence (Jörg and Kelk 1994, p. 180).
.. Attempt
If a person tries to commit a criminal offence, and he does not complete the 
offence due to some external cause, we speak about an attempt. Two types of at-
tempt are discerned: punishable and non-punishable attempt. Additionally, there 
are two situations in which we cannot truly speak of an attempt: voluntary reti-
ration and unsound attempt. Punishable attempt occurs if a criminal offence is 
committed, whereas non-punishable attempt occurs in case of an minor offence. 
Art. 45 sr par. 1 says: ‘An attempt to a criminal offence is punishable, whenever 
the intent of the perpetrator has been revealed by a commencement of imple-
mentation’.
 The interpretation of ‘a commencement of implementation’ is problematic. A 
well-known case in which this phrase had to be interpreted is the ‘Eindhoven 
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arson’ (hr March 19, 1934, nj 1934: 450), in which the Supreme Court decided 
that there was no attempt to a criminal offence. In this case, a man called H. has 
done virtually everything to ensure that the house chosen will be burnt to the 
ground. He has put a gas stove slanting on a pillow, surrounded by cloths and 
toilet paper soaked with petrol. A gas pistol is attached to the gas stove, while a 
rope, dangling out of the window, is attached to the trigger. H. however, did not 
pull the rope, possibly because people had gathered around the house after they 
smell the petrol (Doomen 1990, p. 106).
 H. is found guilty of attempted arson and sentenced to a prison sentence of 
four years. The Supreme Court, as remarked above, finds the man not guilty 
of attempted arson. Apparently the act of preparing the house for an arson in 
every detail is not the same as ‘a commencement of implementation’. We can 
approach the content of this phrase in two ways: a subjective and an objective 
one. Subjective attempt takes into account mainly the intention of a person; 
what objective results his intention has, is not the important matter. Objective 
attempt occurs when we have traceable consequences of the attempt at the mo-
ment a person is prevented from accomplishing his attempt (Jörg and Kelk 1994, 
p. 159).
 In the argumentation of the Supreme Court we can find a more detailed 
account of the criteria that should be fulfilled for a case of ‘commencement 
of implementation’ to occur. The first part is the original ‘objective’ criterion. 
There should be a deed that is necessary for the intended purpose (an arson 
in this case), that cannot be aimed at something else, and that stands in direct 
connection with the intended criminal act (ibid., p. 162). The second criterion 
is added because the objective criterion is often valid for preparatory acts, not 
only for implementation acts. This criterion says that the deed should lead to 
the intended purpose – in accordance with the rules of ordinary experience 
– without further intervention of the perpetrator (ibid., p. 163).
 This second criterion seems too restricted. If some unforeseen event occurs, 
and the intended purpose is not attained, there will not be a ‘commencement 
of implementation’. In the arson case, such events could be: the gas pistol does 
not function, the soaked cloths do not catch fire, the gas pistol does not ignite 
the fire, or someone prevents the hand of the perpetrator to pull down the rope 
(ibid., p. 163). We can generalise these circumstances in the following clause: ‘If 
the deed does not lead to the intended purpose, this should be due to some 
unforeseen fact or act that prevents the intended causal chain from taking effect.’ 
It becomes clear now how the Supreme Court justified its decision: the second 
criterion does not apply: the intended purpose is not attained. The extra condi-
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tion that applies to this criterion, and which could have yielded a commence-
ment of implementation after all, does not apply either. If, on the other hand, 
H. would have commenced pulling the rope, but some of the bystanders would 
have prevented him from doing that, there would be a suitable commencement 
of implementation.
 In case of voluntary retiration, an attempt does not occur. Voluntary retiration 
occurs if a person, originally intending to perform some criminal offence, ceases 
the execution of the act before it has been accomplished. Jörg and Kelk (1994, p. 
167) formulate a criterion for the occurrence of voluntary retiration. This crite-
rion reads as follows (translated from Dutch): ‘Voluntary retiration occurs if the 
perpetrator ceases his attempt based upon a new deliberation of the same cir-
cumstances’. In a judgement of the Supreme Court (hr December 15, 1992, nj 
1993: 333) a man who refrains from raping a woman is considered to be retiring 
voluntarily. The woman kicked him and asked what point there was in raping 
her. We may wonder whether the above criterion applies to this case: there are 
new circumstances, namely that the woman offers resistance. Obviously, there is 
a new deliberation of these circumstances too, but we may wonder whether the 
man would have stopped his attempt if the woman had not offered resistance.
 A case of unsound attempt occurs if the nature of an attempt is such that it can 
never lead to a completion of the criminal offence. On the one hand there can 
be an unsound means for the intended act, on the other hand the intended act 
can have an unsound object. Both means and object can be either absolutely or 
relatively unsound. Relative unsoundness occurs if the means or object is usually 
suitable for the intended goal, but does not suffice in the case at hand. Absolute 
unsoundness occurs if the means or object is never suitable for the intended goal 
(Jörg and Kelk 1994, p. 167).
 The subjective interpretation of penal law says that we should consider the 
intentions of perpetrator. In this view, any attempt, sound or unsound, is punish-
able. The distinction between relatively and absolutely unsound attempts thus 
makes sense only in an objective interpretation of penal law. We may say that in 
an objective interpretation only an absolutely unsound attempt does not lead to 
punishment. An example of such an attempt is a woman that tried to poison her 
husband by giving him extracts of copper coins (Dutch Supreme Court, May 7 
1906, W 8372). However, the amounts of copper were by far insufficient to cause 
her husband to die (ibid., p. 168-169).
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. A domain choice: violent crimes and crimes against life
To limit the domain that should be formalised in chapter 8, I have chosen one 
specific group of offences: crimes against life and violent crimes. Titles 19 to 
21 sr contain the regulations on these crimes. Title 19 contains regulations on 
crimes against life, title 19a contains regulations on abortion, title 20 contains 
regulations on maltreatment, and title 21 contains regulations on the culpable 
causation of death or physical injury. I limit myself to four types of crimes: man-
slaughter (subsection 7.4.1), qualified manslaughter (subsection 7.4.2), murder 
(subsection 7.4.3), and culpable homicide (subsection 7.4.4).
 Cleiren and Nijboer (1994, p. 749) list the main characteristics of crimes 
against life. First, death is a constitutive element of the offence description. 
Thus, the death of a person is a necessary condition for the punishability of the 
suspect. Second, there should be a causal connection between the behaviour of 
the suspect and the death of the victim. Whether the death of the victim can be 
ascribed to the suspect is evaluated in accordance with the causality theory of 
reasonable attribution. Third, the time and place of the offence are often related 
to the time and place of the behaviour. However, sometimes the commence-
ment of the consequence counts as the time and place of the offence. The time 
of the behaviour remains relevant for, among other things, the determination of 
the age of the perpetrator.
 I list a number of features of culpable causation of death or physical injury 
(Cleiren and Nijboer 1994, p. 785). These offences have in common that they are 
caused by reproachable behaviour. The consequence of such behaviour is not 
intended, but the consequence is damaging to such a degree that the suspect 
should be punished. This form of guilt occurs if a person thinks or knows less 
or is less conscientious than man in general, and his behaviour leads to death or 
physical injury (ibid., p. 786). Only those persons that have a certain profession 
should be judged in relation to the common standards in their profession (ibid.). 
Finally, if two or more persons are guilty of some fact, this does not reduce the 
degree of individual guilt (ibid., p. 787). As regards the time and place of the of-
fence, the remarks in the previous paragraph also apply in case of culpable causa-
tion of death or physical injury (ibid., p. 788).
.. Manslaughter
The article on manslaughter (art. 287 sr) contains two constituents: a person 
a kills a different person b, and a does this intentionally. The act of killing can 
be performed in an unlimited number of ways (Cleiren and Nijboer 1994, p. 
750). The causality theory employed is reasonable attribution. The consequence 
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(death) does not have to occur immediately after the act that can be seen as the 
cause of the death (ibid., p. 751). The interest protected is human life. In practise, 
it can be hard to determine when life begins and when it ends (ibid., p. 751). The 
norm expressed in the article on manslaughter is applicable to all people. The 
article not only forbids a person to kill; it is also applicable if a certain course-
of-events leading to the death of a person can be prevented by an intervention. 
Finally, the kind of intent required ranges over all common types of intent, 
among which conditional intent. If the originally intended means for killing 
a person was not employed, but another means still leads to the death of that 
person, there is still intent (dolus generalis) (ibid., p. 751-752). The constituents of 
manslaughter can be represented in the following schema.
manslaughter occurs if:
 1 a person (a) kills another person (b)
and 2 (a) does this intentionally
.. Qualified manslaughter
Qualified manslaughter differs from manslaughter in the following respects. As 
an addition to the article on manslaughter, qualified manslaughter (art. 288 sr) 
should be followed, accompanied or preceded by a punishable fact, committed 
with the intention to prepare or facilitate that fact. Or it should be committed 
to ensure that the person himself, or his accomplices, remains unpunished, or to 
ensure the possession of what has been illegally taken when he was caught in 
the act. The schema below shows the structure of the constituents in the article 
on qualified manslaughter.
qualified manslaughter occurs if:
 1 manslaughter (a) is
  1.1 followed by a punishable fact (c)
 or 1.2 accompanied by a punishable fact (c)
 or 1.3 preceded by a punishable fact (c)
and 2 manslaughter (a)
  2.1 committed by a person (b) with the intention to
   2.1.1 prepare a punishable fact (c)
  or 2.1.2 facilitate a punishable fact (c)
 or 2.2 when he (b) was caught in an act (f), (b) 
    committed (a)
   1.2.1 to ensure the person himself (b) to remain 
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     unpunished
  or 1.2.2 to ensure his accomplices (d) to remain 
     unpunished
  or 1.2.3 to ensure (b) the possession of what has been
     illegally taken (e)
  or 1.2.3 to ensure (d) the possession of what has been 
     illegally taken (e) 
.. Murder
The third offence discussed is murder. Murder is a special case of manslaughter. 
If a suspect is charged with murder, and malice aforethought cannot be proved, 
a judge can declare manslaughter to be proved, even if manslaughter is a part 
of the charge. The central constituent of murder (malice aforethought) differs 
from intent. It means that a person kills someone after having thought this over 
in quiet and conscious deliberation (Cleiren and Nijboer 1994, p. 755). A few 
remarks should be made on this. First, malice aforethought can occur with all 
kinds of intent, including conditional intent (ibid., p. 755-756). Second, it can 
occur in combination with the presence of a nervous exhaustion in a person. 
Third, means, person, and time and place of the offence are not a necessary sub-
ject of malice aforethought (ibid., p. 756). This means that one may kill someone 
with malice aforethought without beforehand having determined the exact 
time and place of the offence, and without having established the means with 
which the offence will be performed, or even the person who will be the vic-
tim. We can represent the constituents of murder as follows.
murder occurs if:
 1 a person (a) commits manslaughter (b)
and  2 this person (a) does so with malice aforethought
.. Culpable homicide
Fourth, culpable homicide is described in art. 307 sr. This article says that a 
person is guilty of culpable homicide if another person’s death can be ascribed 
to him. Central conditions in this offence type is the criterion that the death 
is caused in a culpable way (ibid., p. 788). A considerable amount of time may 
elapse between the behaviour and the death of the person. The acts of persons 
with a special duty of care may be more eligible for a qualification as culpable 
homicide (ibid., p. 789). Further characteristics of this offence are given in the 
general remarks on culpable causation of death or physical injury. The constitu-
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ents of culpable homicide can be represented as follows.
culpable homicide occurs if:
 1 the death of a person (a) can be attributed to another 
   person (b)
and 2 the death of that person (a) is caused by person (a) 
   in a culpable manner
This concludes the brief description of crimes against life. These offences will 
be used as examples in chapter 8.
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 Dutch penal law: a domain representation
In this chapter, the ontology of law developed in the preceding chapters will 
be applied to the domain of Dutch penal law. First, in section 8.1, a logic is dis-
cussed that was originally developed for the representation of legal argumenta-
tion, and this logic is used for the representation of the elements distinguished 
in the ontology. Subsequently, in section 8.2, a number of inference rules is listed 
that can be used for reasoning with the logical representation of the domain. 
Then, in section 8.3, it is explained how knowledge qualification rules work. 
Finally, in section 8.4, the representation of elements, the inference rules, and 
the knowledge qualification rules are employed to model some aspects of the 
domain of Dutch penal law. 
. A logic for legal knowledge representation
In this section, I explain how a specific language can be used to represent a 
domain in terms of the ontology of law developed in this thesis. The logic em-
ployed for the representation of the domain is based on Hage’s reason-based 
logic (rbl). Rbl, and the reasons for its selection are discussed (subsection 8.1.1). 
Next, the way this logic can be used to represent each of the categories of the 
knowledge-based ontology of law is explained (subsections 8.1.2 - 8.1.7). 
.. Reason-based logic
Reason-based logic is described in Hage (1996, 1997). It is an extension of first-
order predicate logic (from now on called predicate logic). Furthermore, it is 
nonmonotonic, and its ontology is far more extensive than that of predicate log-
ic. Monotonicity means that the conclusions drawn from a number of premises 
will never change when new premises are added. So, if we may conclude r from 
two premises p → r and p, we also may conclude r from the three premises p 
→ r, p, and q. In non-monotonous logics, adding premises may lead to different 
conclusions. So, while we may conclude r from a set of two premises p → r and 
p, we may not always conclude r from a set of three premises p → r, p, and q. A 
non-monotonous logic, like rbl, enables us to represent only a limited part of a 
domain without barring the possibility of reasoning with that limited amount 
of represented knowledge in a manner more in line with human reasoning with 
incomplete information.
 Some of the important ontological assumptions of rbl are that there are 
states-of-affairs. States-of-affairs are potential facts: if a state-of-affairs obtains, it 
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is a fact; if not, it is a non-fact (Hage 1997, p. 131). Reasons are facts that plead 
pro or con states-of-affairs (ibid.). These basic ontological assumptions deviate 
from the assumptions in this thesis. Events and states-of-affairs are concrete facts. 
If an event is not instantiated, it is an event type, and if a state-of-affairs is not 
instantiated, it is a state-of-affairs type. Events and states-of-affairs are both facts. 
An uninstantiated fact is a fact type. 
 Hage’s model of legal reasoning consists of a more complex account of 
rule application than most other approaches. Instead of the deductive model, 
in which fulfilment of the conditions of a rule leads to the establishment of 
the consequence of that rule, Hage assumes that the following steps are neces-
sary (ibid., p. 152). First, the applicability of a rule is established, i.e., it is checked 
whether, given the circumstances of a case, a rule can be applied. Second, if this 
is the case, the potential applicability of the rule is a reason to apply the rule. 
Third, it is determined whether the reasons in favour of the conclusion of the 
rules outweigh the reasons that plead against that conclusion. Fourth, if this is 
the case, and thus, if the rule ought to be applied, the conclusion of that rule can 
be derived (ibid., p. 152-153, p. 161-164).
 In brief, this four-step process amounts to: (1) establishing potential applica-
bility, (2) transforming potential applicability into a reason for actual applicabil-
ity, (3) weighing reasons pro and con the conclusion of the rule, and (4) deriving 
the conclusion of the rule from the fact that the rule ought to be applied. Rule 
application thus becomes a matter of generating and weighing reasons. This ap-
proach constitutes a way of expressing the defeasibility of legal reasoning: the 
applicability of a rule is not the only factor contributing to the establishment of 
the rule’s consequence part. Instead, other reasons may block the establishment 
of the consequence, and thus the nonmonotonous nature of legal reasoning is 
expressed.
 The ideas behind rbl will form the basis for the formalisation of the func-
tions and entities that were introduced in chapter 6. First, just as rules are rep-
resented as terms in rbl, my extension of rbl accommodates functions such as 
the counts-as relation as terms. Second, a number of relations is added in order 
to provide the means for representing different types of beliefs and knowledge. 
These are ⇒
ci
,
 
⇒
cp
, ⇒
ca
 and ⇒
c
; respectively the relations cause intentionally, 
cause physically, counts as, and constitutes. The ⇒ symbol (without an additional 
subscript) stands for the relation between condition and consequence in a rule, 
whereas ⊃ stands for the relation between condition and consequence in a 
principle. Both symbols are borrowed from rbl.
 My notational conventions are the following. Terms start with lower case 
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characters. Variables are printed in italic. Predicates start with upper case char-
acters. Sets are typeset in bold. Predicate arguments are put between brackets. 
If necessary to solve ambiguity, brackets are also used in sentences. The differ-
ence between terms and sentences is illustrated as follows. The term walk(john) 
denotes the fact ‘John walks’, i.e., it refers to the actual fact, whereas Walk(john) 
expresses the fact John walks; it describes what is the case, namely that John walks 
(Hage 1997, p. 131; Hage discusses states-of-affairs, while I generalise the discus-
sion to facts). Thus, a term is the name of a fact, and a sentence describes a fact.
.. Entities
The entities that are part of the model were identified in section 6.1. The fol-
lowing legally-relevant entities should be represented in the formalism: sentenc-
es, statements, propositions, beliefs, artefacts, rules, and concepts. Additionally, 
there are the following legal entities: legal principles, legal norms, legal decisions, 
legal systematisations, judicial interpretations, judicial classifications, legal rules, 
and legal concepts. The (partial) formalisation in rbl of these sentences is dis-
cussed below.
Legally-relevant entities
Sentences – Sentences are meaningful sequences of words, put in a natural lan-
guage. The characteristic of being a sentence is represented in the predicate 
Sentence. A name is provided for each sentence as an abbreviation, in addition 
to its content:
Sentence(sentence,content)
Statements – An assertive sentence becomes a statement if it is uttered by some 
individual. This is relevant for a formalisation and can be expressed by a predi-
cate that has three arguments: the person who utters the statement, the name of 
the sentence that is uttered, and the name of the context in which the sentence 
is uttered:
Statement(person,sentence,context)
Propositions – Propositions amount to what is expressed by assertive sentences. 
The predicate Proposition has two arguments, expressing its name and its con-
tent:
Proposition(proposition,content)
Beliefs – Beliefs are propositions that are within the reach of a propositional at-
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titude (the ‘believe’-attitude). A belief is represented as a two-place predicate:
Belief(belief,content)
The content of a typical belief that John stole a car is represented as a structured 
logical individual:
belief: stole(john,car)
Each belief has several properties. These properties are expressed as predicates, 
relating a belief name to the specific characteristic the named belief has.
OriginationSource(belief,origination_source)
ContentSource(belief,content_source)
Subject(belief,content_source)
Object(belief,content_source)
For instance, for the belief above (named ‘belief ’), the following characteristics 
might hold:
OriginationSource(belief,testimony)
ContentSource(belief,case_dossier)
Subject(belief,anne)
Object(belief,legally_relevant)
Object(belief,concrete)
Artefacts – Artefacts are tangible objects made by human beings. They are repre-
sented by individual constants, and the fact that an individual constant refers to 
an artefact is expressed by the predicate Artefact:
Artefact(artefact)
Rules – Rules are linguistic expressions that relate two types of phenomena to 
each other. Rules are expressed as terms. Their conditions, the rule symbol and 
the consequence form a structured logical individual. The fact that this term is a 
rule can be further stressed by the predicate Rule. A rule can be abbreviated by 
replacing it with a rule name.
rule: condition ⇒ consequence
Rule(rule)
Concepts – A concept is an abstract idea, containing the characteristics of con-
crete instances of the concept. Concepts are expressed in terms of the counts-as 
relation between the conditions for their obtaining, and the resulting concept 
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type. The fact that some entity is a concept is expressed with the Concept predi-
cate.
concept: condition_expression ⇒ca concept
Concept(concept)
The conditions part can be a single condition or a complex of conditions, built 
with the syntactic conventions for structured logical individuals. The term 
concept is the name of the concept type that results from the application of the 
counts-as relation.
Legal entities
Legal rules – Legal rules, just as rules, are expressions that relate two types of phe-
nomena to each other. In this sense, they are equivalent to rules. Additionally, 
there are conditions under which the rule is a legal rule. These depend on the 
ontological stance taken. For instance, the criterion can be legal validity.
legal_rule: condition ⇒ consequence
LegalRule(legal_rule)
Legal principles – Legal principles are general values that apply to certain areas 
within the law. In line with Hage’s rbl they are represented as structured logical 
individuals, containing a condition expression, a consequence expression, and 
the connective ⊃. The principle gets a name in order to refer to it more easily. 
In case of a principle like ‘freedom of contract’, applicable conditions should be 
made explicit in order to be able to formulate it in terms of rbl.
principle: condition_expression ⊃ consequence
Principle(principle)
Legal norms – Legal norms are entities that explicitly guide some kind of be-
haviour or action. They contain deontic modalities. Norms are formalised as 
follows. pd stands for permitted-to-do, fd stands for forbidden-to-do, od stands 
for ought-to-do, ob for ought-to-be (Hage 1997, p. 169).
norm: pd(actor,action)
norm: fd(actor,action)
norm: od(actor,action)
norm: ob(goal)
Norm(norm)
The actors, actions and goals playing a role in the legal norms are referred to by 
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the terms between brackets. To emphasize the fact that some structured logical 
individual is a norm, we can use the Norm predicate.
 Legal decisions – Legal decisions are decisions in some legal case, made by a 
qualified legal authority under suitable circumstances. They result from a spe-
cific act by a specific person. The mere fact that a certain entity is a legal deci-
sion is expressed as follows. The term between brackets is the name of the legal 
decision:
LegalDecision(legal_decision)
Legal systematisations – A legal systematisation is the result of an attempt to im-
pose a more general structure on a relatively unstructured part of a legal system, 
or the implicit presence of such a structure in a part of a legal system. Legal 
systematisations are referred to by terms, and they can be further identified by 
the following predicates: 
LegalSystematisation(judicial_systematisation)
Judicial interpretations – A judicial interpretation is the result of an assessment that 
a judge (or a different qualified authority) makes of some complex of (legal) 
rules and (legal) norms. For judicial interpretations, the same is valid as for legal 
systematisations: 
JudicialInterpretation(judicial_interpretation)
Judicial classifications – Judicial classifications abstract from reality, by classifying 
a fact or an act as belonging to some legal type. Judicial classifications are indi-
cated by the predicate JudicialClassification:
JudicialClassification(judicial_classification)
Legal concepts – Legal concepts are concepts whose definition is given (at least 
partly) in formal sources of law. Legal concepts are formalised in a manner simi-
lar to that of ordinary concepts: a structured logical individual contains a name 
for the legal concept, the applicable conditions, and the name of the concept. 
The conditions and the concept are connected with the counts-as relation. In 
addition, the predicate LegalConcept indicates that the term indicated is the 
name of a legal concept.
legal_concept: legal_condition_expression ⇒ca concept
LegalConcept(legal_concept)
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.. Ontological status layers
All status layers are expressed as predicates. Thus, we can assign a status layer to 
a logical individual in the same way as we do with a normal property. This also 
means that one logical individual can have more than one ontological status 
layer.
Legally-relevant ontological status layers
Exist(x)
Constituted(x)
Recognised(x)
Legally-relevant ontological status layers
LegallyEfficacious(x)
LegallyValid(x)
LegallyConstituted(x)
LegallyRecognised(x)
.. Epistemic roles
Epistemic roles are expressed as structured logical individuals or as predicates. 
Additionally, properties of the epistemic roles are expressed as predicates.
Legally-relevant epistemic roles
Reasons – Reasons are statements, propositions or facts that are employed for the 
explanation or justification of some other statement, proposition or fact. The ty-
pology of reasons in subsection 4.5.2 gives us a starting point for the formalisa-
tion of reasons. First, the reason is represented as a structured logical individual:
reason: content
Second, its characteristics are given in the form of predicates that have as their 
arguments the name of the reason concerned, and the name of the subject, act, 
or other objects:
ReasonFor(reason,subject)
ReasonTo(reason,act)
ReasonForTo(reason,subject,act)
ObjectOrientedness(reason,type)
ContentSource(reason,source)
OriginationSource(reason,source)
Subject(reason,x)
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Object(reason,type)
InternalModality(reason,type)
ExternalModality(reason,type)
Third, we indicate what the origin of the reason is, i.e., on which belief or fact 
it is based. For this purpose, we use the counts-as relation;
relation: belief ⇒ca reason
or:
relation: fact ⇒ca reason
Additionally, we may express the fact that a reason is recognised as such by an 
individual or a community:
Recognise(x,relation)
In order to be able to express the fact that the recognition of a reason concerns 
the recognition of that reason as a reason to do something requires a different for-
mat. Because ReasonTo is a predicate itself, it cannot function as an argument of 
the Recognition predicate. Instead, ReasonTo has to be translated into a term-
like expression:
Recognise(x,reason_to(reason,act))
Defeaters – A subclass of reasons is formed by defeaters. Defeaters are negative 
reasons, i.e., they attack some reason in such a way that it is no longer correct. 
They are expressed formally in a way analogous to reasons. Additionally, the ob-
ject of the attack should be specified. A belief or a fact counts as a defeater, and 
this relation may be recognised. Also, it may be indicated whether a defeater is 
recognised as a defeater for a certain belief or act.
relation: belief ⇒ca defeater
relation: fact ⇒ca defeater
Recognise(x,relation)
Recognise(x,defeater_for(defeater,object))
Factual knowledge – If an object complies with certain so-called knowledge cri-
teria, it counts as factual knowledge. Factual knowledge is an epistemic role a 
belief (or a different entity, such as a proposition) can play. The knowledge quali-
fication relation says that a certain belief becomes factual knowledge.
factual_knowledge_qualification: belief ⇒ca factual_knowledge(belief)
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fkq_rule: true(belief) & acquired_reliably(belief) & justified(belief) ⇒ 
applicable(factual_knowledge_qualification)
Practical knowledge – If an ability complies with certain knowledge criteria, it 
counts as practical knowledge. Reliability was chosen as a criterion for the as-
sessment of practical knowledge. Translated to the knowledge qualification rules 
given above, the result is as follows.
practical_knowledge_qualification: belief ⇒ca practical_knowledge(belief)
pkq_rule: acquired_reliably(belief) ⇒ 
applicable(practical_knowledge_qualification)
Legal epistemic roles
Factual legal knowledge – If a legal object (a belief, a proposition) complies with 
certain so-called knowledge criteria, it counts as factual legal knowledge. The 
way this qualification is formalised is similar to the formalisation of legally-rel-
evant knowledge, but the criteria employed may very well differ from the ones 
mentioned.
factual_legal_knowledge_qualification: belief ⇒ca factual_legal_knowledge(belief)
flkq_rule: true(belief) & acquired_reliably(belief) & justified(belief) ⇒ 
applicable(factual_legal_knowledge_qualification)
Practical legal knowledge – If a legal ability complies with certain knowledge cri-
teria, it counts as practical legal knowledge. Practical knowledge is formalised 
in the same way as legally-relevant practical knowledge. However, the precise 
meaning of the reliability criterion may differ.
practical_legal_knowledge_qualification: 
belief ⇒ca practical_legal_knowledge(belief)
plkq_rule: acquired_reliably(belief) ⇒ 
applicable(practical_legal_knowledge_qualification)
.. Relations
There are two different ways to express relations in rbl. The first is by using 
structured logical individuals, the second by using predicates. Both types are 
used in the discussion of legally-relevant and legal relations below.
Legally-relevant relations
Causation – Causation is a two-place relation between phenomena: a certain 
event causes a different event or state-of-affairs. Causation is represented by a 
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connective that combines events and their consequences (events or states-of-
affairs) in structured logical individuals. This connective is ⇒
c
, and a causation 
relation is expressed as follows.
causal_relation: event ⇒c effect
Subtypes of causality can be represented as.
event ⇒ci effect
event ⇒cp effect
In these expressions, ci stands for ‘causes intentionally’, and cp for ‘causes physi-
cally’. 
 Counting as – Counting as is a two-place relation that associates two types of 
phenomena to each other. The counts-as relation is represented in similar man-
ner, where ca in the ⇒
ca
 symbol stands for ‘counts as’.
counts_as_relation: x-term ⇒ca y-term
The counts-as relation can hold between different ontological types, for in-
stance between beliefs and reasons.
 Recognition – Recognition is a two-place relation that says what individual, 
what group of individuals, or what institution recognises a certain phenomenon. 
Recognition is expressed as a predicate. The recognition predicate takes as its 
arguments the subject of recognition (the person or institution who recognises), 
and the object of recognition.
Recognise(x,object)
For instance, the fact that Judy recognises the fact that killing on purpose counts 
as murder is expressed as follows.
Recognise(judy,killing_on_purpose(x,y) ⇒ca murder(x,y))
This is a case of individual recognition: Judy is a single person accepting this 
counts-as relation. Collective recognition is expressed with the same predicate 
as individual recognition. In this case we quantify over the individuals belonging 
to a certain society (where a society is a collection of individuals, represented by 
the set society). Thus, we use the following expression.
∀individual∈society(Recognise(individual,object))
Legal relations
Legal causation – Legal causation differs from the other types of causation. There-
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fore, it gets its own connective.
event ⇒cl effect
This expression can be translated into a different form:
(Recognise(authority,event ⇒ca cause_for(effect)) ↔ Valid(event ⇒cl effect)
This expression says that event causes effect in a legal sense if and only if there 
is a legal authority who recognises the validity of the fact that event counts as a 
cause for effect. Note that this definition does not restrict in any way what is 
recognised as a cause for an effect. Specific restrictions emanating from legal 
causality theories can be used to narrow the scope of the formal definition of 
legal causation.
 Legal counting as – The legal counts-as relation is expressed in the same way as 
the ordinary counts-as relation. The only difference is that the content of a legal 
counts-as relation is derived from some valid legal source. The formal expression 
is as follows.
counts_as_relation: x-term ⇒ca y-term
The fact that this counts-as relation is legal can be expressed by the predicate 
legal.
Legal(counts_as_relation)
Legal recognition – Legal recognition is expressed by a predicate too. The legal 
recognition predicate takes as its arguments the subject of recognition (the per-
son or institution who recognises), and the object of recognition.
LegallyRecognise(x,object)
There are two types of legal recognition: systemic recognition and authoritative 
recognition. Systemic recognition is expressed in a separate predicate:
SystemicallyRecognised(object)
This predicate is connected to individual recognition as follows.
(∃individual ∈ legalsystem ∃object1 ∈ legalsystem (Recognise(individual,object1) 
∧ ∃object2 ∈ legalsystem(Valid(object1) → Valid(object2)) 
↔ SystemicallyRecognised(object2))
The expression says that in order for an object to be recognised systemically, this 
object has to be a valid consequence of the validity of a different object that is 
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recognised individually. Thus, an object that is part of a legal system, and that 
is the valid consequence of a different object that has been individually recog-
nised, is systemically recognised itself.
 The second type of legal recognition is authoritative recognition. It is a special 
form of individual recognition. To be recognised authoritatively, the recognising 
subject should be a legal authority.
(Recognise(subject,object) ∧ LegalAuthority(subject)) ↔ 
AuthoritativelyRecognise(subject,object)
.. Acts
The difference between entities and acts should be reflected clearly in the for-
malism. Often, the result of performing an act is an entity; for instance, the result 
of making a decision is a decision, the result of making a classification is a clas-
sification, the result of applying a rule is the instantiation of the consequence 
part of that rule.
 All acts are formalised in a similar way: by introducing a special predicate 
named after the act. This predicate has an identifier as its argument. Below, the 
general predicate and an example are given.
Act(act)
SignContract(act1)
The act identifier is used in two other predicates: the PerformAct and Result-
FromAct predicates:.
PerformAct(actor,act)
ResultFromAct(actor,act,result)
In addition, the name of the actor and – in case of the ResultFromAct predicate 
– the result are involved as arguments. 
 Legal acts and legally-relevant acts are identified as such by applying the 
predicates Legal and LegallyRelevant to the act identifier.
Legal(act1)
LegallyRelevant(act1)
.. Facts
Facts are indicated with the Fact predicate. They are identified using structured 
logical individuals. Thus we can (1) indicate the characteristics of facts, and (2) 
construct complex facts from multiple parts, and still be able to refer to them 
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in first-order logic. The following expressions are used to specify the different 
types of legally-relevant facts and legal facts.
Fact(fact)
Legal(fact)
LegallyRelevant(fact)
Event(fact)
StateOfAffairs(fact)
Brute(fact)
Recognised(fact)
Conventional(fact)
Institutional(fact)
The difference between legally-relevant facts and legal facts is expressed by the 
predicates LegallyRelevant and Legal. These can be combined with other char-
acteristics. If we want to express that fact is both legal and conventional, we use 
the following expressions.
Fact(fact)
Legal(fact)
Conventional(fact)
A complex fact may be built from other (simple) facts. We can build these 
expressions as structured logical individuals with the connectives used in rbl. 
Thus, a complex fact may look like the following.
Fact(complex_fact)
complex_fact: simple_fact_1 & simple_fact_2 & simple_fact_3
. Inference rules
In this section, the upgrading of terms to sentences and downgrading of sen-
tences to terms is discussed (subsection 8.2.1). Next, reasoning with different 
types of causation relations is explained (subsection 8.2.2), as well as reasoning 
with the counts-as relation (subsection 8.2.3), and with rules (subsection 8.2.4).
.. Upgrading and downgrading
The upgrading and downgrading inference rules are important, as they enable 
us to translate sentences into terms and vice versa. The translation occurs accord-
ing to the following notational conventions. A sentence is translated into a term 
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by replacing all upper-case characters by lower-case characters, preceded by an 
underscore (except for the first character of the sentence). A term is translated 
into a sentence by replacing the first lower-case character by an upper-case 
character, and replacing all remaining lower-case characters, preceded by an 
underscore, by a corresponding upper-case character, leaving the underscore 
out. For instance, a sentence ExamplePredicate(example) translates into a term 
example_predicate(example).
 Upgrading terms to sentences proceeds in the following way. If the following 
condition holds:
Obtains(fact)
then
Fact
Downgrading sentences to terms is done in the following manner. If the follow-
ing condition holds: 
Fact
then:
Obtains(fact)
.. Causality
The different forms of causation each have their own inference rules. These 
inference rules are listed for intentional causation, physical causation, and legal 
causation respectively.
 Inferring effects from intentional causation relations – Inferring effects from inten-
tional causation relations occurs in the same way as for physical causation. The 
difference is found in the means by which the derivation may be blocked: the 
type of defeating reasons involved differs. The conditions to be fulfilled in order 
to derive the obtaining of the effect are that both an event, and the intentional-
causal relation between the event and an effect should obtain, and that the ef-
fect and the intentional-causal relation between event and effect should not be 
excluded.
If the following conditions hold:
Obtains(event) ∧
Obtains(event ⇒ci effect) ∧
~Excluded(effect) ∧
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~Excluded(event ⇒ci effect)
then
Obtains(effect)
Reasons for the exclusion of either the effect of the intentional cause or of the 
causal relation (in general or in a specific instance) are guiding reasons; reasons 
for an agent not to behave in a specific manner. For instance, if I want to call the 
police because I witnessed a crime, but I am afraid the perpetrator of the crime 
will threaten my life, this may be reason for me not to call the police.
 Inferring effects from physical causation relations – Contrary to the nature of 
defeating reasons for intentional-causal relations, reasons for the exclusion of 
either the effect of the physical cause or of the causal relation (in general or in 
a specific instance) are reasons why that physical cause does not obtain or why 
the causal relation does not obtain. These are explanatory reasons. For instance, 
if I try call the police using my cell phone, but my cell phone does not work, I 
will not be able to contact the police. The derivation proceeds in the same way 
as for intentional causation, but the derivation leading to the conclusion that the 
effect or the physical-causation relation is excluded, differs in character, as the 
reasons employed are different. This derivation, however, is not further speci-
fied.
If the following conditions hold:
Obtains(event) ∧
Obtains(event ⇒cp effect) ∧
~Excluded(effect)
~Excluded(event ⇒cp effect)
then
Obtains(effect)
Inferring effects from legal causation relations – The legal causation relation is estab-
lished by the recognition of a counts-as relation by a legal authority. As soon as 
the legal causation relation is projected post hoc on a certain course-of-events, 
and it holds between a specific cause and effect, the defeasibility of this relation 
is limited to the treatment of the case in an appeal. Additionally, the counts-as 
relation is defeasible. Defeat of this relation has as a consequence that the legal 
causation relation does not obtain. The derivation of the obtaining of a legal-
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causation relation from the recognition of a counts-as relation and the obtaining 
of that relation proceeds as follows:
If
Recognise(authority,event ⇒ca cause_for(effect)) ∧ 
Obtains(event ⇒ca cause_for(effect))
then
Obtains(event ⇒cl effect)
Subsequently, we can derive the obtaining a an effect from the obtaining of an 
event and the legal-causation relation between the event and the effect:
If
Obtains(event) ∧
Obtains(event ⇒cl effect)
Then
Obtains(effect)
.. Inferring conclusions from counts-as relations
The derivation of the obtaining of the y-term of a counts-as relation depends 
on the obtaining of a counts-as relation and the x-term of that counts-as rela-
tion. If the y-term and the counts-as relation are not excluded, then the y-term 
will obtain. Thus, the following derivation holds.
If
Obtains(x-term) ∧
Obtains(x-term ⇒ca y-term) ∧
~Excluded(y-term) ∧
~Excluded(x-term ⇒ca y-term)
then
Obtains(y-term)
.. Inferring conclusions from rules
The following account of the derivation of conclusions from rules is taken from 
Hage (1997, p. 141ff.). In the first step, the applicability of a rule is determined. 
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A rule is applicable if there is some rule whose validity is established, and whose 
conditions obtain. 
Given a rule
rule: conditions ⇒ conclusion
If
Valid(conditions ⇒ conclusion) ∧
Obtains(conditions)
then
Applicable(conditions ⇒ conclusion)
In the second step, the applicability of the rule is translated into a reason that the 
rule ought to be applied.
If
Applicable(conditions ⇒ conclusion)
then
ReasonFor(applicable(conditions ⇒ conclusion),
ob(applies(conditions ⇒ conclusion)))
In the third step, it is determined whether the reasons why the rule ought to be 
applied outweigh the reasons why the rule ought not to be applied. If this is the 
case, the conclusion is derived that the rule ought to be applied.
If
Outweigh(reasons(ob(applies(conditions ⇒ conclusion))),
reasons(~ob(applies(conditions ⇒ conclusion))),conclusion)
then
OB(applies(conditions ⇒ conclusion))
In the fourth and final step, the conclusion is derived from the fact that the rule 
ought to be applied, and the fact that the conclusion is not excluded.
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If
OB(applies(conditions ⇒ conclusion)) ∧
~Excluded(conclusion)
then
Conclusion
. Knowledge qualification rules
In the subsections below, the rules that constitute the transition between be-
liefs and knowledge are discussed. First, it is explained how belief is qualified 
as knowledge in the formal framework introduced in this chapter (subsection 
8.3.1). Then, I discuss under what circumstances different knowledge criteria 
are fulfilled (subsection 8.3.2). Third, it is explained how knowledge and belief 
can be transferred from one individual to another (subsection 8.3.3). Finally, 
I indicate the way in which we can use the knowledge qualification rules in 
reasoning with legal knowledge, while taking into account different stances in 
philosophy of law (subsection 8.3.4).
.. Inferring knowledge qualifications
Both propositions and beliefs can be qualified as knowledge. In the former case, 
we define knowledge relative to the characteristics of a proposition. In the latter 
case, the knowledge qualification is a characteristic of a belief held by a person. 
In order to define a knowledge qualification relation, we need to embed the 
counts-as relation in a rule. The conditions part of the rule contains the condi-
tions that must be fulfilled in order to ‘trigger’ the consequence part of the rule; 
this consequence part consists of a counts-as relation between a proposition or 
a belief on the left-hand side of the relation, and the knowledge qualification 
with respect to that proposition or belief on its right-hand side.
 As to the qualification of a belief as knowledge, two steps should be taken; 
first it is determined whether a belief is justified. This depends on the question 
whether a belief is acquired reliably, whether it is coherent with a relevant set of 
beliefs, and whether it is properly justified (i.e., backed by reasons):.
justification_qualification: belief ⇒ca justified(belief)
jq_rule: acquired_reliably(belief) & coherent(belief) & justified_properly(belief) ⇒ 
applicable(justification_qualification)
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Second, the actual knowledge qualification depends on the truth of the belief 
and its status as being justified.
knowledge_qualification: belief ⇒ca knowledge(belief)
kq_rule: belief(x) & true(x) & justified(x) ⇒ applicable(knowledge_qualification)
The derivation is conducted in several steps, following the inference schemata 
for rules and counts-as relations in subsections 8.2.3 and 8.2.4. The results of 
applying the inference rules (if they are all applicable) are:
Obtains(x ⇒ca knowledge(x))
Obtains(knowledge(x))
This framework also enables the application of different knowledge qualifica-
tion rules for different types of knowledge. Both the justification qualification 
rule and the knowledge qualification rule can be adjusted. For instance, if reli-
ability does not play a role in the justification of a certain type of knowledge, the 
alternative justification qualification rule would amount to the following.
justification_qualification_1: belief ⇒ca justified(belief))
jq_qualification_1: belief(belief) & type(belief,interpretation) & coherent(belief) & 
justified_properly(belief) ⇒ applicable(justification_qualification_1)
The rule needs its own name, as it differs from the rule stated above. Addition-
ally, the type of the belief should be an interpretation. This is indicated by the 
type(belief,interpretation) part of the term. For some types of knowledge, the 
knowledge qualification rule itself would be different. For instance, for interpre-
tative beliefs, the truth criterion may be left out.
knowledge_qualification_1: belief ⇒ca knowledge(belief)
kq_rule_1: belief(belief) & type(belief,interpretation) & justified(belief) ⇒ 
applicable(knowledge_qualification_1)
Apart from inference rules for knowledge qualification in general, we have to 
propose rules for knowledge qualification for an individual in order to be able 
to say under which conditions an individual knows something. This is done by 
introducing a personal justification qualification rule, in which a proposition is 
linked to a person via the term believe(x,belief).
personal_justification_qualification: belief ⇒ca justified_for(belief,x)
pjq_rule: believe(x,belief) & knows(x,acquired_reliably(x,belief)) & 
knows(x,coherent(belief)) & knows(x,justified_properly_for(belief,x)) ⇒ 
applicable(personal_justification_qualification)
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Thus, in order to justify a belief for a certain individual, this individual has to 
believe the content of the proposition, he has to know that the belief has been 
acquired reliably, that it is coherent, and that it is properly justified for him. In 
order for some person to know something, the proposition has to be true and it 
has to be justified for the individual, as was set out in the previous rule.
personal_knowledge_qualification: belief ⇒ca knowledge_for(belief,x)
pkq_rule: knows(x,true(belief)) & justified_for(belief,x) ⇒ 
applicable(personal_knowledge_qualification)
Most of the conditions in the qualification rules contain the term ‘knows’. In 
order to prevent an infinite regress from occurring, we have to make sure that, 
if a person has to know that a proposition is true, or if he has to know that a 
proposition is justified for him, he can attain such a state without having to fulfil 
the same qualification conditions again. In that case, he would have to employ 
other criteria in order to know that a proposition is true than in order to know 
that proposition.
 For instance, in order to know that it is raining, Peter has to know that it is 
true that it is raining, and he has to know that he is justified in believing that it 
is raining. If we would employ the same criteria in each instance of ‘knowing’, 
he would also have to know that he knows that it is raining etc. Instead, in order 
to attain a situation in which we can actually use the knowledge qualification in 
practical situations (such as in the assessment of data in computer systems), we 
have to end such infinite regresses. I will not go into this matter extensively, but 
infinite regresses may for instance be barred by introducing additional knowl-
edge qualification rules for knowledge criteria, that impose less strict demands 
on propositions before they may be qualified as knowledge.
.. Fulfilling individual knowledge criteria
Knowledge criteria play a role in transforming mere belief into knowledge. 
Although the question whether a criterion is fulfilled often depends on human 
assessment, an attempt is made here to model knowledge criteria in rbl. First, 
the truth criterion below says that a sentence should correspond to a fact in or-
der to be true. Of course, this does not solve the problem how to establish such 
correspondence. Rather, the assumption that truth depends on correspondence 
of a sentence with a fact is expressed:
truth: correspond_to(sentence,fact) ⇒ true(sentence)
Second, the proper justification criterion lists the conditions determined for 
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that criterion in subsection 2.4.2. I choose to model defeat and challenge ex-
plicitly in the conditions of the rules. An alternative would be to leave defeat to 
the inference rules defined for rbl.
proper_justification: (reason_for(reason,belief) & conclusive_wrt(reason,belief)) ∨ 
(reason_for(reason,belief) & non_conclusive_wrt(reason,belief) & 
~defeater_for(defeater,belief) & ~defeater_for(defeater,reason)) ⇒ justified(belief)
In the personal proper justification criterion, the conditions are made relative to 
an agent. In this case, defeat and challenge are also modelled explicitly.
proper_personal_justification: (reason_for(reason,belief) & 
conclusive_wrt(reason,belief)) ∨ (reason_for_wrt(reason,belief,agent) & 
non_conclusive_wrt(reason,belief) & ~defeater_for_wrt(defeater,belief,agent) & 
~defeater_for_wrt(defeater,reason,agent)) ⇒ justified_for(belief,agent)
Third, reliability is defined recursively, relative to the chain of belief acquisition. 
The reliable acquisition rule demands that the current reliability is greater than 
0.9. If this is the case, the belief has been acquired reliably.
reliable_acquisition: current_reliability(belief) > 0.9 ⇒ acquired_reliably(belief)
The version of the reliable acquisition rule that is made relative to an agent is 
called personal reliable acquisition. This rule demands that the reliability of the 
acquisition of some belief is greater than 0.9 for a certain agent.
personal_reliable_acquisition: current_reliability(agent,belief) > 0.9 ⇒ 
acquired_reliably(agent,belief)
The current reliability of a belief is the reliability with which it is acquired, mul-
tiplied by the reliability of acquisition in other steps in a chain of acquisition. 
Thus, if a belief is acquired through a chain of three steps, and in each step the 
reliability of acquisition is 0.95, the resulting reliability with respect to this belief 
at the end of the chain is 0.953 = 0.857375, which is lower than 0.9. In this case, 
the belief is not acquired reliably relative to the final step.
 Fourth, the coherence criterion may consist of the subcriteria consistency, 
support, preference, and universality. The former three of these subcriteria can 
be treated formally to a certain extent. Universality, in the way it was described 
in 2.4.4, can be hardly expressed in a formal manner. The consistency of a belief 
with a belief set can be translated in the demand that a belief set does not imply 
the denial of that belief. Support of a belief for a different belief exists when the 
former is a reason for the latter. A preference relation between two principles 
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exists if one entity generally outweighs another one. The expressions that repre-
sent these three subcriteria are given below.
consistency: ~implies(entity_set,~entity) ⇒ consistent_with(entity,entity_set)
support: reason_for(entity_1,entity_2) ⇒ supports(entity_1,entity_2)
preference: outweighs(entity_1,entity_2) ⇒ preference_relation(entity_1,entity_2)
The following definition determines whether a belief coheres with a set of 
beliefs that it is part of. A general notion of coherence needs a quantification 
notion which would enable us to express the presence of as many support and 
preference relations as possible. The definition demands that a belief is consistent 
with the belief set it belongs to, that there is a support relation between the be-
lief and a different belief in the belief set, and that there is a preference relation 
between the belief and a different belief in the belief set.
coherence: consistent_with(belief,belief_set) & 
(supports(belief_1,belief) ∨ supports(belief,belief_1)) & 
(preference_relation(belief,belief_2) ∨ preference_relation(belief_2,belief))
⇒ coherent_with(belief,belief_set)
In this subsection, it was explained how knowledge criteria can be formalised to 
a certain extent. It should be noted, however, that for practical use of such crite-
ria, a vast quantity of information about a domain has to be defined explicitly. 
.. Transfer of belief and knowledge
If an individual wishes to communicate his beliefs, the content of these beliefs 
should be transferred to his audience. If an individual wishes to communicate 
knowledge, and make sure that it remains knowledge throughout this process, 
additional demands are imposed. To acquire belief solely by transfer, two condi-
tions have to be met. First, the belief content p has to be transferred. Thus, an 
agent a transfers the belief content to agent b. Second, the agent b should acquire 
a belief with the same content. In order to transfer knowledge, the knowl-
edge criteria applicable to the belief content have to be fulfilled. Each of these 
knowledge criteria can be fulfilled either directly or by transferring beliefs that 
constitute their fulfilment.
 An account of knowledge transfer in which both beliefs and the content of 
applicable knowledge criteria are transferred, is subject to the criticism that 
beliefs alone cannot provide a knowledge qualification. What we need, is suffi-
cient backing of the beliefs about the transferred content of fulfilled knowledge 
criteria. Without imposing restrictions on the length of the justification chain, 
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however, this would lead to an infinite regress. We have to assume that beliefs 
about the content of fulfilled knowledge criteria can be qualified as knowledge 
as well. This could be attained, for instance, by establishing the reliability of the 
source of the beliefs about the content of fulfilled knowledge criteria. The reli-
ability of the source should ensure that those beliefs are true.
 The transfer of a piece of knowledge thus amounts to transferring the belief 
underlying that piece of knowledge, say p, and the beliefs concerning the fulfil-
ment of the knowledge criteria turning that belief p into knowledge: the belief 
that p is true, the belief that p is justified, the reasons for p, and the belief about 
the reliability of the acquisition route of p. The resulting belief will be turned 
into knowledge by these beliefs, if these beliefs are acquired reliably. This feature 
is expressed in the rule below by the demand that the belief content should be 
personal knowledge for the agent. The transfer_belief rule says that an agent b 
has a belief denoted by x if some other agent a has belief x, tells its content to b, 
and b understands it, and b believes it.
transfer_belief: has_belief(a,x) & tells_to(a,b,x) & understands(b,x) & believes(b,x) 
⇒ has_belief(b,x)
The transfer_knowledge rule says that an agent b has a piece of knowledge 
(denoted by x) if some other agent a has that piece of knowledge, tells the con-
tent of that piece of knowledge to b, and it is personal knowledge for b. Under 
what conditions a piece of knowledge is personal knowledge for an agent was 
explained above. 
transfer_knowledge: knows(a,x) & tells_to(a,b,x) & understands(b,x) & 
personal_knowledge_for(b,x) ⇒ knows(b,x)
.. Reasoning with legal knowledge
The knowledge predicate functions very much like a quality stamp. It basically 
says that a certain belief or statement is worthy. Once we have a piece of knowl-
edge, we have a piece of information that is qualified for further reasoning. A 
piece of information can deserve its knowledge qualification from different 
sources and criteria. Once it has such qualification, it can be employed for fur-
ther reasoning, regardless of its origination source. In this subsection, I focus on 
reasoning with legal knowledge from different legal-ontological perspectives. 
 As I remarked in subsection 3.2.1, knowing the law from a natural-law per-
spective should be divided into knowing the abstract principles of natural law 
and knowing the rules and norms of positive law. Knowing the law amounts to 
knowing those rules and norms of positive law that comply with the principles 
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of natural law. As an example, I take a legal rule and a derivable legal norm. The 
rule is: ‘Killing a person on purpose counts as manslaughter’. The norm is: ‘One 
may not kill another person intentionally’. These are a rule and a norm of posi-
tive law. A corresponding principle of natural law could be that one ought not 
kill human beings.
 Thus, the conditions under which a belief about a rule of positive law can be 
turned into knowledge are as follows. First, we have to verify our belief about 
the rule of positive law. The content of the belief about the rule should corre-
spond with the content of the rule. Second, we have to acquire knowledge of 
some principle of natural law that complies with the rule of positive law. Third, 
we establish the correspondence or coherence of the rule of positive law with 
the principle of natural law. The coherent_with expression could be used for 
establishing the relation between the rule and the principle.
legal_knowledge_qualification_nl: belief ⇒ca legal_knowledge_nl(belief)
lkq_nl_rule: knowledge(belief) & corresponds_with(belief,rule) & 
knowledge(belief_2) & corresponds_with(belief_2,principle) & 
coherent_with(belief,belief_2) ⇒ applicable(legal_knowledge_qualification_nl)
In case of legal positivism (cf. subsection 3.2.2), knowing the law is possible 
through knowledge of sources of law and their validity. Validity, in its turn, is 
determined by knowledge of the recognition of those sources of law by a proper 
authority. This can be expressed in an additional rule defining validity.
legal_knowledge_qualification_lp: belief ⇒ca legal_knowledge_lp(belief)
lkq_lp_rule: knowledge(belief) & corresponds_with(belief,rule) & valid(rule) ⇒ 
applicable(legal_knowledge_qualification_lp)
The same goes for institutional theories of law (cf. subsection 3.2.2). In this case, 
the validity of a rule depends on its embedding in a system of institutional rules. 
This should be expressed in an alternative rule defining validity. The basic legal 
knowledge qualification rule for institutional theories of law is the same as for 
legal-positivist theories.
 Hermeneutic theories have a different approach towards knowledge (cf. 
subsection 3.2.5). The distinction between knowing that and knowing how is 
vague in such theories, and accordingly, it is harder to define a knowledge quali-
fication rule for individual beliefs. I will therefore not attempt to define such a 
rule regarding hermeneutic theories. It would require a thorough embedding 
of knowledge in its context, and therefore an account of the influence pieces of 
knowledge have on each other.
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. Representing knowledge about Dutch penal law
In this section, I apply the knowledge-based model of law to the domain of 
Dutch penal law. I do so by showing the role of knowledge in the representation 
of various components of penal law. A formal account of such components will 
generally lead to a loss of content compared to natural-language representations. 
The account given in the current section should show the central role of certain 
categories (entities, relations etc.) in the representation of legal knowledge. These 
categories are elements of the knowledge-based ontology of law described in 
chapter 6. In the current section, I discuss the representation of the questions 
leading to the establishment of guilt and punishability (subsection 8.4.1), of 
principles (subsection 8.4.2), central concepts of penal law (subsection 8.4.3) 
and violent crimes and crimes against life (subsection 8.4.4). Finally, I discuss 
how knowledge of specific statutes is established (subsection 8.4.5).
.. Guilt and punishability
At the start of a trial, the two main questions are: is a suspect guilty, and if so, 
is he punishable? The two groups of questions determining guilt and punish-
ability of a suspect were discussed in section 7.1. Below, these questions will be 
expressed in the form of rules and norms. The first question is: Is the summons 
valid?
norm_1: ob(valid(summons))
rule_1: ~valid(summons) ⇒ca void(summons)
The norm says that the summons ought to be valid. The rule says that if the 
summons is not valid, it counts as void. If there is an instance of the type sum-
mons that is not valid, then that instance counts as void. The next question is: Is 
the judge competent?
norm_2: ob(competent(judge))
The norm expressed is that the judge ought to be competent. The third ques-
tion is: Is the public prosecutor amenable? 
norm_3: ob(amenable(public_prosecutor))
The norm says that the public prosecutor should be amenable. The fourth ques-
tion is: Is there a reason for adjournment of the trial? If there is such a reason, 
the trial ought to be adjourned.
rule_4: reason_for(reasons,adjournment) ≠ ∅ ⇒ ob(adjourned(trial))
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In this case, the rule says that if there are reasons for the adjournment of the trial, 
then the trial ought to be adjourned. 
 After these four questions, a second group of four questions is introduced. 
The first question of this second group is whether it has been proved that the 
suspect has committed a fact as charged.
norm_5a: ob(proved(commit(suspect,fact)))
norm_5b: ob(acquitted(suspect))
rule_5: ~proved(commit(suspect,fact)) ⇒ applicable(norm_5b)
The first norm (5a) says that it ought to be proved that the suspect committed 
the fact as charged. The rule says that if this is not the case, the second norm (5b) 
is applicable. This norm says that the suspect should be acquitted. The second 
question is whether the fact is punishable.
norm_6a: ob(punishable(fact))
norm_6b: ob(exempted_of_legal_proceedings(suspect))
rule_6: ~punishable(fact) ⇒ applicable(norm_6b)
The first norm (6a) states that the fact ought to be punishable. The rule says that 
if the fact is not punishable, then the second norm (6b) is applicable. This norm 
says that the suspect ought to be exempted of legal proceedings. The third ques-
tion is whether the suspect is punishable. 
norm_7a: ob(punishable(suspect))
norm_7b: ob(exempted_of_legal_proceedings(suspect))
rule_7: ~punishable(suspect) ⇒ applicable(norm_7b)
The first norm (7a) states that the suspect ought to be punishable. The rule says 
that if the suspect is not punishable, then the second norm (7b) is applicable. 
This norm says that the suspect ought to be exempted of legal proceedings. The 
fourth question is what punishment should be imposed.
rule_8: (~void(summons) & ~incompetent(judge) & 
~not_amenable(public_prosecutor) & ~ob(adjourned(trial)) & 
~ob(acquitted(suspect)) & ~ob(exempted_of_legal_proceedings(suspect))) ⇒ 
ob(applicable(norm_8))
norm_8: ob(imposed(punishment,suspect))
The rule says that if all conditions (already discussed above) remain unfulfilled, 
i.e., if the summons is not void, the judge is not incompetent etc., then the norm 
is applicable. This norm states that a punishment should be imposed on the sus-
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pect. Contrary to what the norm seems to imply, it is possible that a suspect will 
not be punished.
.. Principles
General principles of penal law are expressed using several entities from the 
knowledge-based model of law. These include rules and principles. The legiti-
macy principle says that any legal judgement should be properly argued for. The 
legality principle says that a judgement should conform to some basic demands 
that make the judgement legal, i.e., for instance no fact is punishable without 
a prior law that makes that fact punishable. What is expressed as the term ‘le-
gal_basis_for’ amounts to the conditions that no fact is liable to penalty without 
applicable legislation, no penalty can be imposed without a law permitting the 
imposition, no penalty can be imposed without a preceding law, analogous rea-
soning is not allowed in the argumentation of the judge, and laws should be suf-
ficiently clear. The legitimacy and legality principles are expressed below.
rule_1: properly_justified(judgement) ⇒ca legitimate(judgement)
legitimacy_principle: ob(legitimate(judgement))
rule_2: legal_basis_for(judgement) ⇒ca legal(judgement)
legality_principle: ob(legal(judgement))
Each of the principles is expressed by a norm and a rule. The rules say under 
what conditions a judgement counts as legitimate and legal. The norms say that 
judgements ought to be legitimate and legal.
 The subsidiarity and proportionality principles, expressing the necessity 
of employing the least drastic means available in a certain legal case, and the 
proportionality of the means to be employed with the goal to be reached, are 
expressed as follows.
subsidiarity_principle: ob(minimal_wrt(means, solve(undesirable_situation))
proportionality_principle: 
ob(proportional_wrt(means,solve(undesirable_situation)))
Both principles are translated into norms, and the criteria expressed by these 
principles are arguments of the norms. In both cases this is a criterion expressing 
a relation between the means employed to reach some goal, and the goal itself, 
which is solving an undesirable situation. In some cases, the principles should be 
formulated in a different way, stressing the fact that there ought to be employed 
minimal and proportional means in order to attain a desirable situation.
 The following expressions are translations of the three principles establishing 
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the priority relations between conflicting rules: lex specialis derogat legi generali, lex 
posterior derogat legi priori, and lex superior derogat legi inferiori.
specialis_principle: ob(applicable(more_specific_than(rule_1,rule_2)))
posterior_principle: ob(applicable(issued_later_than(rule_1,rule_2)))
superior_principle: ob(applicable(issued_by_higher_authority_than(rule_1,rule_2)))
These principles are translated as norms too. These norms say that there should 
be specific relations between two rules (expressed by the variables rule_1 and 
rule_2).
.. Central concepts of penal law
In this subsection, I discuss the formalisation of six concepts that play an impor-
tant role in penal law. These are: facts, culpability, exemption grounds, causality, 
participation, and attempt. Culpability of a suspect is determined in a trial fol-
lowing the two groups of four questions discussed under the denominator ‘guilt 
and punishability’. As I discussed these questions extensively in subsections 7.3.2 
and 8.4.1, I leave them out in the overview below.
Facts
In the legal domain, facts are often constructed entities. In section 6.6, I de-
scribed how to build complex facts from simple facts.
Fact(complex_fact)
complex_fact: simple_fact_1 & simple_fact_2 & simple_fact_3
We can assign other characteristics to facts and complex facts too. The distinc-
tion between material facts and judicial facts made in subsection 7.3.1 to clarify 
the ne bis in idem principle, for instance, can be expressed as follows.
MaterialFact(fact_1)
JudicialFact(fact_2)
In an example case, simple facts may constitute material facts and judicial facts 
in different combinations.
fact_1: drunk(john)
fact_2: driving(john)
fact_3: fact_1 & fact_2
rule: drunk(person) & driving(person) ⇒ca commits_criminal_offence(person)
MaterialFact(fact_3)
JudicialFact(fact_1)
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JudicialFact(fact_3)
There are two judicial facts, because both the fact that John is drunk and the fact 
that John is drunk and driving are punishable (public drunkenness and drunk 
driving), and there is only one material fact, as the two simple facts cannot be 
regarded apart from each other. Application of the ne bis in idem principle would 
prevent the agent from being prosecuted twice, as there is only one material fact 
involved, whereas initially he could have been prosecuted for either of the two 
judicial facts.
 Ontological status layers can be imposed on these facts. For instance, the act 
by which a judge recognises some fact, for instance the qualification of fact_3 
as a judicial fact, is expressed by downgrading the predicate JudicialFact(fact_3) 
to a term judicial_fact(fact_3)), and taking it as an argument of the act Legal-
lyRecognise.
LegallyRecognise(judge,judicial_fact(fact_3))
The result of this act is that the same fact gets the ontological status layer Legal-
lyRecognised.
LegallyRecognised(judicial_fact(fact_3))
In similar ways, additional ontological status layers or specific legal character-
istics can be attributed to a certain fact. The attribution of characteristics like 
JudicialFact and MaterialFact are useful for an obvious reason: as soon as we 
have qualified a fact in terms of such characteristics, we can also derive the ap-
plicability of the ne bis in idem principle.
Exemption grounds
Exemption grounds from punishment prevent the imposition of a sanction to 
a suspect. An overview of the distinctions relevant to exemption grounds was 
given in subsection 7.3.3. The questions in a trial in which exemption grounds 
play a major role were discussed in section 7.1, and the formalisation of the 
norms underlying these questions was the topic of subsection 8.4.1. I now turn 
to the formalised classification of facts as exemption grounds.
 Rules 1 and 2 express the conditions under which a suspect is exempted from 
the application of sanctions.
rule_1: applicable(exemption_ground) ⇒ exempted_from(suspect,sanction)
rule_2: ground_for_justification ∨ exemption_ground_from_guilt ⇒ca 
exemption_ground
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Rule 2 says that both a ground for justification and an exemption ground from 
guilt count as an exemption ground. Rule 1 says that if an exemption ground is 
applicable, then the suspect is exempted from the application of a sanction. The 
distinction between general and specific exemption grounds cuts through the 
distinction between grounds for justification and exemption grounds from guilt. 
The general or specific nature of an exemption ground is therefore added as an 
extra characteristic, expressed as a predicate.
GeneralDefence(exemption_ground)
SpecificDefence(exemption_ground)
As an example, I take two exemption grounds, namely being of unsound mind, 
and force majeure. These are expressed as follows:
rule_3: being_of_unsound_mind ⇒ca exemption_ground_from_guilt
rule_4: absolute_force_majeure ⇒ca ground_for_justification
Both are general exemption grounds, which is indicated by the predicate intro-
duced above:
GeneralDefence(being_of_unsound_mind)
GeneralDefence(absolute_force_majeure)
Specific rules can be used to establish the actual presence of exemption grounds. 
In order to do so, a link should be made between the classification of a suspect’s 
acts and applicable law, in that the specific behaviour of the suspect becomes the 
subject of a series of classifications, from ‘brute’ facts to a detailed characterisa-
tion in terms of the different types of exemption grounds.
Causality
Causality theories influence what acts are classified as causes for some phenom-
enon. Whether the man throwing a slipper to his wife’s head could have fore-
seen her death (almost certainly not) and whether his act was a conditio sine qua 
non for her death (almost certainly) are two radically different interpretations of 
legal causality. The theory employed in a case determines what event is recog-
nised as a legal cause for an effect. The recognition relation that underlies legal 
causality is expressed as follows (cf. subsections 4.7.2 and 6.4.2):
(Recognise(authority,event ⇒ca cause_for(effect)) ↔ Valid(event ⇒cl effect)
Causality theories are hard to formalise. Probably the easiest theory to formalise 
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is the conditio sine qua non theory. This theory can be expressed in the following 
rule:
rule: (fact → effect) ⇒ (fact ⇒ca cause_for(effect))
This rule says that if the effect only occurs if the fact occurs, then the fact counts 
as a cause for effect.
Participation
The different forms of participation can all relatively easy be expressed in a 
formal way. First, there is the relation between the different subtypes of partici-
pation and participation itself. Rule 1 expresses the counts-as relation between 
the different subtypes of participation and the fact that a perpetrator participates 
in a fact.
rule_1: (fact_1 ∨ fact_2 ∨ fact_3 ∨ fact_4) ⇒ca fact_5
fact_5: participate_in(perpetrator,fact)
Rule 2 expresses the condition under which a person commits a fact. It says that 
in order for a person to commit a fact, he should fulfil the constituents of the 
offence description.
rule_2: fact_6 ⇒ fact_1
fact_6: fulfil(perpetrator,offence_description)
fact_1: commit(perpetrator,fact)
Rule 3 says that in order for a person to make another person commit a fact, he 
should cause that other person to commit a certain fact.
rule_3: fact_7 ⇒ fact_2
fact_7: causes_to_commit(perpetrator,person,fact)
fact_2: make_commit(perpetrator,fact)
In rule 4, the conditions are expressed under which a person co-commits a fact. 
In order to do so, there should be at least two different persons that can be con-
sidered to commit the fact.
rule_4: fact_8 ∧ fact_9 ⇒ fact_3
fact_8: commit(perpetrator,fact)
fact_9: commit(perpetrator_2,fact)
fact_3: co-commit(perpetrator,fact)
Rule 5 expresses the condition under which a perpetrator is said to provoke 
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someone else to commit a fact.
rule_5: fact_10 ⇒ fact_4
fact_10: provoke_to_commit(perpetrator,person,fact)
fact_4: provoke(perpetrator,fact)
Complicity occurs if some person helps another person commit a fact. Rule 6 
defines the conditions under which this phenomenon occurs.
rule_6: fact_11 ⇒ fact_5
fact_11: help_commit(accomplice,perpetrator,fact)
fact_5: accomplice_to(accomplice,fact)
Attempt
In establishing the occurrence of an attempt, we have to deal with the complex 
problem of revealing the intentions and acts underlying something that was 
never realised. After all, attempt does not show itself in a completed punishable 
fact – otherwise it would not be an attempt. The criterion for attempt formu-
lated by the Supreme Court (discussed in subsection 7.3.6) can be formalised in 
the following manner.
rule_1: fact_1c ⇒ fact_1d
fact_1a: has(perpetrator,intent)
fact_1b: commences(implementation)
fact_1c: reveals(fact_1a,fact_1b)
fact_1d: attempt ⇒ca punishable(attempt)
Rule 1 states that if the intent of a perpetrator reveals itself in a commencement 
of implementation, then the attempt that can be derived from this counts as a 
punishable attempt. Rule 2 defines voluntary retiration.
rule_2: fact_2b ⇒ fact_2a
fact_2a: voluntarily_retires(person)
act_2a: ceases(person,attempt)
fact_2b: performs_on_the_basis_of(person,act_2a,new_deliberation)
This rule says that in case a person ceases an attempt on the basis of a new de-
liberation of the circumstances given, he voluntarily retires. Rule 3 defines the 
concept of unsound attempt.
rule_3: fact_3b ∨ fact_3c ⇒ fact_3a
fact_3a: attempt ⇒ca unsound(attempt)
fact_3b: unsound(means)
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fact_3c: unsound(object)
fact_3d: ∀case ~suitable_for(means,goal,case)
fact_3e: ∀case ~suitable_for(object,goal,case)
rule_3a: fact_3d ∨ fact_3e ⇒ (unsound(attempt) ⇒ca absolutely(unsound(attempt)))
rule_3b: ~fact_3d ∨ ~fact_3e ⇒ (unsound(attempt) ⇒ca relatively(unsound(attempt)))
This rule states that if means or object are unsound, then the attempt counts as 
an unsound attempt. Rules 3a and 3b define the situations in which an attempt 
is objectively and subjectively unsound. An attempt is objectively unsound if 
there is no case in which a means or object could be sufficient to attain a certain 
goal. An attempt is subjectively unsound if the goal cannot be attained in the 
case at hand.
.. Violent crimes and crimes against life
Below, it is demonstrated in what way a statute can be translated into the ontol-
ogy described in chapter 6. The first example is art. 287 sr:
“Anyone who deliberately takes the life of someone else, is – being guilty of 
manslaughter – subject to a prison sentence that does not exceed 15 years, 
or a fine of the fifth category.”
The analysis of this article is as follows. Two act types are defined. The first act 
type consists of a person a killing another person b intentionally. The first person 
is not equal to the second, hence a ≠ b. Then, there is a rule comprising of the 
counts-as relation between the first act type and the second act type (act_1 and 
act_2), and a rule that says that if there is a case of manslaughter, then the suspect 
is punishable with a certain maximum sentence. The specification of this pun-
ishment is given as the fact type fact_1. 
act_1: intentionally(kill(a,b)) ∧ a ≠ b
act_2: commit(a,manslaughter)
rule_1: act_1 ⇒ca act_2
rule_2: act_2 ⇒ fact_1
fact_1: punishable_with(a,{max_15_years(prison_sentence) ∨ 
max_5th_category(fine)})
The English translation of the article on qualified manslaughter (art. 288 sr) is:
“Manslaughter, followed, accompanied or preceded by a punishable fact, 
and committed with the aim to prepare or to facilitate that fact, or – if 
caught in the act – to ensure oneself or other participators to that fact that 
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they remain unpunished or to ensure the possession of the illegally acquired 
good, is subject to a life sentence, a prison sentence that does not exceed 20 
years, or a fine of the fifth category.”
This article is translated in formal expressions as follows. Three act types refer 
to manslaughter, a punishable fact, and to qualified manslaughter. The fact types 
express the conditions under which the article applies, and the consequences of 
its application. Rules 1 and 2 define the stages in which the punishment of a 
person is determined; first the conditions are given under which manslaughter 
occurs, then the potential punishment is listed. 
act_1: commit(a,manslaughter)
act_2: commit(a,punishable_fact)
act_3: commit(a,qualified_manslaughter)
fact_1: intention_of_is(a,act_1,(prepare(a,act_2) ∨ facilitate(a,act_2))
fact_2: caught_in_the_act(a,act_2) & 
intention_of_is(a,act_1,ensure(a,remain_unpunished)) ∨ 
intention_of_is(a,act_1,ensure(accomplices,remain_unpunished))
fact_3: intention_of_is(a,act_2,ensure(possession_of_illegally_taken_material))
fact_4: followed_by(act_1,punishable_fact) ∨ 
accompanied_by(act_1,punishable_fact) ∨ preceded_by(act_1,punishable_fact)
rule_1: (fact_1 ∨ fact_2 ∨ fact_3) & fact_4 ⇒ca act_3
rule_2: act_3 ⇒ fact_5
fact_5: punishable_with(a,life(prison_sentence) ∨ 
max_20_years(prison_sentence) ∨ max_5th_category(fine)
The translation of the article on murder (art. 289 sr) is as follows:
“Anyone who intentionally and after deliberation takes the life of another 
person is guilty of murder and is subject to a life sentence, a prison sentence 
that does not exceed 20 years, or a fine of the fifth category.”
This article is translated into the following formal expressions. The acts types 1 
through 3 define the conditions for murder to occur, whereas act type 4 is the 
actual murder act. Fact type 1 describes the possible punishment. Rule 1 defines 
the conditions under which murder occurs. Rule 2 defines the resulting punish-
ment.
act_1: kill(a,b) ∧ a ≠ b
act_2: commit(a,with_malice_aforethought(act_1))
act_3: commit(a,on_purpose(act_1))
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act_4: commit(a,murder)
fact_1: punishable_with(a,max_20_years(prison_sentence) ∨ 
life(prison_sentence) ∨ max_5th_category(fine))
rule_1: act_1 & act_2 & act_3 ⇒ca act_4
rule_2: act_4 ⇒ fact_1
The translation of the article on culpable homicide (art. 307 sr) is:
“A person who can be blamed for the death of someone else, is punished 
with a prison sentence or detention of no more than nine months, or a fine 
of the fourth category.”
This article is translated into the following formal expression:
act_1: commit(b,culpable_homicide)
fact_1: guilty_of(b,death(a)) ∧ a ≠ b
fact_2: punishable_with(b,max_9_months(prison_sentence) ∨ 
max_4th_category(fine))
rule_1: fact_1 ⇒ca act_1
rule_2: act_1 ⇒ fact_2
Rule 1 states that in case a person is guilty of the death of another person, this 
counts as a case of committing culpable homicide. Rule 2 says that an occur-
rence of culpable homicide is punishable with either a prison sentence or a 
fine.
.. Knowing statute law
In subsection 8.3.4, I explained how to define the knowledge qualification rela-
tion within a framework of legal positivism. 
legal_knowledge_qualification_lp: belief ⇒ca legal_knowledge_lp(belief)
lkq_lp_rule: knowledge(belief) & corresponds_with(belief,rule) & valid(rule) ⇒ 
applicable(legal_knowledge_qualification_lp)
The manslaughter rules are repeated below.
act_1: intentionally(kill(a,b)) ∧ a ≠ b
act_2: commit(a,manslaughter)
rule_1: act_1 ⇒ca act_2
rule_2: act_2 ⇒ fact_1
norm: ought_not(act_2)
fact_1: punishable_with(a,{max_15_years(prison_sentence) ∨ max_5th_
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category(fine)})
The first manslaughter rule (intentionally killing another person counts as man-
slaughter) is used as an instantiation for the variables in the knowledge qualifica-
tion rule:
legal_knowledge_qualification_lp: (act_1 ⇒ca act_2) ⇒ca 
legal_knowledge_lp(act_1 ⇒ca act_2)
lkq_lp_rule: knowledge(act_1 ⇒ca act_2) & corresponds_with(act_1 ⇒ca act_2, act_1 
⇒ca act_2) & valid(act_1 ⇒ca act_2) ⇒ applicable(legal_knowledge_qualification_lp)
Each instance of the variable belief is filled with the content of rule 1, assuming 
that the content of that belief is the given rule. The variable rule is filled with 
the content of the rule. The demands that the belief is knowledge, that the belief 
corresponds with the rule, and that the rule is valid are fulfilled. Thus, if there are 
no defeating reasons present, the consequence of the rule applies, which means 
that the rule ‘legal_knowledge_qualification_lp’ is applicable. The variable belief 
is filled with an instance of the rule, and thus we can derive that the rule counts 
as legal knowledge in a legal-positivist stance.
. Representing knowledge about the legal domain
In this chapter, it has been shown how the knowledge-based model of the legal 
domain can be used as the basis for formal representations of legal knowledge. 
I explained the way in which the representatives of the model’s basic categories 
can be modelled in terms of Hage’s (1997) reason-based logic. Furthermore, I 
discussed the ways in which inference rules can be used to reason with repre-
sentations, how knowledge qualification can be formalised, and how specific 
knowledge from the domain of Dutch penal law can be represented. Rather 
than showing that such representations can be meaningfully employed in 
knowledge-based systems, I tried to explain the way in which certain features of 
legal knowledge can be represented: e.g., the specific transition from legal belief 
to legal knowledge. By making explicit a larger part of the structural features 
of knowledge about the legal domain, a more precise representation of such 
knowledge can be attained.
 Still, having explained the lines along which we can discern major character-
istics of knowledge about the legal domain, it may easily be seen that such char-
acteristics can play a role in assessing the content of legal information systems. 
Moreover, they can play a role in such information systems. Meta-information 
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on the structure and content of knowledge about the legal domain, e.g., on the 
justification of represented knowledge, constitutes an important asset for users 
of those systems. Such meta-information may not only prove useful in adding 
justificatory material to conclusions of information systems that use simple pro-
duction rules for inferencing, it a may also add to the functionality and quality 
of legal databases and accompanying search engines.
 There is, of course, a trade-off between the richness of expressions in for-
mal languages (the degree to which they can provide detailed meaning), and 
their usefulness in automated inferencing (the degree to which they can be 
employed to derive conclusions). Therefore, the application of characteristics of 
knowledge, such as the ones expressed in the model in this thesis, should not 
beforehand be deemed restricted to formalised representations of the law. Pro-
viding information on, for instance, the precise justifying role of some part of a 
judgement, could very well be useful as meta-information on that judgement, 
without the involvement of any formalisation.
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 Conclusion
In this chapter, I draw conclusions on the basis of the content of the previous 
chapters. The conclusions are provided in accordance with the problem defini-
tion and research questions. The problem definition for this thesis was: What 
role can a concept of legal knowledge, formulated from the perspective of epis-
temology, play in the representation of legal knowledge? The research questions 
were: 
(1) What are the characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain, given 
the viewpoint of general epistemology?
(2) What are the characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain, given 
the viewpoint of legal epistemology?
(3) What characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain are useful as 
constituents for a model of the legal domain?
(4) How can this ontology of law be used to represent knowledge about the 
domain of Dutch penal law?
Below, I provide a number of conclusions answering the research questions. 
The first research question
The first research question regards the characteristics of knowledge about the 
legal domain given the viewpoint of general epistemology. With respect to this 
question, I list five conclusions:
 1) The three dimensions of knowledge – acquisition, object and justifica-
tion – are dimensions of knowledge about the legal domain too. In the legal 
domain, these dimensions have different meanings, given the specific nature of 
such knowledge. The acquisition of knowledge about the legal domain is partly 
driven by rules. These rules determine what sources may be employed, and in 
what way knowledge about these sources should be acquired. The object of 
knowledge about the legal domain is characterised by the facts that it is intangi-
ble (most of its objects cannot be touched), and that it is rule-based (the exist-
ence of many objects is based on some kind of explicit or implicit rule), or based 
on reasoning and interpretation (it is derived from other objects by a process of 
reasoning). The justification of such knowledge is also driven by rules. Legitimi-
sation demands impose specific demands on the way in which legal knowledge 
is justified.
 2) One of the main characteristics of knowledge about the legal domain is 
that acquisition, object and justification are intertwined to a high degree. Proper 
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acquisition of knowledge in the legal domain may lead to instant justification. 
Proper acquisition and justification can create new objects, such as interpreta-
tions and judicial decisions. Rather than a unidirectional relation between, for 
instance, perception and the object of perception, knowledge about the legal 
domain is often acquired in a bidirectional process between the subject and 
the object to be known. Knowledge of such objects can be acquired through 
knowledge of their acquisition and justification: if we know the origination 
history of an interpretation, we may claim to know that interpretation. This 
phenomenon causes the intertwinement of acquisition, object and justification.
 3) Knowledge about the legal domain is prone to the distinction between 
externalist and internalist knowledge theories, and between doxastic and non-
doxastic knowledge theories. First, legal knowledge, such as knowledge of an 
interpretation, fits in with an internalist and doxastic framework: beliefs about 
interpretations are justified through other beliefs. Second, legally-relevant 
knowledge, such as knowledge about the facts of a case, fits in with an external-
ist non-doxastic knowledge theory: in such a theory beliefs are justified by an 
appeal to external criteria like reliability. Handling all types of knowledge about 
the legal domain in the same manner, employing a single concept of knowledge, 
would mean not to recognise the diversity of knowledge types actually present.
 4) Knowledge criteria are the barrier between mere belief and knowledge; 
they define the conditions under which a belief is qualified as knowledge. Truth, 
proper justification, reliability and coherence were discussed. The legal domain 
allows for the use of these criteria, though they have to be adapted to suit the 
specific characteristics of the different types of knowledge about the legal do-
main. Knowledge about the legal domain can be divided into legally-relevant 
knowledge and legal knowledge. Furthermore, there are distinctions between 
abstract and concrete knowledge, and between factual and practical knowledge. 
A piece of knowledge can be classified through these three distinctions. Accord-
ingly, different sets of knowledge criteria are applied.
 5) Some knowledge acquisition situations in the legal domain can be classified 
as epistemic dependency situations: the acquisition is done within an epistemic 
niche. Although epistemic dependence can threaten the truth-conduciveness of 
beliefs, this need not be the case if practical and procedural restrictions are care-
fully designed with the goal of truth-conduciveness in mind.
The second research question
With respect to the second question, the characteristics of knowledge about the 
legal domain should be established, given the viewpoint of legal epistemology. I 
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provide three conclusions:
 1) Different legal-theoretical theories influence the way in which knowledge 
can be acquired. These theories include or imply views on the acquisition, ob-
ject and justification of knowledge, and thereby tend to impose different con-
ditions on knowledge qualification. A clear distinction of knowledge and the 
object of knowledge, for instance, may facilitate knowledge acquisition, while 
the entanglement of knowledge and its object may complicate matters.
 2) Formal and material sources of law may be considered as knowledge sourc-
es for the law, if additional requirements are met. Such requirements depend on 
the legal-theoretical stance taken. Apart from formal and material sources of law, 
such knowledge acquisition processes as reasoning and interpretation prove to 
be very important sources of knowledge for the law, precisely because knowl-
edge and object of knowledge are intertwined to a certain degree in each of the 
legal-theoretical views discussed.
 3) To disentangle the intertwinement between knowledge and its object, the 
distinction between epistemology and ontology has to be maintained. The rela-
tions between the epistemic and ontological levels can be isolated as unidirec-
tional constitution relations that do not cause a circularity problem: knowing 
may constitute being and vice versa. The ability to maintain this distinction de-
pends on the legal-theoretical stance taken; a hermeneutical theory of law does 
not allow for it.
The third research question
The third research question regards the usefulness of the characteristics of 
knowledge about the legal domain as constituents for a model of law. With re-
spect to this question, I provide three conclusions.
 1) With respect to the object of knowledge, the following is observed. Due to 
the intertwinement of knowledge of the law and the law itself, knowing the law 
requires a view on the entities constituting the law. The search for characteristics 
of knowledge about the legal domain thus implies a search for the ontological 
constituents of the domain. From the discussion of ontological stances with 
respect to the law, we can derive five existence status layers: existence, validity, 
recognition, constitution, and efficacy. By distinguishing different ways in which 
objects can exist, it becomes possible to accommodate different legal-theoretical 
stances on the existence of objects in a model of the legal domain. 
 2) With respect to the justification of knowledge, the following can be 
concluded. Reasons (and defeaters) can function as basic elements for legal 
argumentation. This means that they can be used as basic building blocks to 
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represent larger argumentation structures. Moreover, guiding reasons may con-
stitute existence status layers for certain objects. Thus, the intertwinement of the 
epistemic level and the ontological level becomes visible in more detail: justifi-
cation in the form of reasons may constitute certain aspects of the existence an 
object (for instance, a decision). 
 3) In the relations between objects (both tangible and intangible ones) two 
relations play a major role: counting as and causation. The former serves to 
assign a new status to an object. The latter indicates the consequences of the 
occurrence of an event. The counting-as relation is a useful mechanism for the 
description and explanation of the existence of (intangible) structures of social 
and legal entities. Regarding the causation relation, a distinction is made be-
tween physical and intentional causation, catering for the need to explain the 
interaction between the mental and the physical world.
The fourth research question
The fourth question regards the actual use of the ontology of law for the repre-
sentation of knowledge in the domain of Dutch penal law. With respect to this 
question, I list two conclusions.
 1) An analysis of the legal domain leads to the conclusion that there are six 
basic categories: entities, ontological status layers, epistemic roles, relations, acts 
and facts. These categories, and subtypes belonging to these categories, were 
used to represent characteristics and statutes of Dutch penal law. In fact, these 
characteristics and statutes were translated into expressions of reason-based 
logic, employing the categories of the knowledge-based ontology of law.
 2) From this application of the knowledge-based ontology of law, and the ap-
plication of a slightly adapted version of reason-based logic, it may be concluded 
that it is possible to express an extensive ontology of law in a formal language, 
without losing to much expressive power. However, in this case, a higher expres-
siveness has a trade-off: a lower usefulness of these expressions for automated 
inferencing.
The problem definition
Above, I have drawn conclusions with respect to the research questions. Still, I 
have not yet given an explicit answer to the main question. The problem defi-
nition was: What role can a concept of legal knowledge, formulated from the 
perspective of epistemology, play in the representation of legal knowledge? The 
implicit answer to this question consisted of a discussion of legal epistemology, 
legal ontology, knowledge representation, penal law, and a knowledge-based 
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model of the legal domain. What began as a theoretical exercise into the nature 
of knowledge about the legal domain, was gradually made concrete in a listing 
of categories of entities, relations and ontological status layers and epistemic 
roles. 
 All these subjects were meant to provide insight into the content, structure, 
and borders of knowledge about the legal domain. They lead to the most im-
portant conclusion of this thesis: if we wish to use a concept of knowledge as 
the basis of an ontology of law, we have to accept the fact that we have to define 
content, structure, and borders of knowledge about the legal domain ourselves, 
based on a view on the nature of law. By explaining the relation between 
knowledge of the law and the law itself, following different views on the nature 
of law, it becomes possible to provide basic categories of a model. The model 
allows – to a certain extent – for the accommodation of the epistemic and on-
tological commitments of different legal-theoretical positions, thereby bringing 
legal theory to the domain of legal knowledge representation.
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Dutch translations of legal terms
abortion afbreken van zwangerschap
absence of all guilt afwezigheid van alle schuld
absence of substantive illegality afwezigheid van materiële
   wederrechtelijkheid
absolutely impeded omission absoluut verhinderd nalaten
accomplice medeplichtige
acquittal vrijspraak
adjournment schorsing
affect affect
amenable ontvankelijk
attempt poging
authorised official order bevoegd gegeven ambtelijk bevel
being of unsound mind ontoerekeningsvatbaar
carelessness onvoorzichtigheid
charge tenlastelegging
co-commit medeplegen
commencement of  begin van uitvoering
 implementation 
commit plegen
competent bevoegd
complicity medeplichtigheid
conscientious objections gewetensdrang
constituent bestanddeel
continuous act voortgezette handeling
crimes against life levensdelicten
crimes against life and  levens- en geweldsdelicten
 violent crimes
culpability schuld (culpa)
culpable causation of death  veroorzaken van de dood of van
 or physical injury  lichamelijk letsel door schuld
culpable homicide dood door schuld
death dood (overlijden)
detention hechtenis
Dutch Supreme Court Hoge Raad
emergency noodtoestand
evidence bewijsmateriaal
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exemption ground uitsluitingsgrond
exemption ground from  strafuitsluitingsgrond
 punishment 
exemption ground of guilt schulduitsluitingsgrond
exemption of legal proceedings ontslag van rechtsvervolging
fine geldboete
force majeure overmacht
force majeure as necessity overmacht als noodtoestand
formal source of law formele rechtsbron
freedom of contract contractvrijheid
guilt schuld
imprisonment gevangenisstraf
intent opzet
judgement arrest
ground for justification rechtvaardigingsgrond
knowledge source for the law kenbron van het recht
law of obligations verbintenissenrecht
legal regulation wettelijk voorschrift
legality legaliteit
legitimacy legitimiteit
legitimate and convincing wettig en overtuigend bewijs
 evidence 
make commit doen plegen
malice aforethought voorbedachte raad 
maltreatment mishandeling
manslaughter doodslag
material source of law materiële rechtsbron
misuse of authority misbruik van gezag
moral pressure morele druk
murder moord
offence description delictomschrijving
participation deelneming
proportionality proportionaliteit
providing of an opportunity verschaffen van gelegenheid
provocation uitlokking
psychological force majeure psychische overmacht
publication openbaarmaking
punishability strafbaarheid
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qualified manslaughter gekwalificeerde doodslag
reasonable attribution redelijke toerekening
reproach of guilt schuldverwijt
reproachability verwijtbaarheid
reproduction verveelvoudiging
self-defence noodweer
source of law rechtsbron
special duty of care bijzondere zorgplicht
subsidiarity subsidiariteit
summons dagvaarding
two or more offences arising  eendaadse samenloop
 from the same act 
unauthorised official order onbevoegd gegeven ambtelijk
   bevel
unauthorised official order that onbevoegd gegeven ambtelijk
 was considered to be given   bevel dat te goeder trouw
 authorised in good faith  bevoegd gegeven werd geacht
unreasonable use of self-defence noodweerexces
unsound attempt ondeugdelijke poging
various offences for which one  meerdaadse samenloop
 sentence is pronounced 
void nietig
voluntary retiration vrijwillig terugtreden
wrongful act onrechtmatige daad
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Index
Aarnio  38, 82, 84
acquisition  22, 27
acts  135, 172
AI-and-law  15
Algra  68
applying legal rules  136
applying rules  136
argumentation  88
argumentation schema  89
artefacts  130, 164
attempt  154
Audi  22, 43, 51
Barwise  15, 112
basic norm  85
Bedeutung. See reference
belief
acquisition  22, 23
justification  24
object  23
beliefs  130, 163
interpretative  54
memorial  53
perceptual  53
reasoned  54
testimonial  53
belief justification  24
Bench-Capon  109
Bix  119
BonJour  45
Breuker  123
Brouwer  48, 64, 83, 84
brute facts  137
Buri, von  104
causality  152, 174
causation  134, 169
causation relation  103
causa proxima  104
Cleiren  157
Cliteur  64
coherence  45
coherentism  33
committing  153
complicity  154
concepts  130, 164
constitution  98, 132
constraints  113
conventional  113
necessary  113
nomic  113
constructivism  75
conventionalist-cum-institutional 
theory  66, 79
conventional facts  66, 137
conventional legal facts  138
correspondence truth  36
counting as  134, 170
counts-as relation  101, 176
crimes against life  157
culpability  148
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Summary
This thesis concerns the representation of knowledge about the legal domain. It 
is based on the assumption that philosophical theories of knowledge can con-
tribute to the quality of knowledge representation. In chapter 1, I provide an 
introduction to the questions discussed in this book, focusing on the role of the 
concept of knowledge in representing the legal domain.
 In chapter 2, I discuss the subject what knowledge is in accordance with 
an epistemic viewpoint. I show the differences between three dimensions of 
knowledge: its acquisition, its object, and its justification. Five acquisition sourc-
es are distinguished: perception, memory, consciousness, reason, and testimony. 
These account for the broad spectre of channels through which we can acquire 
knowledge. The object of knowledge is the domain of ontology. As properties 
within the object dimension of knowledge I name the type/token distinction 
and the kind of existence concerned. These properties cover the ways in which 
we can refer to and generalise over concrete objects. As to the justification di-
mension of knowledge, I carefully distinguish between the different meanings 
of justification: justification as a state, as a process, and as a status. Additionally, I 
explain the role of reasons and defeaters in justification. The same dimensions 
of knowledge are discussed with respect to a special class of knowledge: legal 
knowledge. 
 Furthermore, I discuss the distinction between different types of knowledge 
theories. They regard the ways in which the acquisition and justification of 
knowledge is attained. The qualification of beliefs as knowledge involves the 
establishment of knowledge criteria, and the distinction between different belief 
types. Various belief types may demand the imposition of different knowledge 
criteria. Finally, I use the phenomenon called epistemic niche to explain the situa-
tion in which legal professionals acquire knowledge.
 In chapter 3, I discuss legal knowledge from a legal-theoretical viewpoint. I 
start the chapter with a discussion of the hermeneutical stance in the theory of 
law. As an example of such a stance I discuss Dworkin’s view on knowing the 
law. In addition, I derive epistemic claims from several stances in legal philoso-
phy: natural law, legal positivism, institutional theories of law, a conventionalist-
cum-institutional approach, and hermeneutical theories. Finally, I explain what 
formal and material sources of law are, and how they can function as knowledge 
sources for the law.
 In chapter 4, I deal with the constituting entities of the legal domain, i.e., with 
the ontological characteristics of law. I give an overview of ontological claims 
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with respect to the law from different legal-theoretical stances. Furthermore, 
two objects of legal knowledge are discussed: systematisations and interpreta-
tions; moreover, the elements that are part of the reasoning process that leads 
to establishing these objects are explained. For that purpose, I discuss Toulmin’s 
seminal work on argumentation, and I give an elaborate view on reasons and 
defeaters. Subsequently, a distinction is made between different ontological sta-
tus layers. Such ontological status layers express the different modes of existence 
that we can find for objects in the legal domain. The status layers distinguished 
are: existence, validity, recognition, constitution, and efficacy. Finally, I introduce 
two basic relations that take care of the connections between different objects 
in the legal domain: counting as and causality. Counting as establishes constitu-
tion relations between objects and facts, and is thus the primary basis of insti-
tutional facts. Causality in the legal domain is very much subject to theoretical 
considerations of the question what ought to be considered as a cause for some 
phenomenon.
 Chapter 5 is devoted to the representation of legal knowledge. In this chapter, 
I discuss three subjects. The first subject is the concept of representation. Several 
representation languages are discussed, as well as demands that can be imposed 
upon a representation language for the legal domain. The second subject is the 
question how classic views on meaning can be applied to legal concepts. The 
third subject consists of legal ontologies, i.e., conceptual frameworks for the 
representation of legal knowledge. 
 In chapter 6, I introduce a knowledge-based model of the law. This model 
consists of entities, ontological status layers, epistemic roles, relations, acts and 
facts. Ontological status layers are the ontological states that an object can have. 
Epistemic roles are knowledge-related states an object may acquire. For all enti-
ties, relations etc., subtypes are distinguished. The combination of entities, rela-
tions, acts and facts with ontological status layers and epistemic roles enables the 
expression of epistemic and ontological views with respect to legal entities. 
 In chapter 7, some central notions within Dutch penal law are explained. 
This chapter serves to have sufficient knowledge about the legal domain for an 
example of the concrete application of the knowledge-based model of law. The 
questions underlying guilt and punishability, other main principles and concepts 
of penal law, and some specific articles in the domain of crimes against life are 
explained.
 In chapter 8, I use the ontology presented in chapter 6 to represent some of 
the characteristics of Dutch penal law. For this purpose, I choose the representa-
tion language Reason-Based Logic. This language is adapted to fit in with the 
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specific ontological and epistemic demands imposed on the basis of the knowl-
edge-based model of law. I indicate how the elements of the knowledge-based 
model of law should be represented in this language. Furthermore, inference 
rules regarding knowledge qualification and reasoning are introduced.
 In chapter 9, I draw conclusions, grouped as answers to the research questions 
and the problem definition. The problem definition of this thesis is: What role 
can a concept of legal knowledge, formulated from the perspective of episte-
mology, play in the representation of legal knowledge? The main conclusion is, 
that if we wish to use a concept of knowledge as the basis of an ontology of 
law, we have to define content, structure, and borders of knowledge about the 
legal domain, based on a view on the nature of law. By explaining the relation 
between knowledge of the law and the law itself, following different views on 
the nature of law, it becomes possible to provide basic categories of a model. The 
model provided allows – to a certain extent – for the accommodation of the 
epistemic and ontological commitments of different legal-theoretical positions, 
thereby bringing legal theory to the domain of legal knowledge representation.
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
224 225
ap p l i e d  l e gal  e p i st e molog y
224 225
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift gaat over de representatie van kennis van het juridische domein, 
en is gebaseerd op de vooronderstelling dat filosofische theorieën over kennis 
kunnen bijdragen aan de kwaliteit van kennisrepresentatie. In hoofdstuk 1 leid 
ik de vragen in die in dit boek besproken worden, waarbij ik de nadruk leg op 
de rol van het concept van kennis bij de representatie van het juridische do-
mein.
 In hoofdstuk 2 bespreek ik, vanuit een epistemologisch gezichtspunt, de vraag 
wat kennis is. Daarbij ga ik in op de verschillen tussen drie dimensies: de ver-
krijging, het object en de rechtvaardiging van kennis. Er worden vijf bronnen 
voor de verkrijging van kennis onderscheiden: perceptie, geheugen, bewustzijn, 
rede en getuigenis. Het object van kennis wordt onderzocht in de ontologie. 
Belangrijke onderscheidingen met betrekking tot het object van kennis zijn het 
verschil tussen type en token, en tussen verschillende vormen van bestaan. Zij 
betreffen de manieren waarop we naar concrete objecten kunnen verwijzen, 
en hoe we er algemene uitspraken over kunnen doen. De rechtvaardiging van 
kennis valt uiteen in verschillende typen: rechtvaardiging als toestand, als proces 
en als status. Daarnaast bespreek ik de rol van redenen en weerleggingen in 
rechtvaardiging. Dezelfde dimensies van kennis worden bovendien besproken 
met betrekking tot een speciale soort kennis: juridische kennis.
 In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik juridische kennis vanuit een rechtstheoretische in-
valshoek. Een toelichting op het hermeneutische standpunt in de rechtstheorie 
is aanleiding voor een nadere uitleg van Dworkin’s gezichtspunt op kennis van 
het recht. Ik geef aan welke epistemologische claims kunnen worden afgeleid 
uit verschillende rechtstheoretische perspectieven, te weten natuurrecht, rechts-
positivisme, institutionele rechtstheorie, conventioneel/institutionele rechts-
theorie en hermeneutische theorieën. Daarnaast licht ik toe wat formele en 
materiële rechtsbronnen zijn, en hoe zij kunnen fungeren als kenbronnen voor 
het recht.
 In hoofdstuk 4 ga ik in op de entiteiten die deel uitmaken van het juridisch 
domein. Daarbij geef ik een overzicht van ontologische claims met betrekking 
tot het recht vanuit verschillende rechtstheoretische gezichtspunten. Ik bespreek 
twee objecten van juridische kennis in meer detail: systematiseringen en inter-
pretaties. Dergelijke objecten zijn het resultaat van een redeneerproces. In dat 
redeneerproces zelf kunnen we bepaalde entiteiten onderscheiden. Toulmin’s 
standaardwerk over argumentatie vormt de aanzet tot een uitgebreide discussie 
van dergelijke entiteiten, zoals redenen en weerleggingen.
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 Vervolgens wordt het onderscheid geïntroduceerd tussen verschillende on-
tologische statuslagen, die uitdrukking geven aan de verschillende manieren 
waarop objecten in het juridische domein kunnen bestaan. De onderscheiden 
statuslagen zijn: bestaan, geldigheid, erkenning, constitutie en effectiviteit. In 
aanvulling op deze statuslagen zorgen twee belangrijke relaties voor de verban-
den tussen verschillende objecten in het juridische domein: gelden als (counting 
as) en causaliteit. Gelden als vestigt constitutierelaties tussen objecten en feiten, 
en vormt daardoor de belangrijkste bestaansvoorwaarde voor institutionele fei-
ten. Causaliteit in het juridische domein is sterk verbonden met de vraag wat als 
oorzaak moet worden aangemerkt voor een bepaald fenomeen.
 In hoofdstuk 5 besteed ik aandacht aan de representatie van juridische kennis. 
Ten eerste bespreek ik het concept van representatie. Verschillende representa-
tietalen komen aan de orde, naast eisen die aan een representatietaal voor het 
juridisch domein gesteld kunnen worden. Ten tweede komt de vraag naar voren 
hoe traditionele opvattingen over betekenis kunnen worden toegepast op juri-
dische concepten. Ten derde worden drie juridische ontologieën besproken. Dit 
zijn conceptuele raamwerken voor de representatie van juridische kennis.
 In hoofdstuk 6 bespreek ik het kennisgebaseerde model van het juridisch 
domein. Het model bestaat uit entiteiten, ontologische statuslagen, epistemo-
logische rollen, relaties, handelingen en feiten. Ontologische statuslagen zijn de 
verschillende manieren waarop een object kan bestaan. Epistemologische rollen 
zijn rollen die een object kan hebben met betrekking tot kennis. Voor alle ba-
siscategorieën van het model worden subtypen onderscheiden. De combinatie 
van entiteiten, relaties, handelingen en feiten met ontologische statuslagen en 
epistemologische rollen maakt het mogelijk om epistemologische en ontologi-
sche gezichtspunten uit te drukken met betrekking tot juridische entiteiten.
 In hoofdstuk 7 volgt een overzicht van enkele centrale kenmerken van het 
Nederlandse strafrecht. Dit hoofdstuk dient om voldoende kennis over het 
juridische domein weer te geven om tot een concrete toepassing van het ken-
nisgebaseerde model van het juridische domein te komen. Hierbij komen on-
der meer de vragen aan de orde waarmee de schuld en strafbaarheid van een 
verdachte worden bepaald, naast andere belangrijke principes en concepten van 
het strafrecht, en enkele specifieke artikelen met betrekking tot levensdelicten.
 In hoofdstuk 8 gebruik ik de ontologie uit hoofdstuk 6 om enkele eigen-
schappen van het Nederlandse strafrecht te representeren. Bij de representatie 
koos ik voor de representatietaal Reason-Based Logic. Deze taal wordt aange-
past om te voldoen aan de specifieke ontologische en epistemologische eisen 
die op basis van het kennisgebaseerde model worden gesteld. Ik geef aan hoe 
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de elementen van het model in deze taal kunnen worden gerepresenteerd. 
Daarnaast introduceer ik een aantal afleidingsregels voor kenniskwalificatie en 
redeneren in het algemeen. 
 In hoofdstuk 9 trek ik conclusies. Daarbij volg ik de onderzoeksvragen en de 
probleemdefinitie. De probleemdefinitie van dit proefschrift luidt: welke rol kan 
een concept van juridische kennis, geformuleerd vanuit het standpunt van de 
kenleer, spelen in de representatie van juridische kennis? De belangrijkste con-
clusie is als volgt. Als we een concept van kennis willen gebruiken als basis voor 
een ontologie van het recht, dan moeten we de inhoud, structuur en grenzen 
van kennis over het juridische domein definiëren, waarbij we ons baseren op 
een visie op de aard van het recht. Door de relatie tussen kennis van het recht 
en het recht zelf te bespreken, waarbij verschillende visies op de aard van het 
recht worden aangehouden, wordt het mogelijk om basiscategorieën van een 
model te bepalen. Het model dat in dit proefschrift wordt beschreven, laat tot 
op zekere hoogte toe dat de diverse epistemologische en ontologische claims 
van verschillende rechtstheoretische posities een plaats kunnen krijgen binnen 
één model, waardoor rechtstheorie binnen het bereik van juridische kennisre-
presentatie wordt gebracht. 
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Applied legal epistemology examines 
several practical implications of 
theoretical insights into the nature of 
legal knowledge. In this book, a small 
part of Dutch penal law is modelled, 
using a conceptual framework based 
on theoretical investigations into 
legal knowledge. Knowledge can be 
regarded with respect to three main 
dimensions: its acquisition, its object, 
and its justification. In each dimension, 
the specific characteristics of legal 
knowledge become apparent. 
Apart from a theoretical exercise into 
the nature of legal knowledge, this 
book provides opportunities for lifting 
the representation of legal knowledge 
to a higher level. Specific additional 
information on the status of represented 
knowledge can, for instance, be used 
to determine whether it is sufficiently 
justified. It may thus prove relevant 
for the legal-philosophically inclined 
as well as for those putting their effort 
into building legal knowledge-based 
systems.
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